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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or
36.1%. Per-
share book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because
the number of
Berkshire shares increased: We issued stock in acquiring
FlightSafety
International and also sold new Class B shares.* Over the
last 32 years
(that is, since present management took over) per-share
book value has
grown from $19 to $19,011, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded
annually.
1996年本公司的净值成长了36.1%，约62亿美元，不过每股净值仅成长了31.8%，
原因在于去年我们以发行新股的方式并购了国际飞安公司，同时另外还追加发行了一
些B级普通股*，总计过去32年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值
由当初的19元成长到现在的19,011美元，年复合成长率约为23.8%。
* Each Class B share has an economic interest equal to
1/30th of
that possessed by a Class A share, which is the new designation
for
the only stock that Berkshire had outstanding before May
1996.
Throughout this report, we state all per-share figures
in terms of
"Class A equivalents," which are the sum of the
Class A shares
outstanding and 1/30th of the Class B shares outstanding.
* B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利，这是从1996年五月开始Berkshire新增的股份类
型，在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，亦即全部流通在外的A级普通股数加上
流通在外的B级普通股数的三十分之一。
For technical reasons, we have restated our 1995 financial
statements, a matter that requires me to present one of
my less-than-
thrilling explanations of accounting arcana. I'll make
it brief.
基于技术性原因，我们必须将1995年的财务报表予以重编，这使我能够再度展现令
人震摄的会计密技，相信我，我会试着长话短说。
The restatement was required because GEICO became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Berkshire on January 2, 1996, whereas it
was previously
classified as an investment. From an economic viewpoint
- taking into
account major tax efficiencies and other benefits we gained
- the value
of the 51% of GEICO we owned at year-end 1995 increased
significantly
when we acquired the remaining 49% of the company two days
later.
Accounting rules applicable to this type of "step
acquisition," however,
required us to write down the value of our 51% at the time
we moved to
100%. That writedown - which also, of course, reduced book
value -
amounted to $478.4 million. As a result, we now carry our
original 51%
of GEICO at a value that is both lower than its market
value at the time
we purchased the remaining 49% of the company and lower
than the value at
which we carry that 49% itself.
重编的原因是因为原先被列为被投资的GEICO保险在1996年1月2日正式成为
Berkshire 100%持有的子公司，从经济观点来看，考量可观的租税优惠与其它优点，
我们原先在1995年底持有的51%的GEICO股权，其价值在二天后我们取得剩余49%
股权之后大幅增加，然而对于这种渐进式购并，一般公认会计原则却要求我们必须在
取得100%股权时，将原因帐上51%的成本反向予以调减，使得账面价值减少为4.784
亿美元，这结果使得原来51%股权的账面价值不但远低于后来49%股权的取得市价，
也低于我们持有后来这49%股权的账面价值。
There is an offset, however, to the reduction in book value
I have
just described: Twice during 1996 we issued Berkshire shares
at a
premium to book value, first in May when we sold the B
shares for cash
and again in December when we used both A and B shares
as part-payment
for FlightSafety. In total, the three non-operational items
affecting
book value contributed less than one percentage point to
our 31.8% per-
share gain last year.
不过除了刚刚提到净值的减少之外，我们在1996年两度溢价发行股份，第一次是在
五月办理现金增资发行B级普通股，第二次是在十二月发行A级与B级普通股，以购
并国际飞安公司，总的来说，以上三项非营业项目对于去年本公司31.8%的每股净值
成长率的净影响还不到1%。
I dwell on this rise in per-share book value because it
roughly
indicates our economic progress during the year. But, as
Charlie Munger,
Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have repeatedly told you,
what counts at
Berkshire is intrinsic value, not book value. The last
time you got that
message from us was in the Owner's Manual, sent to you
in June after we
issued the Class B shares. In that manual, we not only
defined certain
key terms - such as intrinsic value - but also set forth
our economic
principles.
今年我之所以一再强调每股净值，原因在于它大约就等于我们在去年的实质进展，不
过就像是查理跟我一再提醒各位的，对Berkshire来说，真正重要的不是账面价值，
而是实质价值，最近一次跟各位提到是在今年六月本公司发行B级普通股时，在送给
各位的股东手册当中，我们不但对于一些名词予以定义，诸如实质价值等，同时也揭
露了我们的企业宗旨。
For many years, we have listed these principles in the
front of our
annual report, but in this report, on pages 58 to 67, we
reproduce the
entire Owner's Manual. In this letter, we will occasionally
refer to the
manual so that we can avoid repeating certain definitions
and
explanations. For example, if you wish to brush up on "intrinsic
value,"
see pages 64 and 65.
多年来，我们在年报前头揭示这些宗旨，在这里我们偶尔也会提到股东手册，这样我
们就可以不必再重复解释一些常用的名词，比如说如果你想要了解一下什么叫实质价
值，建议大家可以再翻翻那本手册的第64、65页。
Last year, for the first time, we supplied you with a table
that
Charlie and I believe will help anyone trying to estimate
Berkshire's
intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table,
which follows, we
trace two key indices of value. The first column lists
our per-share
ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents)
and the second
column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating
businesses
before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments but after
all interest
and corporate overhead expenses. The operating-earnings
column excludes
all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized
from the
investments presented in the first column. In effect, the
two columns
show what Berkshire would have reported had it been broken
into two parts.
从去年开始我们首度提供给各位一张查理跟我本人认为可以帮助大家估计Berkshire
公司实质价值的表格，在下面这张经过更新资料的表上，我们可以发现到两项与价值
相关的重要指标，第一栏是我们平均每股持有的投资金额(包含现金与约当现金)，第
二栏则是每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，来自本业的营业利益(但未扣除所得税与购
买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、利息
收入与资本利得，事实上，若是把Berkshire拆成两部份的话，这两栏数字将分别代
表这两个部门的损益绩效。
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share
Investments Excluding All Income from
Year Per Share Investments
---- ----------- -------------------------
1965................................$ 4 $ 4.08
1975................................ 159 (6.48)
1985................................ 2,443 18.86
1995................................ 22,088 258.20
1996................................ 28,500 421.39
Annual Growth Rate, 1965-95......... 33.4% 14.7%
One-Year Growth Rate, 1995-96 ...... 29.0% 63.2%
As the table tells you, our investments per share increased
in 1996
by 29.0% and our non-investment earnings grew by 63.2%.
Our goal is to
keep the numbers in both columns moving ahead at a reasonable
(or, better
yet, unreasonable) pace.
从这张表大家可以看出，我们1996年的每股投资金额增加了29%，而非投资的本业
盈余则增加了63.2%，我们的目标是让这两栏的数字以合理的速度稳定地成长，当然
若是偶尔能以不合理的速度暴增也不错。
Our expectations, however, are tempered by two realities.
First,
our past rates of growth cannot be matched nor even approached:
Berkshire's equity capital is now large - in fact, fewer
than ten
businesses in America have capital larger - and an abundance
of funds
tends to dampen returns. Second, whatever our rate of progress,
it will
not be smooth: Year-to-year moves in the first column of
the table above
will be influenced in a major way by fluctuations in securities
markets;
the figures in the second column will be affected by wide
swings in the
profitability of our catastrophe-reinsurance business.
不过这样的预期可能会受到两项现实的因素所干扰，首先，我们很难再达到或接近过
去那样高的成长速度，原因在于Berkshire现在的资本规模实在是太庞大了，事实上
以我们现在的资本规模已经可以排在全美企业的前十名，过多的浮滥资金一定会影响
到整体的报酬率，第二点，不管成长的速度如何，铁定很难以平稳的速度增加，第一
栏的数字将很容易随着股市大环境上下波动，第二栏的数字则会跟着超级灾害再保业
务获利的不稳定变动而变化。
In the table, the donations made pursuant to our shareholder-
designated contributions program are charged against the
second column,
though we view them as a shareholder benefit rather than
as an expense.
All other corporate expenses are also charged against the
second column.
These costs may be lower than those of any other large
American
corporation: Our after-tax headquarters expense amounts
to less than two
basis points (1/50th of 1%) measured against net worth.
Even so, Charlie
used to think this expense percentage outrageously high,
blaming it on my
use of Berkshire's corporate jet, The Indefensible. But
Charlie has
recently experienced a "counter-revelation":
With our purchase of
FlightSafety, whose major activity is the training of corporate
pilots,
he now rhapsodizes at the mere mention of jets.
在这张表中，股东指定捐赠的款项被列为第二栏的减项，虽然我们将之视为股东的福
利而非支出，企业其它的支出同样也被放在第二栏当作减项，这些开支远低于其它美
国大企业的平均水准，每年我们企业总部的费用占净值的比率大约不到万分之五，即
便如此查理还是认为这样的比率高得离谱，我想主要要怪罪于我个人所使用的
Berkshire企业专机-无可辩解号，不过最近在我们买下国际飞安-这家专门负责训练
飞行的公司之后，查理的态度有了180度的转变，现在只要一提到飞机他就狂乐不
已。
Seriously, costs matter. For example, equity mutual funds
incur
corporate expenses - largely payments to the funds' managers
- that
average about 100 basis points, a levy likely to cut the
returns their
investors earn by 10% or more over time. Charlie and I
make no promises
about Berkshire's results. We do promise you, however,
that virtually
all of the gains Berkshire makes will end up with shareholders.
We are
here to make money with you, not off you.
认真的说，控制成本开支绝对重要，举例来说很多共同基金每年的营业费用大多在
2%上下，这等于间接剥削了投资人将近10%的投资报酬，虽然查理跟我不敢向各位
保证我们的投资绩效，但我们却可以向各位打包票，Berkshire所赚的每一分钱一定
会分文不差地落入股东的口袋里，我们是来帮各位赚钱，而不是帮各位花钱的。
The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price
实质价值与股票市价的关系
In last year's letter, with Berkshire shares selling at
$36,000, I
told you: (1) Berkshire's gain in market value in recent
years had
outstripped its gain in intrinsic value, even though the
latter gain had
been highly satisfactory; (2) that kind of overperformance
could not
continue indefinitely; (3) Charlie and I did not at that
moment consider
Berkshire to be undervalued.
去年当Berkshire的股价约在36,000美元时，我曾向各位报告过(1)Berkshire这几
年的股价表现远超越实质价值，虽然后者的成长幅度也相当令人满意，(2)这样的情况
不可能无限制地持续下去，(3)查理跟我不认为当时Berkshire的价值有被低估的可能
性。
Since I set down those cautions, Berkshire's intrinsic
value has
increased very significantly - aided in a major way by
a stunning
performance at GEICO that I will tell you more about later
- while the
market price of our shares has changed little. This, of
course, means
that in 1996 Berkshire's stock underperformed the business.
Consequently, today's price/value relationship is both
much different
from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it,
more
appropriate.
自从我下了这些批注之后，Berkshire的实质价值又大幅地增加了，主要的原因在于
GEICO惊人的表现，(关于这点在后面还会向大家详细报告)，而在此同时Berkshire
的股价却维持不动，这代表在1996年Berkshire的实质价值表现优于股价，也就是
说，在今日Berkshire的价格/价值比比起一年以前而言，又有很大的不同，这同时
也是查理跟我认为比较合理的情况。
Over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders
must
of necessity match the business gains of the company. When
the stock
temporarily overperforms or underperforms the business,
a limited number
of shareholders - either sellers or buyers - receive outsized
benefits at
the expense of those they trade with. Generally, the sophisticated
have
an edge over the innocents in this game.
就长期而言，Berkshire股东的整体利得一定会与企业经营的获利一致，当公司股价
的表现暂时优于或劣于企业经营时，少部份的股东-不管是买进的人或是卖出的人，
将会因为做出这样的举动而从交易的对方身上占到一些便宜，通常来说，都是老经验
的一方在这场游戏中占上风。
Though our primary goal is to maximize the amount that
our
shareholders, in total, reap from their ownership of Berkshire,
we wish
also to minimize the benefits going to some shareholders
at the expense
of others. These are goals we would have were we managing
a family
partnership, and we believe they make equal sense for the
manager of a
public company. In a partnership, fairness requires that
partnership
interests be valued equitably when partners enter or exit;
in a public
company, fairness prevails when market price and intrinsic
value are in
sync. Obviously, they won't always meet that ideal, but
a manager - by
his policies and communications - can do much to foster
equity.
虽然我们主要的目标是希望让Berkshire的股东经由持有公司所有权所获得的利益极
大化，但在此同时我们也期望能让一些股东从其它股东身上所占到的便宜能够极小
化，我想这是一般人在经营家族企业时相当重视的，不过我们相信这也适用在上市公
司的经营之上，对合伙企业来说，合伙权益在合伙人加入或退出时必须能够以合理的
方式评量，才能维持公平，同样地，对于上市公司来说，惟有让公司的股价与实质价
值一致，公司股东的公平性才得以维持，当然很明显，这样理想的情况很难一直维持，
不过身为公司经理人可以透过其政策与沟通的方式来大力维持这样的公平性。
Of course, the longer a shareholder holds his shares, the
more
bearing Berkshire's business results will have on his financial
experience - and the less it will matter what premium or
discount to
intrinsic value prevails when he buys and sells his stock.
That's one
reason we hope to attract owners with long-term horizons.
Overall, I
think we have succeeded in that pursuit. Berkshire probably
ranks number
one among large American corporations in the percentage
of its shares
held by owners with a long-term view.
当然股东持有股份的时间越长，那么Berkshire本身的表现与他的投资经验就会越接
近，而他买进或卖出股份时的价格相较于实质价值是折价或溢价的影响程度也就越
小，这也是为什么我们希望能够吸引具有长期投资意愿的股东加入的原因之一，总的
来说，我认为就这点而言，我们算是做的相当成功，Berkshire大概是所有美国大企
业中拥有最多具长期投资观点股东的公司。
Acquisitions of 1996
1996年的并购案
We made two acquisitions in 1996, both possessing exactly
the
qualities we seek - excellent business economics and an
outstanding
manager.
我们在1996年进行了两件并购案，两者皆拥有我们想要的特质-那就是绝佳的竞争
优势与优秀的经理人。
The first acquisition was Kansas Bankers Surety (KBS),
an insurance
company whose name describes its specialty. The company,
which does
business in 22 states, has an extraordinary underwriting
record, achieved
through the efforts of Don Towle, an extraordinary manager.
Don has
developed first-hand relationships with hundreds of bankers
and knows
every detail of his operation. He thinks of himself as
running a company
that is "his," an attitude we treasure at Berkshire.
Because of its
relatively small size, we placed KBS with Wesco, our 80%-owned
subsidiary, which has wanted to expand its insurance operations.
第一桩购并案是堪萨斯银行家保险-从字面上可知，这是一家专门提供银行业者保险
的保险公司，在全美22个州从事相关业务，拥有相当不错的承保记录，全仰赖Don
Towle这位杰出的经理人的努力，Don与上百位银行家皆保持良好的关系，而且也了
解他所从事业务的每一项细节，那种感觉就好像是在经营"自己"的事业一样，这种精
神是Berkshire最欣赏的，由于它的规模不太大，同时正好Berkshire 持有80%股
权的Wesco有意拓展保险事业，所以我们决定把它摆在Wesco之下成为其子公司。
You might be interested in the carefully-crafted and sophisticated
acquisition strategy that allowed Berkshire to nab this
deal. Early in
1996 I was invited to the 40th birthday party of my nephew's
wife, Jane
Rogers. My taste for social events being low, I immediately,
and in my
standard, gracious way, began to invent reasons for skipping
the event.
The party planners then countered brilliantly by offering
me a seat next
to a man I always enjoy, Jane's dad, Roy Dinsdale - so
I went.
大家或许会对我们这次精心设计的购并计划感到兴趣，在1996年初我受邀参加侄媳
妇Jane 40岁的生日宴会，由于我个人对于社交活动通常不太感兴趣，所以很自然地
我按照惯例想出许多理由以婉拒这项邀请，不过对方显然有备而来，特别将我安排在
另外一位我极有兴趣打交道的对象-Roy Dinsdale也就是Jane的父亲，此举使得我
无法拒绝而欣然赴会。
The party took place on January 26. Though the music was
loud - Why
must bands play as if they will be paid by the decibel?
- I just managed
to hear Roy say he'd come from a directors meeting at Kansas
Bankers
Surety, a company I'd always admired. I shouted back that
he should let
me know if it ever became available for purchase.
生日宴会在1月26日举行，虽然当时现场音乐震耳欲聋(我实在搞不懂为何乐队总是
要弹得那么大声，难道他们的出场费是按照分贝数计算的吗?)，不过我还是听到Roy
说他刚参加完堪萨斯银行家保险的董事会，这是我一直相当欣赏的一家公司，我大声
地响应他说，如果这家公司有意出售的话，记得一定要通知我。
On February 12, I got the following letter from Roy: "Dear
Warren:
Enclosed is the annual financial information on Kansas
Bankers Surety.
This is the company that we talked about at Janie's party.
If I can be
of any further help, please let me know." On February
13, I told Roy we
would pay $75 million for the company - and before long
we had a deal.
I'm now scheming to get invited to Jane's next party.
2月12日我收到一封Roy的来函，上面写到：亲爱的华伦，随函附送一份堪萨斯银
行家保险的年度财务报表，就是上次在Janie的生日宴会上提到的那一家公司，如果
你有任何需要，请务必让我知道。2月13日，我告诉Roy愿意出7,500万美元买下
这家公司，不久之后，整个交易就搞定，现在的我正盘算明年还要再参加Jane的生
日宴会。
Our other acquisition in 1996 - FlightSafety International,
the
world's leader in the training of pilots - was far larger,
at about $1.5
billion, but had an equally serendipitous origin. The heroes
of this
story are first, Richard Sercer, a Tucson aviation consultant,
and
second, his wife, Alma Murphy, an ophthalmology graduate
of Harvard
Medical School, who in 1990 wore down her husband's reluctance
and got
him to buy Berkshire stock. Since then, the two have attended
all our
Annual Meetings, but I didn't get to know them personally.
1996年发生的另一件购并案，全世界最大的飞行员训练公司-国际飞安公司，其规
模比起前一个案子要大得多了，总金额高达15亿美元，不过这个案子发生的过程一
样充满戏剧性，本案的功臣首推Richard Sercer-他是塔克森市的飞行顾问，当然还
要归功于他的妻子-Alma Murphy，哈佛医学院眼科学系毕业的她好不容易在1990
年说服她的丈夫买进Berkshire的股份，而且在那之后每年都到奥玛哈参加我们的股
东会，只是我一直没有机会与他们认识。
Fortunately, Richard had also been a long-time shareholder
of
FlightSafety, and it occurred to him last year that the
two companies
would make a good fit. He knew our acquisition criteria,
and he thought
that Al Ueltschi, FlightSafety's 79-year-old CEO, might
want to make a
deal that would both give him a home for his company and
a security in
payment that he would feel comfortable owning throughout
his lifetime.
So in July, Richard wrote Bob Denham, CEO of Salomon Inc,
suggesting that
he explore the possibility of a merger.
碰巧的是，Richard同时也是国际飞安公司长期投资的股东，刚好在去年他认为这两
家公司应该有机会可以做一个结合，他相当了解Berkshire购并公司的标准，同时也
知道国际飞安79岁的总裁-Al Ueltschi想要为自己的公司找一个理想的归宿，以为
自己的股权找到一层保障，所以就在七月份，Richard写信给所罗门公司的总裁-Bob
Denham请他研究这项合并交易的可能性。
Bob took it from there, and on September 18, Al and I met
in New
York. I had long been familiar with FlightSafety's business,
and in
about 60 seconds I knew that Al was exactly our kind of
manager. A month
later, we had a contract. Because Charlie and I wished
to minimize the
issuance of Berkshire shares, the transaction we structured
gave
FlightSafety shareholders a choice of cash or stock but
carried terms
that encouraged those who were tax-indifferent to take
cash. This nudge
led to about 51% of FlightSafety's shares being exchanged
for cash, 41%
for Berkshire A and 8% for Berkshire B.
Bob于是接手进行这个案子，在9月18日我和Al正式在纽约碰面，我对国际飞安
这家公司的经营状况本来就相当熟悉，而在60秒内我马上就知道Al正是符合我们类
型的经理人，一个月后，合约正式敲定，由于查理跟我希望能够尽量避免再发行
Berkshire的新股份，所以在这项交易中，虽然我们提供国际飞安原股东换取股票或
现金两种选择，但是交易条件等于间接鼓励这些税负没有太大差异的股东选择领取现
金，结果总计最后有51%的股份领取现金，41%换得Berkshire A级普通股，另外
8%换得Berkshire B级普通股。
Al has had a lifelong love affair with aviation and actually
piloted
Charles Lindbergh. After a barnstorming career in the 1930s,
he began
working for Juan Trippe, Pan Am's legendary chief. In 1951,
while still
at Pan Am, Al founded FlightSafety, subsequently building
it into a
simulator manufacturer and a worldwide trainer of pilots
(single-engine,
helicopter, jet and marine). The company operates in 41
locations,
outfitted with 175 simulators of planes ranging from the
very small, such
as Cessna 210s, to Boeing 747s. Simulators are not cheap
- they can cost
as much as $19 million - so this business, unlike many
of our
operations, is capital intensive. About half of the company's
revenues
are derived from the training of corporate pilots, with
most of the
balance coming from airlines and the military.
Al 一生热爱飞行，曾经驾驶过查理林登号，在经过1930年代轰轰烈烈的飞行事业
之后，他开始担任泛美航空的机长，之后并在1951年创立国际飞安公司，将这家公
司塑造成飞行仿真器制造与飞行员训练的世界级领导公司(单引擎、直升机、客机与水
上飞机)，营业据点遍布41个地方，拥有175座的飞行仿真器，大至波音747客机，
小到Cessna 210型小飞机，大家要知道飞行仿真器的造价可不便宜，有的要价甚至
高达1,900万美金，所以这一行不像我们原来拥有的其它事业，算是相当资本密集
的，该公司大约有一半的营业收入来自于训练飞行员的收入，其余则来自于航空公司
与军事单位。
Al may be 79, but he looks and acts about 55. He will run
operations just as he has in the past: We never fool with
success. I
have told him that though we don't believe in splitting
Berkshire stock,
we will split his age 2-for-1 when he hits 100.
Al 今年虽然已经79岁，不过外表举止看起来像55岁，他将一如往常继续经营这家
公司，我们从来不会把成功搞混，我甚至跟他开玩笑说，虽然我们从没想过将
Berkshire的股份予以分割，不过等他满100岁时，我们倒是可以考虑把他的年纪一
分为二。
An observer might conclude from our hiring practices that
Charlie
and I were traumatized early in life by an EEOC bulletin
on age
discrimination. The real explanation, however, is self-interest:
It's
difficult to teach a new dog old tricks. The many Berkshire
managers who
are past 70 hit home runs today at the same pace that long
ago gave them
reputations as young slugging sensations. Therefore, to
get a job with
us, just employ the tactic of the 76-year-old who persuaded
a dazzling
beauty of 25 to marry him. "How did you ever get her
to accept?" asked
his envious contemporaries. The comeback: "I told
her I was 86."
有人可能会怀疑我们现在雇用人的政策，可能是缘于早期年龄歧视政策所受到的创
伤，其实真正的原因乃是出于自私的观点，因为我们认为实在是很难教新狗老把戏！
在Berkshire，许多经理人虽然已经年过70，但是他们还是像年轻时一样活跃，频频
击出全垒打，所以如果各位有意到本公司谋得一职，请记得运用一位高龄76岁老翁
如何追到25岁年轻辣妹的技巧，当同年龄的同伴很钦羡地问他：你到底是如何说服
对方同意的呢?? 他回答到：很简单，我告诉她我今年86岁!
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now we pause for our usual commercial: If you own a
large
business with good economic characteristics and wish to
become associated
with an exceptional collection of businesses having similar
characteristics, Berkshire may well be the home you seek.
Our
requirements are set forth on page 21. If your company
meets them - and
if I fail to make the next birthday party you attend -
give me a call.
接下来休息一下，顺便做点广告，如果你拥有具极佳竞争优势的大企业同时想要与拥
有同样特质的企业群为伍的话，Berkshire可以提供你绝佳的归宿，我们的要求条件
详如附件，若是你的公司符合这些条件，而我又没能来得及参加你的生日派对，记得
打电话给我。
Insurance Operations - Overview
保险事业盈余-总检讨
Our insurance business was terrific in 1996. In both primary
insurance, where GEICO is our main unit, and in our "super-cat"
reinsurance business, results were outstanding.
在1996年，我们保险事业的营运大放异彩，不管是初级保险-其中以GEICO车险为
主，或者是霹雳猫再保业务的表现都很杰出。
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our
insurance
business is, first, the amount of "float" we
generate and, second, its
cost to us. These are matters that are important for you
to understand
because float is a major component of Berkshire's intrinsic
value that is
not reflected in book value.
就像是在过去年报中一再跟各位解释的，对于我们的保险事业来说，真正重要的，第
一是我们因此取得的保险浮存金，第二就是取得它的成本，这两点相当的重要，大家
必须了解浮存金虽然不会反应在公司净值之上，但却是Berkshire实质价值构成的关
键因素之一。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In
an
insurance operation, float arises because premiums are
received before
losses are paid. Secondly, the premiums that an insurer
takes in
typically do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually
must pay.
That leaves it running an "underwriting loss,"
which is the cost of
float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float
over time is
less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to
obtain funds.
But the business is an albatross if the cost of its float
is higher than
market rates for money.
更进一步说，浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮
存金的产生原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，
而通常保险业者收取的保费不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，于是保险公
司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当浮存金成本长期而言低于从其它管
道取得资金的成本时，保险公司就有存在的价值，不过保险事业取得浮存金的成本若
远高于资金市场利率时，它就像是一只在陆地上笨重的信天翁。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's
insurance
business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have
calculated our
float - which we generate in large amounts relative to
our premium
volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves,
funds held
under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves,
and then
subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs,
prepaid taxes
and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance.
Our cost of
float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit.
In those years
when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last
four, our cost
of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid
for holding
money.
不过如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业可说是大获全胜，表中的浮
存金，系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣
金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金
部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而定，在某
些年度，就像是最近四年，由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚
至是负的，光是持有这些资金我们就已经开始赚钱了。
(1) (2) 9; Yearend Yield
Underwriting #9; Approximat on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ------------- ---------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) ; (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967.......... profit 17.3 less than zero 9; 5.50%
1968.......... profit 19.9 less than zero 9; 5.90%
1969.......... profit 23.4 less than zero 9; 6.79%
1970.......... 9; 0.37 32.4 1.14% 9; 6.25%
1971.......... profit 52.5 less than zero 9; 5.81%
1972.......... profit 69.5 less than zero 9; 5.82%
1973.......... profit 73.3 less than zero 9; 7.27%
1974.......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 9; 8.13%
1975.......... #9; 11.35 87.6 12.96% 9; 8.03%
1976.......... profit 102.6 less than zero 9; 7.30%
1977.......... profit 139.0 less than zero 9; 7.97%
1978.......... profit 190.4 less than zero 9; 8.93%
1979.......... profit 227.3 less than zero #9; 10.08%
1980.......... profit 237.0 less than zero #9; 11.94%
1981.......... profit 228.4 less than zero #9; 13.61%
1982.......... #9; 21.56 220.6 9.77% #9; 10.64%
1983.......... #9; 33.87 231.3 14.64% #9; 11.84%
1984.......... #9; 48.06 253.2 18.98% #9; 11.58%
1985.......... #9; 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9; 9.34%
1986.......... #9; 55.84 797.5 7.00% 9; 7.60%
1987.......... #9; 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 9; 8.95%
1988.......... #9; 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989.......... #9; 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 9; 7.97%
1990.......... #9; 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 9; 8.24%
1991.......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 9; 7.40%
1992.......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 9; 7.39%
1993.......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 9; 6.35%
1994.......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 9; 7.88%
1995.......... profit 3,607.2 less than zero 9; 5.95%
1996.......... profit 6,702.0 less than zero 9; 6.64%
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our
float has
grown at an annual compounded rate of 22.3%. In more years
than not, our
cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to
"free" money has
boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way. Moreover,
our acquisition
of GEICO materially increases the probability that we can
continue to
obtain "free" funds in increasing amounts.
自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年以22.3%复合成长率增加，大
部分的年度，我们的资金成本都在零以下，受惠于这些免费的资金，大大地帮助
Berkshire的绩效提升。更甚者，在完成对GEICO的并购之后，我们取得免费资金的
成长速度又加快了许多。
Super-Cat Insurance
霹雳猫保险业务
As in the past three years, we once again stress that the
good results
we are reporting for Berkshire stem in part from our super-cat
business
having a lucky year. In this operation, we sell policies
that insurance
and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from
the effects of
mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes are rare
occurrences,
our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits
in most years
- and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words,
the
attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great
many years to
measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly
terrible year
in the super-cat business is not a possibility - it's a
certainty. The
only question is when it will come.
与过去三年一样，我们再次强调今年Berkshire保险事业之所以能够有这么好的成
绩，部份的原因要归功于霹雳猫业务又渡过幸运的一年，从事这类业务，我们出售保
单给保险公司与再保公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正
重大的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，才突然
发生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年
才有办法看得清，不过大家必须明了，所谓的重大损失的年头不是可能会发生，而是
肯定会发生，唯一的问题是它什么时候会降临。
I emphasize this lugubrious point because I would not want
you to
panic and sell your Berkshire stock upon hearing that some
large
catastrophe had cost us a significant amount. If you would
tend to react
that way, you should not own Berkshire shares now, just
as you should
entirely avoid owning stocks if a crashing market would
lead you to panic
and sell. Selling fine businesses on "scary"
news is usually a bad
decision. (Robert Woodruff, the business genius who built
Coca-Cola over
many decades and who owned a huge position in the company,
was once
asked when it might be a good time to sell Coke stock. Woodruff
had a
simple answer: "I don't know. I've never sold any.")
我之所以会把丑话说在前头，是因为我不希望大家那天突然听到Berkshire因为某某
大型意外灾害须理赔一大笔钱时，恐慌地抛售手中的持股，而如果届时你真的会有这
种反应，那么你根本就不应该拥有本公司的股份，就像是如果你是那种碰到股市崩
盘，会恐慌性的抛售手中股票的人，我建议你最好不要投资股票，听到坏消息而把手
中的好股票卖掉通常不会是一个明智的决定，(数十年前创办可口可乐的天才企业家
-Robert Woodruff曾经被问到，什么情况下是出售可口可乐股票的好时机，
Woodruff简短的回答到，我不知道，我从来就没有卖过!)。
In our super-cat operation, our customers are insurers
that are
exposed to major earnings volatility and that wish to reduce
it. The
product we sell - for what we hope is an appropriate price
- is our
willingness to shift that volatility to our own books.
Gyrations in
Berkshire's earnings don't bother us in the least: Charlie
and I would
much rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%.
(After all, our
earnings swing wildly on a daily and weekly basis - why
should we demand
that smoothness accompany each orbit that the earth makes
of the sun?)
We are most comfortable with that thinking, however, when
we have
shareholder/partners who can also accept volatility, and
that's why we
regularly repeat our cautions.
谈到霹雳猫保险业务，我们的客户主要是一些想要降低本身必须承担盈余变动剧烈风
险的保险公司，而我们贩卖的产品-当然一定要以合理的价格，将这些盈余变动的风
险转移到本公司的帐上，因为我们对于Berkshire公司盈余剧烈的变动一点都不会介
意，查理跟我宁可接受上下变动但平均可达15%的结果，也不要平稳的12%，(就像
是我们知道公司的盈余每天、每周都会变动，那么我们又何必强求公司的盈余变化一
定要跟地球环绕太阳轨道的时间一致呢?) 我想如果Berkshire的股东合伙人也能有
这样的看法，那么我们执行业务时便能更得心应手，而这也是为什么我们要一再提出
相同警告的原因。
We took on some major super-cat exposures during 1996.
At mid-year
we wrote a contract with Allstate that covers Florida hurricanes,
and though
there are no definitive records that would allow us to
prove this point, we
believe that to have then been the largest single catastrophe
risk ever
assumed by one company for its own account. Later in the
year, however, we
wrote a policy for the California Earthquake Authority
that goes into
effect on April 1, 1997, and that exposes us to a loss
more than twice that
possible under the Florida contract. Again we retained
all the risk for
our own account. Large as these coverages are, Berkshire's
after-tax
"worst-case" loss from a true mega-catastrophe
is probably no more than
$600 million, which is less than 3% of our book value and
1.5% of our market
value. To gain some perspective on this exposure, look
at the table on
page 2 and note the much greater volatility that security
markets have
delivered us.
我们在1996年陆续接了好几件大业务，在年中我们与全美保险签约承保佛罗里达飓
风险，虽然没有确切的数据可供左证，但我们相信这应该是单一公司独力承受单一风
险的最高记录，接着到年底，我们又与加州地震局签约承保比佛罗里达飓风高出一倍
的理赔上限，保单预计从1997年4月1日开始生效，再一次我们独立承揽所有的风
险，虽然承保的金额相当庞大，但是即使在最坏的状况下，任何一件大型灾害的税后
损失也不会超过六亿美元，大约不到Berkshire净值的3%或市值的1.5%，大家要了
解这类风险的影响性，比起年报第二页所示的股票市场变动对我们的影响性来说，前
者可谓是小巫见大巫。
In the super-cat business, we have three major competitive
advantages.
First, the parties buying reinsurance from us know that
we both can and
will pay under the most adverse of circumstances. Were
a truly cataclysmic
disaster to occur, it is not impossible that a financial
panic would
quickly follow. If that happened, there could well be respected
reinsurers
that would have difficulty paying at just the moment that
their clients
faced extraordinary needs. Indeed, one reason we never
"lay off" part of
the risks we insure is that we have reservations about
our ability to
collect from others when disaster strikes. When it's Berkshire
promising,
insureds know with certainty that they can collect promptly.
在霹雳猫保险业务，我们主要有三项竞争优势，首先向我们投保再保险的客户都知道
我们有能力，也会在最糟糕的情况下履约付款，因为万一真的发生什么样的大灾难，
很难保证金融恐慌就不会接踵而至，届时在其客户最需要援助时，可能连一些原本享
有盛誉的再保公司都拿不出钱来，而事实上我们之所以从来不将风险再转嫁出去的一
个原因也是因为我们对于灾难发生时，其它保险公司能否顺利支付赔款的能力有所保
留，反之只要是Berkshire做出的保证，所有的保户都可以百分之百确定一定可以立
即得到理赔。
Our second advantage - somewhat related - is subtle but
important.
After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult
to obtain
reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then
be particularly
great. At such a time, Berkshire would without question
have very
substantial capacity available - but it will naturally
be our long-standing
clients that have first call on it. That business reality
has made major
insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the
desirability of
doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting
sizable "stand-
by" fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down
their ability to get
coverage from us should the market tighten.
我们的第二项优势，跟第一项有点关联，虽然不显著但却相当重要，当一件大灾害发
生后，保险公司最迫切需要重新办理投保时，可能会发现很难再找到新保单，在这个
时候，Berkshire保证绝对可以提供任何服务，当然我们会优先受理原来与我们有长
期往来的客户，这个经验已经使得全世界的保险公司与再保公司了解与我们维持往来
的必要性，事实上，我们现在正从许多再保公司那里收取预备准备费，以防万一市场
情况紧绷时，他们可以确保取得再保的优先机会。
Our final competitive advantage is that we can provide
dollar
coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere
in the
industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a
single call to
Berkshire will produce a firm and immediate offering.
我们拥有的最后一项优势是我们能够提供别处得不到单一最高的投保上限，保险业者
都知道只要打一通电话到Berkshire，就可以立即得到确定满意的答复。
A few facts about our exposure to California earthquakes
- our largest
risk - seem in order. The Northridge quake of 1994 laid
homeowners' losses
on insurers that greatly exceeded what computer models
had told them to
expect. Yet the intensity of that quake was mild compared
to the "worst-
case" possibility for California. Understandably,
insurers became - ahem -
shaken and started contemplating a retreat from writing
earthquake coverage
into their homeowners' policies.
有关加州大地震方面有几点需要在这里做说明，因为这是我们最大的风险部位所在，
1994年发生的北岭大地震使得保险业的住宅保险损失远超过计算机所估算的预期范
围，不过这次地震的震度比起预估可能的最坏情况，最还算是相对轻微的，所以可想
而知某些保险业者肯定都吓坏了，因此开始考虑将地震险从他们的住宅险保单条款中
撤掉。
In a thoughtful response, Chuck Quackenbush, California's
insurance
commissioner, designed a new residential earthquake policy
to be written by
a state-sponsored insurer, The California Earthquake Authority.
This
entity, which went into operation on December 1, 1996,
needed large layers
of reinsurance - and that's where we came in. Berkshire's
layer of
approximately $1 billion will be called upon if the Authority's
aggregate
losses in the period ending March 31, 2001 exceed about
$5 billion. (The
press originally reported larger figures, but these would
have applied only
if all California insurers had entered into the arrangement;
instead only
72% signed up.)
深富远见的加州保险委员会委员Chuch Quackenbush立即规划出一张由加州地震
局背后支持新的住宅地震保单，然而这项预计从1996年12月1日开始正式生效的
措施极需要再保险的庇护，这时候就轮到我们上场了，Berkshire总共提供10亿美
元的再保险防护，当地震局在2001年3月31日之前因地震发生的损失超过50亿
美元时，(媒体原先报导的数字比这更高，不过那是在所有保险业者都一同加入时的情
况，总计最后只有72%的业者参与签约)。
So what are the true odds of our having to make a payout
during the
policy's term? We don't know - nor do we think computer
models will help
us, since we believe the precision they project is a chimera.
In fact,
such models can lull decision-makers into a false sense
of security and
thereby increase their chances of making a really huge
mistake. We've
already seen such debacles in both insurance and investments.
Witness
"portfolio insurance," whose destructive effects
in the 1987 market crash
led one wag to observe that it was the computers that should
have been
jumping out of windows.
大家一定会问在保单有效期间我们最后真正必须支付理赔的机率到底有多大?? 老实
说我们实在是不知道，而我们也不认为用计算机运算出来的程序可以帮我们什么忙，基
本上计算机做出的预测根本就是垃圾，它们反而会让做决策的人误以为得到某种确定的
假象，从而使得他们犯下大错的机会大增，过去不管是在保险或投资业者，这种离谱
的情况屡见不鲜，看看投资组合保险在1987年股市大崩盘时所造成的惨况，有人开
玩笑说，当时应该要跳楼是计算机而不是那些被它所愚弄的人。
Even if perfection in assessing risks is unattainable,
insurers can
underwrite sensibly. After all, you need not know a man's
precise age to
know that he is old enough to vote nor know his exact weight
to recognize
his need to diet. In insurance, it is essential to remember
that virtually
all surprises are unpleasant, and with that in mind we
try to price our
super-cat exposures so that about 90% of total premiums
end up being
eventually paid out in losses and expenses. Over time,
we will find out
how smart our pricing has been, but that will not be quickly.
The super-
cat business is just like the investment business in that
it often takes a
long time to find out whether you knew what you were doing.
虽然保险业者无法准确地评估风险到底有多大，不过我们却还是可以合理的接下保
单，就像是你并不一定要真的知道一个人的实际年龄，才能判断他是否可以去投票或
是一定要知道一个人几公斤重才认为他该不该减肥，同样的，从事保险这一行，大家
必须谨记的是，基本上所有的意外都不会让人感到愉快，所以在接下保单时，我们心
里早有预备，准备把90%的保费收入花在损失理赔与相关费用之上，慢慢的一段时间
下来，我们就会发现，这样的订价是否合理，这绝对需要时间来证明，霹雳猫保险这
一行就像是投资事业一样，绝对需要一段很长的时间，你才能确定知道自己到底在干
什么。
What I can state with certainty, however, is that we have
the best
person in the world to run our super-cat business: Ajit
Jain, whose value
to Berkshire is simply enormous. In the reinsurance field,
disastrous
propositions abound. I know that because I personally embraced
all too
many of these in the 1970s and also because GEICO has a
large runoff
portfolio made up of foolish contracts written in the early-1980s,
able
though its then-management was. Ajit, I can assure you,
won't make
mistakes of this type.
不过有一点我绝对可以向各位保证的是，我们拥有全世界最优秀的霹雳猫保险保险专
家，那就是Ajit Jain，他在Berkshire的价值大到难以想象，在再保险这一行，恐怖
的灾难时常发生，我很清楚的原因是我个人在1970年代就抱了不少个地雷，而
GEICO在1980年代初期，即使当时拥有最能干的经理人，也同样签了一堆愚蠢的保
险合约，不过提到Ajit，我可以向各位保证，绝对不会再犯同样的错误。
I have mentioned that a mega-catastrophe might cause a
catastrophe in
the financial markets, a possibility that is unlikely but
not far-fetched.
Were the catastrophe a quake in California of sufficient
magnitude to tap
our coverage, we would almost certainly be damaged in other
ways as well.
For example, See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac could be
hit hard. All in
all, though, we can handle this aggregation of exposures.
另一方面我也说过，自然灾害的发生同样也会间接导致金融风暴的发生，这样的可能
性不大，但也不是不可能，要是加州真的发生规模大到我们理赔下限的大地震，我们
旗下其它事业也可能会受到严重的打击，比如说喜斯糖果、富国银行或Freddie Mac
等，不过总的来说，我们应该可以妥善处理发生的状况。
In this respect, as in others, we try to "reverse
engineer" our future
at Berkshire, bearing in mind Charlie's dictum: "All
I want to know is
where I'm going to die so I'll never go there." (Inverting
really works:
Try singing country western songs backwards and you will
quickly regain
your house, your car and your wife.) If we can't tolerate
a possible
consequence, remote though it may be, we steer clear of
planting its seeds.
That is why we don't borrow big amounts and why we make
sure that our
super-cat business losses, large though the maximums may
sound, will not
put a major dent in Berkshire's intrinsic value.
就这方面而言，我们试着事先规划Berkshire的未来，时时谨记查理常说的一句格言，
「希望能够知道自己最后会死在哪里，然后打死都不去那里！」(事先回想真的有效，
大家可以试着多唱唱以前流行的乡村歌曲，很快的你就会发现重新找回你的房子、车
子跟老婆)，如果我们没办法承担可能的后果，不管其可能性有多小，那么我们就必须
避免播下罪恶的种子，这也是为什么我们不大幅举债的原因，同时虽然霹雳猫损失理
赔的上限金额看起来很大，但对Berkshire本身价值的影响却极其有限。
Insurance - GEICO and Other Primary Operations
保险事业营运-GEICO以及其它主要保险
When we moved to total ownership of GEICO early last year,
our
expectations were high - and they are all being exceeded.
That is true
from both a business and personal perspective: GEICO's
operating chief,
Tony Nicely, is a superb business manager and a delight
to work with.
Under almost any conditions, GEICO would be an exceptionally
valuable
asset. With Tony at the helm, it is reaching levels of
performance that
the organization would only a few years ago have thought
impossible.
去年当我们完全取得GEICO的所有权之后，我们曾对它抱以深切的期望，如今这些
期望不但全部实现，甚至是有过之而无不及，不论是从企业或个人的观点来看皆是如
此，GEICO的领导者Tony Nicely不但是一个杰出的经理人同时也是令人感到愉快
的工作伙伴，不论在任何的情况下，GEICO永远都是我们价值不菲的珍贵资产，有
Tony负责掌舵，GEICO甚至迈入几年前根本就想象不到的营运高峰。
There's nothing esoteric about GEICO's success: The company's
competitive strength flows directly from its position as
a low-cost
operator. Low costs permit low prices, and low prices attract
and retain
good policyholders. The final segment of a virtuous circle
is drawn when
policyholders recommend us to their friends. GEICO gets
more than one
million referrals annually and these produce more than
half of our new
business, an advantage that gives us enormous savings in
acquisition
expenses - and that makes our costs still lower.
GEICO的成功没有任何深奥的道理，该公司的竞争优势完全拜其超低成本的经营模式
所赐，低成本代表低售价，低售价自然能够吸引并留住优良的保险客户，而整个营业
流程在满意的客户向他们的朋友推荐GEICO时划下完美的句点，靠着客户的推荐，
GEICO每年至少因此增加100万张保单，占新接业务量的半数以上，也使得我们新
接业务成本大幅下降，从而又进一步降低我们的成本。
This formula worked in spades for GEICO in 1996: Its voluntary
auto
policy count grew 10%. During the previous 20 years, the
company's best-
ever growth for a year had been 8%, a rate achieved only
once. Better yet,
the growth in voluntary policies accelerated during the
year, led by major
gains in the nonstandard market, which has been an underdeveloped
area at
GEICO. I focus here on voluntary policies because the involuntary
business
we get from assigned risk pools and the like is unprofitable.
Growth in
that sector is most unwelcome.
这种模式在1996年大放异彩，自动上门的保险量成长了10%，过去二十年来，该公
司最高也不过是在有一年达到8%而已，更好的是，这些自愿保单的增加主要源自于
非制式的保单市场，这个市场对GEICO来说算是亟待开发的一块，我之所以一再强
调自愿保单的原因在于，从别处分配到的集体性非自愿的保单根本就没什么利润，那
方面的成长就可有可无。
GEICO's growth would mean nothing if it did not produce
reasonable
underwriting profits. Here, too, the news is good: Last
year we hit our
underwriting targets and then some. Our goal, however,
is not to widen our
profit margin but rather to enlarge the price advantage
we offer customers.
Given that strategy, we believe that 1997's growth will
easily top that of
last year.
如果不能产生合理的承保获利，GEICO保费收入的成长就没有任何意义，不过再一次
我们得到的答案是正面的肯定，去年我们顺利达到原先设定的承保目标，甚至还超
越，不过我们真正的目标不是要扩大承保的利差，而是将利润透过价格的调整回馈给
客户，在这样的策略之下，我们相信1997年的成长一定还会超越1996年的表现。
We expect new competitors to enter the direct-response
market, and
some of our existing competitors are likely to expand geographically.
Nonetheless, the economies of scale we enjoy should allow
us to maintain or
even widen the protective moat surrounding our economic
castle. We do best
on costs in geographical areas in which we enjoy high market
penetration.
As our policy count grows, concurrently delivering gains
in penetration, we
expect to drive costs materially lower. GEICO's sustainable
cost advantage
is what attracted me to the company way back in 1951, when
the entire
business was valued at $7 million. It is also why I felt
Berkshire should
pay $2.3 billion last year for the 49% of the company that
we didn't then
own.
同时我们也预期会有新的竞争者加入直效行销的市场，而现有的一些竞争同业也有可
能会扩大他们的营业区域，不过不管怎样，我们目前所建立的规模经济，绝对可以确
保甚至是扩大我们现在占有的经济堡垒，我们在拥有最高市占率的地区尽量降低成
本，预期还会将成本进一步地降低，GEICO永续性的成本优势是当初在1951年吸引
我投资该公司的主要原因，当时整家公司的市值不过只有700万美元，而那也是为
什么我在去年愿意花23亿美元买下另外一半不属于Berkshire的股权的原因。
Maximizing the results of a wonderful business requires
management and
focus. Lucky for us, we have in Tony a superb manager whose
business focus
never wavers. Wanting also to get the entire GEICO organization
concentrating as he does, we needed a compensation plan
that was itself
sharply focused - and immediately after our purchase, we
put one in.
想要让一家好公司的表现发挥到极致，必须依赖优秀的管理人员与明确的目标方向，
值得庆幸的是我们已经有像Tony这样优秀的专业经理人以及绝对不会动摇的目标，
而为了确保GEICO所有的组织成员都能像Tony一样专注一致，我们需要一套能够
搭配的薪资酬劳计划，所以在整个购并案完成之后，我们立刻落实执行。
Today, the bonuses received by dozens of top executives,
starting with
Tony, are based upon only two key variables: (1) growth
in voluntary auto
policies and (2) underwriting profitability on "seasoned"
auto business
(meaning policies that have been on the books for more
than one year). In
addition, we use the same yardsticks to calculate the annual
contribution
to the company's profit-sharing plan. Everyone at GEICO
knows what counts.
现在，以Tony为首的几个主要高阶经理人所领取的薪资奖励主要就看两个指数︰(1)
自愿性保单的成长，以及(2)常态性保单承保的获利(指留在公司超过一年的保单)，此
外，我们也将同样的标准运用于公司每年员工盈余分配的计划，所以基本上在GEICO
每个人都知道真正重要的是什么。
The GEICO plan exemplifies Berkshire's incentive compensation
principles: Goals should be (1) tailored to the economics
of the specific
operating business; (2) simple in character so that the
degree to which
they are being realized can be easily measured; and (3)
directly related to
the daily activities of plan participants. As a corollary,
we shun
"lottery ticket" arrangements, such as options
on Berkshire shares, whose
ultimate value - which could range from zero to huge -
is totally out of
the control of the person whose behavior we would like
to affect. In our
view, a system that produces quixotic payoffs will not
only be wasteful for
owners but may actually discourage the focused behavior
we value in
managers.
GEICO这项计划充分说明的Berkshire薪资奖励的原则，那就是必须要能够达到以下
目标(1)适用于个别公司经营状况(2)简单明了的规则，如此可以很清楚的加以衡量(3)
与每个参与的员工直接相关；所以很自然的，我们避免给予员工不劳而获的乐透彩，
比如说Berkshire的认股权，其最终的价值可能由极少到极大，但这却不是那些我们
想要影响其行为的人员所能够直接控制影响的，在我们的观念中，不合理的薪资奖励
办法，不但是浪费股东的钱，同时也会让旗下的经理人分心而产生不当的行为。
Every quarter, all 9,000 GEICO associates can see the results
that
determine our profit-sharing plan contribution. In 1996,
they enjoyed the
experience because the plan literally went off the chart
that had been
constructed at the start of the year. Even I knew the answer
to that
problem: Enlarge the chart. Ultimately, the results called
for a record
contribution of 16.9% ($40 million), compared to a five-year
average of
less than 10% for the comparable plans previously in effect.
Furthermore,
at Berkshire, we never greet good work by raising the bar.
If GEICO's
performance continues to improve, we will happily keep
on making larger
charts.
每一季，GEICO公司总共9,000名的员工都可以看到根据盈余分配计划所计算出来
的结果，1996年他们确实享受到这项成果，因为根据这项计划所计算出来的数字早
已打破当初规划时的最高上限，连我也知道要如何解决这个问题，那就是把上限再扩
大，到最后，员工总共分配到年度获利的16.9%，金额将近有4,000万美元，远高
于过去五年平均不到10%的比率，同时在Berkshire对于员工辛勤工作的表现，我们
绝对不会回以更高的门坎，如果GEICO的员工继续保持如此优异的表现，我们还会
继续提高奖励的上限。
Lou Simpson continues to manage GEICO's money in an outstanding
manner: Last year, the equities in his portfolio outdid
the S&P 500 by 6.2
percentage points. In Lou's part of GEICO's operation,
we again tie
compensation to performance - but to investment performance
over a four-
year period, not to underwriting results nor to the performance
of GEICO as
a whole. We think it foolish for an insurance company to
pay bonuses that
are tied to overall corporate results when great work on
one side of the
business - underwriting or investment - could conceivably
be completely
neutralized by bad work on the other. If you bat .350 at
Berkshire, you
can be sure you will get paid commensurately even if the
rest of the team
bats .200. In Lou and Tony, however, we are lucky to have
Hall-of-Famers
in both key positions.
负责管理GEICO资金的Lou Simpson同样继续其优异的表现，去年他的投资组合超
越S&P 500指数整整6.2个百分点，关于Lou在GEICO的表现，再一次我们将其
奖励计划跟其投资绩效绑在一起，不看GEICO的承保绩效或整体的成绩，而是以过
去四年平均的投资绩效为准，对于有些保险公司不分承保部门或投资部门，完全不顾
一方优异的表现可能被另一方糟糕的表现所抵消掉的情况，而将其薪资奖励计划完全
绑在一起，一视同仁的做法感到愚不可及，在Berkshire如果你的打击率高达三成五，
我可以向你保证绝对不会亏待你，即使其它同队的球员平均打击率只有二成而已，不
过很庆幸在GEICO，不论是在保险或投资部门，我们都拥有像Lou与Tony这类足
以列入名人堂的优秀球员。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Though they are, of course, smaller than GEICO, our other
primary
insurance operations turned in equally stunning results
last year.
National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined
ratio of 74.2 and,
as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to
premium volume.
Over the last three years, this segment of our business,
run by Don
Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 83.0. Our
homestate
operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded a combined ratio
of 87.1 even
though it absorbed the expenses of expanding to new states.
Rod's three-
year combined ratio is an amazing 83.2. Berkshire's workers'
compensation
business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, has now
moved into six
other states and, despite the costs of that expansion,
again achieved an
excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at
Central States
Indemnity, set new records for premium volume while generating
good
earnings from underwriting. In aggregate, our smaller insurance
operations
(now including Kansas Bankers Surety) have an underwriting
record virtually
unmatched in the industry. Don, Rod, Brad and John have
all created
significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is
more to come.
虽然比起GEICO，我们其它主要保险事业规模要小得多，但他们在去年同样缴出惊人
的成绩单，国家赔偿公司的传统业务综合比率只有74.2，同时以其保费收入来看，
还贡献了大量的浮存金，过去三年以来，这个由Don Wurster负责的部门平均的综
合比率只有83.0；另外由Rod Eldred负责的Homestate业务也有相当幅度的成长，
去年虽然必须负担开拓新州业务的费用，但综合比率仍只有87.1，过去三年平均为
83.2；另外原先由Brad负责的加州劳工退休基金现在已将业务重心移到其它六个
州，虽然初期须负担沉重的开办费用，但是仍然能维持可观的承保获利；最后负责中
央州立产险公司营运的John Kizer则依然表现出色，保费收入不但大幅成长，同时
承保利益更大幅增加，总的来说，我们几个小型保险事业(包含堪萨斯银行家保险在内)
的表现是其它同业所比不上的，Don、Rod、Brad与John全都替Berkshire创造了
可观的价值，而我们也相信他们未来的潜力仍然可期。
Taxes
租税问题
In 1961, President Kennedy said that we should ask not
what our
country can do for us, but rather ask what we can do for
our country. Last
year we decided to give his suggestion a try - and who
says it never hurts
to ask? We were told to mail $860 million in income taxes
to the U.S.
Treasury.
1961年，肯尼迪总统曾经说过一句名言︰不要问国家能为你做些什么，问问你能为
国家做些什么! 去年我们决定照他的建议试一试，不过不知道是谁说问问没有关系
的?? 我们最后得到的答案是总共要缴8.6亿美元的所得税给美国国库。
Here's a little perspective on that figure: If an equal
amount had
been paid by only 2,000 other taxpayers, the government
would have had a
balanced budget in 1996 without needing a dime of taxes
- income or Social
Security or what have you - from any other American. Berkshire
shareholders can truly say, "I gave at the office."
这个数字到底有多大呢? 如果全美能够有2,000名跟Berkshire一样的纳税义务人的
话，则美国国库不需要再征收其它任何的所得税、社会安全捐或任何你想得到名目的
税捐，1996年的预算收支就能够打平，所以Berkshire的股东可以大声地说自己，
功在国库。
Charlie and I believe that large tax payments by Berkshire
are
entirely fitting. The contribution we thus make to society's
well-being is
at most only proportional to its contribution to ours.
Berkshire prospers
in America as it would nowhere else.
查理跟我本人对于Berkshire必须支付如此高额的税负感到完全接受，我们对于整个
社会的贡献远远比不上社会对我们所作的贡献，要不是身在美国，Berkshire不可能
有这样的荣景。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's
reported
earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments
are not
assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply,
but are instead
aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you
view the earnings
of our businesses as they would have been reported had
we not purchased
them. For the reasons discussed on pages 65 and 66, this
form of
presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors
and managers than
one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), which
require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business.
The
total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical
to the GAAP
total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
(in millions)
--------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-tax Earnings minority interests)
---------------- -------------------
1996 1995(1) 1996 1995(1)
------- -------- ------- -------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting.....................$ 222.1 $ 20.5 $ 142.8
$ 11.3
Net Investment Income............ 726.2 501.6 593.1 417.7
Buffalo News........................... 50.4 46.8 29.5
27.3
Fechheimer............................. 17.3 16.9 9.3 8.8
Finance Businesses..................... 23.1 20.8 14.9
12.6
Home Furnishings....................... 43.8 29.7(2) 24.8
16.7(2)
Jewelry................................ 27.8 33.9(3) 16.1
19.1(3) #9;
Kirby.................................. 58.5 50.2 39.9
32.1
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group....... 50.6 34.1 32.2
21.2
See's Candies.......................... 51.9 50.2 30.8
29.8
Shoe Group............................. 61.6 58.4 41.0
37.5
World Book............................. 12.6 8.8 9.5 7.0
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments........ (75.7) (27.0) (70.5)
(23.4)
Interest Expense(4).................... (94.3) (56.0) (56.6)
(34.9)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions.. (13.3) (11.6) (8.5)
(7.0)
Other.................................. 58.8 37.4 34.8
24.4
------- -------- -------- -------
Operating Earnings....................... 1,221.4 814.7
883.1 600.2
Sales of Securities...................... 2,484.5 194.1
1,605.5 125.0
------- -------- -------- -------
Total Earnings - All Entities........... $3,705.9 $1,008.8
$2,488.6 $ 725.2
====== ======= ======= ======
Before the GEICO-related restatement.
(1)不包含GEICO重编部份。
(2) Includes R.C. Willey from June 29, 1995.
(2)包含R.C. Willey 1995年6月29日以后的盈余
(3) Includes Helzberg's from April 30, 1995.
(3)包含Helzberg 1995年4月30日以后的盈余
(4) Excludes interest expenseof Finance Businesses.
(4)扣除金融事业的利息支出
In this section last year, I discussed three businesses
that reported
a decline in earnings - Buffalo News, Shoe Group and World
Book. All, I'm
happy to say, recorded gains in 1996.
去年到这段时，我曾提到有三个事业盈余大幅下滑-水牛城新闻报、鞋子事业与世界
百科全书，今年我们高兴向大家报告，这几个事业都大有进步。
World Book, however, did not find it easy: Despite the
operation's
new status as the only direct-seller of encyclopedias in
the country
(Encyclopedia Britannica exited the field last year), its
unit volume fell.
Additionally, World Book spent heavily on a new CD-ROM
product that began
to take in revenues only in early 1997, when it was launched
in association
with IBM. In the face of these factors, earnings would
have evaporated had
World Book not revamped distribution methods and cut overhead
at
headquarters, thereby dramatically reducing its fixed costs.
Overall, the
company has gone a long way toward assuring its long-term
viability in both
the print and electronic marketplaces.
不过对于世界百科全书来说，这可不是一件简单的事，尽管如今它们是全美仅存以直
销的方式销售百科全书的业者(大英百科全书在去年退出了这个市场)，不过它的销售
数量还是呈现下滑的状态，另外世界百科全书还投入大笔的经费在CD版的新产品之
上，但其效益至少要等到1997年初与IBM的合作正式展开后才有可能显现，在种种
不利的状况下，世界百科全书如果不能大力改革通路方式并降低总部营运开销，以彻
底降低固定成本的话，盈余可能会消失殆尽，不过总的来说，该公司已想尽各种方法
以确保自身能够在竞争激烈的印刷与电子出版市场上继续存活下去。
Our only disappointment last year was in jewelry: Borsheim's
did
fine, but Helzberg's suffered a material decline in earnings.
Its expense
levels had been geared to a sizable increase in same-store
sales,
consistent with the gains achieved in recent years. When
sales were
instead flat, profit margins fell. Jeff Comment, CEO of
Helzberg's, is
addressing the expense problem in a decisive manner, and
the company's
earnings should improve in 1997.
去年唯一让我们感到失望的反而是珠宝事业，波仙还不错，不过Helzberg的盈余却
大幅下滑，单店平均费用持续大幅增加，但是当营收表现平平时，获利自然缩减，针
对这个问题该公司总裁-Jeff Comment已经采取必要的措施，我想它们1997年的
盈余表现应该能够有所改善。
Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform exceptionally,
far outdoing their industry norms. For this, Charlie and
I thank our
managers. If you should see any of them at the Annual Meeting,
add your
thanks as well.
不过总的来说，我们旗下所有的营利事业的表现，比起其同业来说仍然相当杰出，对
此查理跟我本身向所有经理人致上深深的敬意，而如果各位在年会上遇到他们，也请
大家不吝给予掌声。
More information about our various businesses is given
on pages 36-
46, where you will also find our segment earnings reported
on a GAAP
basis. In addition, on pages 51-57, we have rearranged
Berkshire's
financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis,
a presentation
that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the
company. Our
intent is to supply you with the financial information
that we would wish
you to give us if our positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，另外你还可以
找到经过重编，依照Berkshire四大部门的信息，这是查理跟我能够完整呈现
Berkshire现况的模式，我们的目的是希望能够换个角度设想，提供大家所有必要的
信息。
"Look-Through" Earnings
完整透视盈余
Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress
at
Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table
presented
earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees
- though
these dividends typically represent only a small fraction
of the earnings
attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division
of money,
since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of
investees as
more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason
is simple:
Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings
at high
rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
我们认为帐列盈余很难表现Berkshire实际的营运状况，部份原因在于列示在本公司
帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部份，其实对我们而言，我们更
重视未分配的那一部份，因为他们可以为我们创造出更高的价值，原因很简单，因为
我们的被投资公司往往比母公司更有机会把资金投入到高投资报酬的用途之上，既然
如此又何必一定要强迫他们把盈余分配回来呢?
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire
than
reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through"
earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the
operating
earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our
share of the
retained operating earnings of major investees that, under
GAAP
accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3)
an allowance for
the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained
earnings of
investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating
"operating
earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments
as well as
capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
为了要能更真实的反应Berkshire实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了完整透视盈余
的观念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段所提到的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保
留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的
盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系已扣除资
本利得、特别会计调整与企业其它非常态的项目。
The following table sets forth our 1996 look-through earnings,
though I warn you that the figures can be no more than
approximate, since
they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends
paid to us
by these investees have been included in the operating
earnings itemized
on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment
Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出1996年透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位
这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入
已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益项下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend(1) (in
millions)(2)
------------------------ ----------------------- ------------------
American Express Company........ #9; 10.5% $ 132
The Coca-Cola Company........... 8.1% 180
The Walt Disney Company......... 9; 3.6% 50
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 9; 8.4% 77
The Gillette Company............ 9; 8.6% 73
McDonald's Corporation.......... 9; 4.3% 38
The Washington Post Company..... #9; 15.8% 27
Wells Fargo & Company........... 9; 8.0% 84
------
Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees..
661
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3)....
(93) #9;
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire........................
954
------
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire..................
$1,522
======
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire
pays on
the dividends it receives
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with
a market
value of more than $500 million are itemized.
下表是我们市价超过五亿美元以上的普通股投资。
12/31/96
Shares Company Cost* Market
----------- --------------------------------- --------
---------
(dollars in millions)
49,456,900 American Express Company...........$1,392.7
$ 2,794.3
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company.............. 1,298.9
10,525.0
24,614,214 The Walt Disney Company............ 577.0 1,716.8
64,246,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.. 333.4 1,772.8
48,000,000 The Gillette Company............... 600.0 3,732.0
30,156,600 McDonald's Corporation............. 1,265.3
1,368.4
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company........ 10.6 579.0
7,291,418 Wells Fargo & Company.............. 497.8
1,966.9
Others............................. 1,934.5 3,295.4
-------- ---------
Total Common Stocks................ $7,910.2 $27,750.6
====== =======
* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.2
billion
less than GAAP cost.
*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的账面成本少12亿美元。
Our portfolio shows little change: We continue to make
more money
when snoring than when active.
我们的投资组合还是没有多大变动，我们打盹时赚的钱比起醒着时多很多。
Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither
we nor most
business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly-profitable
subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Reserve's
discount rate
was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed
his views
on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently
with our minority
positions in wonderful businesses? The art of investing
in public
companies successfully is little different from the art
of successfully
acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want to
acquire, at a
sensible price, a business with excellent economics and
able, honest
management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these
qualities
are being preserved.
按兵不动对我们来说是一项明智的行为，就像是我们或其它经理人不可能因为谣传联
准会可能调整贴放利率或是华尔街那帮土匪大幅改变他们对股市前景的看法，就决定
把旗下高获利的金鸡母卖来卖去一样，我们也不会对拥有部份所有权的好公司股票任
意出脱，投资上市公司股票的秘诀与取得百分之百的子公司的方法没有什么两样，都
是希望能够以合理的价格取得拥有绝佳竞争优势与才德兼备的经理人，也因此大家真
正应该关心注意的是这些特质是否有任何改变。
When carried out capably, an investment strategy of that
type will
often result in its practitioner owning a few securities
that will come
to represent a very large portion of his portfolio. This
investor would
get a similar result if he followed a policy of purchasing
an interest
in, say, 20% of the future earnings of a number of outstanding
college
basketball stars. A handful of these would go on to achieve
NBA stardom,
and the investor's take from them would soon dominate his
royalty stream.
To suggest that this investor should sell off portions
of his most
successful investments simply because they have come to
dominate his
portfolio is akin to suggesting that the Bulls trade Michael
Jordan
because he has become so important to the team.
只要执行得当，运用这样投资策略的投资人到最后会发现，少数几家公司的股份将会
占他投资组合的一大部分，这样的方式就好像一个人买下假设一群极具潜力的大学明
星篮球队员20%的未来权益，其中有一小部份的球员可能可以进到NBA殿堂打球，
那么投资人会发现其因此从中收取的权利金将会占其收入的绝大部分，要是有人建议
把这部份的权益转让掉就好像是要公牛队把麦可乔登交易出去一样，只因为他对球队
来说实在是太重要了。
In studying the investments we have made in both subsidiary
companies and common stocks, you will see that we favor
businesses and
industries unlikely to experience major change. The reason
for that is
simple: Making either type of purchase, we are searching
for operations
that we believe are virtually certain to possess enormous
competitive
strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast-changing
industry
environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it
precludes the
certainty we seek.
不管是研究买下整家公司或股票投资时，大家会发现我们偏爱变化不大的公司与产
业，原因很简单，我们希望买到的公司是能够持续拥有竞争优势达十年或二十年以上
者，变迁快速的产业环境或许可能让人一夕之间大发利市，但却无法提供我们想要的
稳定性。
I should emphasize that, as citizens, Charlie and I welcome
change:
Fresh ideas, new products, innovative processes and the
like cause our
country's standard of living to rise, and that's clearly
good. As
investors, however, our reaction to a fermenting industry
is much like
our attitude toward space exploration: We applaud the endeavor
but
prefer to skip the ride.
另一方面我必须强调的是，身为公民的一份子，查理跟我相当欢迎改变，因为新的观
念、新的产品或创新的方法可以提升我们的生活水准，这点很明显的对我们有好处，
不过身为投资人对于热门流行产业的态度就好像在太空探险一样，对于这种勇猛的行
为我们给予喝采，但是若要我们自己上场，那就再说吧!
Obviously all businesses change to some extent. Today,
See's is
different in many ways from what it was in 1972 when we
bought it: It
offers a different assortment of candy, employs different
machinery and
sells through different distribution channels. But the
reasons why
people today buy boxed chocolates, and why they buy them
from us rather
than from someone else, are virtually unchanged from what
they were in
the 1920s when the See family was building the business.
Moreover, these
motivations are not likely to change over the next 20 years,
or even 50.
当然所有的产业都会变化，在今日喜斯糖果的经营形态与我们当初在1972年买下这
家公司时又有很大的不同，喜斯提供了更多样的糖果、生产设备与销售通路也大不相
同，不过人们为什么要购买盒装巧克力的动机，与购买盒装巧克力又为什么一定要选
择喜斯的原因，自从喜斯在1920年代由喜太太家族创立以来就从来没有变过，而我
想这原因在往后20年，乃至于50年都不会有所改变。
We look for similar predictability in marketable securities.
Take
Coca-Cola: The zeal and imagination with which Coke products
are sold
has burgeoned under Roberto Goizueta, who has done an absolutely
incredible job in creating value for his shareholders.
Aided by Don
Keough and Doug Ivester, Roberto has rethought and improved
every aspect
of the company. But the fundamentals of the business -
the qualities
that underlie Coke's competitive dominance and stunning
economics - have
remained constant through the years.
在买进股票时我们同样的也追求可预测的未来，以可口可乐来说，可口可乐产品所代
表的热情与想象在总裁古崔塔的带领下升华到极点，此举为公司股东创造出可观的价
值，在Don Keough与Doug Ivester的协助之下，古崔塔从头到尾重新塑造公司的
每一部份，不过这家公司的本质-可口可乐强力的竞争优势与主导性，多年来却从未
改变。
I was recently studying the 1896 report of Coke (and you
think that
you are behind in your reading!). At that time Coke, though
it was
already the leading soft drink, had been around for only
a decade. But
its blueprint for the next 100 years was already drawn.
Reporting sales
of $148,000 that year, Asa Candler, the company's president,
said: "We
have not lagged in our efforts to go into all the world
teaching that
Coca-Cola is the article, par excellence, for the health
and good feeling
of all people." Though "health" may have
been a reach, I love the fact
that Coke still relies on Candler's basic theme today -
a century later.
Candler went on to say, just as Roberto could now, "No
article of like
character has ever so firmly entrenched itself in public
favor." Sales
of syrup that year, incidentally, were 116,492 gallons
versus about 3.2
billion in 1996.
最近我正在研读可口可乐1896年的年报(所以大家现在看我们的年报应该还不嫌太
晚)，虽然当时可口可乐已经成为冷饮市场的领导者，但那也不过只有十年的光景，然
而在当时该公司却早已规划好未来的百年大计，面对年仅14.8万美元的销售额，公
司总裁Asa Candler表示：「我们从没有放弃告诉全世界，可口可乐是能够提升人类
健康与快乐、最卓越超凡的一件东西。」虽然我认为健康这档子事还有待努力，但我
很高兴可口可乐在一百年后的今天，始终还是遵循Candler当初立下的愿景，Candler
又继续谈到：「没有其它东西的味道能够像可乐一样深植人心。」当年的可乐糖浆销
售量不过只有11.6万加仑，时至今日，销售量已达到32亿加仑。
I can't resist one more Candler quote: "Beginning
this year about
March 1st . . . we employed ten traveling salesmen by means
of which,
with systematic correspondence from the office, we covered
almost the
territory of the Union." That's my kind of sales force.
我实在忍不住想要在引用Candler的另一段话：「从今年三月开始，我们雇用了十位
业务员，在与总公司保持密切联系下巡回各地推销产品，基本上我们的业务范围已涵
盖整个美联共和国。」这才是我心目中的销售力量。
Companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be
labeled "The
Inevitables." Forecasters may differ a bit in their
predictions of exactly
how much soft drink or shaving-equipment business these
companies
will be doing in ten or twenty years. Nor is our talk of
inevitability
meant to play down the vital work that these companies
must continue to
carry out, in such areas as manufacturing, distribution,
packaging and
product innovation. In the end, however, no sensible observer
- not even
these companies' most vigorous competitors, assuming they
are assessing
the matter honestly - questions that Coke and Gillette
will dominate
their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime. Indeed,
their
dominance will probably strengthen. Both companies have
significantly
expanded their already huge shares of market during the
past ten years,
and all signs point to their repeating that performance
in the next
decade.
像可口可乐与吉列这类的公司应该可以被归类为"永恒的持股"，分析师对于这些公司
在未来一、二十年饮料或刮胡刀市场的预测可能会有些许的不同，而我们所说的永恒
并不意味这些公司可以不必继续贯彻在制造、配销、包装与产品创新上的努力，只是
就算是最没有概念的观察家或甚至是其最主要的竞争对手，也不得不承认可口可乐与
吉列，在终其一生的投资生涯，仍将在其各自的领域中独领风骚，甚至于他们的优势
还有可能会继续增强，过去十年来，两家公司在原有极大的市占率又扩大许多，而所
有的迹象显示，在往后的十年间，他们还会继续以此态势扩大版图。
Obviously many companies in high-tech businesses or embryonic
industries will grow much faster in percentage terms than
will The
Inevitables. But I would rather be certain of a good result
than hopeful
of a great one.
当然比起一些具爆发性高科技或新创的事业来说，这些被永恒持股公司的成长力略显
不足，但与其两鸟在林，还不如一鸟在手。
Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables,
even
after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone
provides no
certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General
Motors, IBM
and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming
invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business
exhibit
characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable
advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the
Fattest as almost
a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every Inevitable,
there are dozens
of Impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable
to competitive
attacks. Considering what it takes to be an Inevitable,
Charlie and I
recognize that we will never be able to come up with a
Nifty Fifty or
even a Twinkling Twenty. To the Inevitables in our portfolio,
therefore,
we add a few "Highly Probables."
虽然查理跟我本人终其一生追求永恒的持股，但能够真正让我们找到的却属鳞毛凤
角，光是取得市场领导地位并不足以保证成功，看看过去几年来通用汽车、IBM与西
尔斯这些公司，都曾是领导一方的产业霸主，在所属的产业都被赋予其无可取代的优
势地位，大者恒存的自然定律似乎牢不可破，但实际结果却不然，也因此在找到真正
的真命天子之前，旁边可能还有好几打假冒者，这些公司虽然曾经红极一时，但却完
全经不起竞争的考验，换个角度来看，既然能够被称为永恒的持股，查理跟我早就有
心理准备，其数量绝对不可能超过五十家或甚至是不到二十家，所以就我们的投资组
合来说，除了几家真正够格的公司之外，还有另外几家则是属于极有可能的潜在候选
人。
You can, of course, pay too much for even the best of businesses.
The overpayment risk surfaces periodically and, in our
opinion, may now
be quite high for the purchasers of virtually all stocks,
The Inevitables
included. Investors making purchases in an overheated market
need to
recognize that it may often take an extended period for
the value of even
an outstanding company to catch up with the price they
paid.
当然有时你也很有可能以过高的价格买下一家好的公司，这种风险并不是没有，而以
我个人的看法，像现在的时机买任何股票就都有可能必须承担这样的风险，当然也包
含永恒的持股在内，在过热的股市进场买股票的投资人必须要先做好心理准备，那就
是对于付出高价买进的优良企业来说，必须要有更长的一段时间才有办法让他们的价
值得以彰显。
A far more serious problem occurs when the management of
a great
company gets sidetracked and neglects its wonderful base
business while
purchasing other businesses that are so-so or worse. When
that happens,
the suffering of investors is often prolonged. Unfortunately,
that is
precisely what transpired years ago at both Coke and Gillette.
(Would
you believe that a few decades back they were growing shrimp
at Coke and
exploring for oil at Gillette?) Loss of focus is what most
worries
Charlie and me when we contemplate investing in businesses
that in
general look outstanding. All too often, we've seen value
stagnate in
the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention
of
managers to wander. That's not going to happen again at
Coke and
Gillette, however - not given their current and prospective
managements.
有一个问题倒是很值得注意，那就是有一些体质原本不错的公司，由于经营阶层规划
的方向产生偏差，将原本良好的本业基础弃之不顾，反而跑去购并一堆平凡普通的公
司，当这种状况发生时，其投资人所须承受的煎熬便会加重加长，而不幸的这正是几
年前发生在可口可乐与吉列身上的惨事，(大家可以想象十几年前，可口可乐大举投入
养虾事业，而吉列竟热衷于石油探勘吗?)，失去聚焦是查理跟我在思考是否投资一些
外表看起来很不错的公司时最关心的重点，我想傲慢或不甘寂寞的出现，使得这些经
理人胡思乱想进而导致企业的价值停滞不前，这种情形屡见不鲜，不过还好这种情况
应该不会再在可口可乐与吉列现在与未来储备的管理阶层身上发生。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most
investors, both institutional and individual, will find
that the best way
to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges
minimal fees.
Those following this path are sure to beat the net results
(after fees
and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment
professionals.
对于各位个人的投资方式，让我提供一点心得给各位参考，大部分的投资人，不管法
人或是散户，可能会认为投资股票最好的方式是直接去买手续费低廉的指数型基金，
当然这样的做法所得到的结果(在扣除相关手续费用之后)，应该可以很轻易地击败市
场上大部分的投资专家。
Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio,
there
are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing
is not
complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy.
What an
investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected
businesses.
Note that word "selected": You don't have to
be an expert on every
company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate
companies
within your circle of competence. The size of that circle
is not very
important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.
其实你也可以选择建立自己的投资组合，但有几点是大家必须特别注意的，智能型投
资并不复杂，当然它也不是一件容易的事，投资人真正需要具备的是给予所选择的企
业正确评价的能力，请特别注意"所选择"这个字，你不必像很多专家一样同时研究许
多家公司，相反的你要做的只是选择少数几家在你能力范围之内的公司就好，能力范
围的大小并不重要，要紧的是你要很清楚自己的能力范围。
To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient
markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing or emerging
markets.
You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these.
That, of
course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools,
whose
finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects.
In our view,
though, investment students need only two well-taught courses
- How to
Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.
投资要成功，你不需要研究什么是Beta值、效率市场、现代投资组合理论、选择权
定价或是新兴市场，事实上大家最好不要懂得这一些理论，当然我这种看法与目前以
这些课程为主流的学术界有明显不同，就我个人认为，有志从事投资的学生只要修好
两门课程-亦即"如何给予企业正确的评价"以及"思考其与市场价格的关系"即可。
Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase,
at a rational
price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business
whose
earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher
five, ten and
twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a
few companies
that meet these standards - so when you see one that qualifies,
you
should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also
resist the
temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't
willing to own a
stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for
ten minutes.
Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings
march
upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's
market value.
身为一位投资人，大家其实只要以合理的价格买进一些很容易了解且其盈余在未来五
到十年内会大幅成长的企业的部份股权，当然一段时间下来，你会发现只有少数几家
公司符合这样的标准，所以要是你真的找到这样的公司，那就一定要买进足够份量的
股权，在这期间，你必须尽量避免自己受到外界诱惑而偏离这个准则，如果你不打算
持有一家公司股份十年以上，那最好连十分钟你都不要拥有它，在慢慢找到这样盈余
加总能持续累积的投资组合后，你就会发现其市值也会跟着稳定增加。
Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach
that has
produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through
earnings
have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock
price has risen
correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized,
there
would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.
虽然我们很少承认，但这正是Berkshire股东累积财富的唯一方式，我们的透视盈余
在过去几年间大幅跃进，而同期间我们的股票价格也跟着大涨，要不是我们的盈余大
幅增加，Berkshire所代表的价值就不可能大幅成长。
The greatly enlarged earnings base we now enjoy will inevitably
cause our future gains to lag those of the past. We will
continue,
however, to push in the directions we always have. We will
try to build
earnings by running our present businesses well - a job
made easy because
of the extraordinary talents of our operating managers
- and by
purchasing other businesses, in whole or in part, that
are not likely to
be roiled by change and that possess important competitive
advantages.
当然我们现在背负庞大的资金基础将无可避免地会影响到我们未来盈余成长的能
力，但我们还是会按照和过去一致的方向，在现有的基础之上，这部份的难度较低，
因为我们拥有一群杰出的经理人，同时继续买进全部或部份一些不会受外界环境影响
且拥有竞争优势的新事业。
USAir
美国航空
When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic
Airways,
was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer:
"There's
really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy
an airline."
Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your
Chairman decided
in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 9.25%
preferred stock of
USAir.
当Richard Branson-维京亚特兰大航空公司的老板被问到要如才能够变成一个百万
富翁，他的回答很简单：其实也没有什么! 首先你要先成为一个亿万富翁，然后再去
买一家航空公司就成了! 但由于各位的董事长-也就是我本人不信邪，所以我在1989
年决定以3.58亿美元投资取得美国航空年利率9.25%的特别股。
I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO,
and I still
do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial
and wrong.
I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable
operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior
security
seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point:
USAir's
revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated,
fiercely-
competitive market whereas its cost structure was a holdover
from the
days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if
left unchecked,
portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past
record might
be. (If history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes
400 would
consist of librarians.)
那时我相当喜爱同时也崇拜美国航空当时的总裁-Ed Colodny，直到现在仍是如此，
不过我对于美国航空业的分析研究实在是过于肤浅且错误百出，我被该公司过去历年
来的获利能力所蒙骗，同时过分相信特别股可以提供给我们在债权上的保护，以致于
忽略了最关键的一点︰那就是美国航空的营收受到毫无节制的激烈价格竞争而大幅
下滑的同时，其成本结构却仍旧停留在从前管制时代的高档，这样的高成本结构若不
能找到有效解决的办法，将成为灾难的前兆，不管以前航空业曾经享有多么辉煌的历
史(如果历史可以给人们所有的答案，那么富比士四百大富翁不就应该都是图书馆员了
吗?)。
To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements
in its labor contracts - and that's something most airlines
have found it
extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening,
or
actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception.
Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the
imbalance between
the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively.
In the 1990-
1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a
performance that
totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.
要让成本结构合理化，美国航空必须大幅修改其劳资契约，不过这偏偏又是航空公司
难以达成的罩门，除了公司真正面临倒闭的威胁或甚至是真的倒闭，而美国航空也不
例外，就在我们投资该公司特别股不久之后，公司营收与支出的缺口突然开始大幅扩
大，在1990年至1994年间，美国航空累计亏损了24亿美元，此举让公司普通股
的股东权益几乎耗损殆尽。
For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred
dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later,
with the
situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our
investment by
75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995,
I offered to
sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was
unsuccessful.
在这段期间内，美国航空还是继续支付特别股股利给我们，直到1994年才停止，也
因此在不久后，由于该公司前景展望不太乐观，我们决定将美国航空特别股投资的帐
面价值调减75%，只剩下8,950万美元，从而到了1995年，我甚至对外提出以面
额50%的折价，打算出售这笔投资，所幸最后并没有成功出脱。
Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I
got right:
Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract
a somewhat
unusual provision stipulating that "penalty dividends"
- to run five
percentage points over the prime rate - would be accrued
on any
arrearages. This meant that when our 9.25% dividend was
omitted for two
years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between
13.25% and 14%.
幸运的是在投资美国航空所犯的一连串错误当中，我总算做对了一件事，那就是当初
在投资时，我们在特别股投资合约当中，特地加了一项"惩罚股息"条款，也就是说万
一该公司延迟支付股息的话，除原有欠款外，还必须外加依基本利率5%的利息，也
就是说因为这两年我们没有收到9.25%的股息，所以以后美国航空必须就未支付的款
项加计13.25%与14%的利息。
Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive
to pay
arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second
half of 1996,
when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving
us $47.9
million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company's CEO, a huge
thank-you for
extracting a performance from the airline that permitted
this payment.
Even so, USAir's performance has recently been helped significantly
by an
industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company
still has
basic cost problems that must be solved.
面对这样的惩罚条款将督促美国航空尽快清偿对我们的欠款，而等到1996年下半年
美国航空开始转亏为盈时，他们果真开始清偿这笔合计4,790万美元的欠款，为此我
们特别要感谢美国航空现任总裁-Stephen Wolf，是他让这家落难的航空公司得以付
出这笔钱，同时美国航空的表现也归因于航空业景气复苏，当然该公司还是有成本结
构的问题有待解决。
In any event, the prices of USAir's publicly-traded securities
tell
us that our preferred stock is now probably worth its par
value of $358
million, give or take a little. In addition, we have over
the years
collected an aggregate of $240.5 million in dividends (including
$30
million received in 1997).
不过不论如何，目前美国航空普通股的市价显示我们所持有特别股的价值应该回复到
3.58亿美元的面额左右，另外不要忘了，这几年来我们还陆陆续续从该公司收到2.4
亿美元的股息(包含1997年的3,000万美元在内)。
Early in 1996, before any accrued dividends had been paid,
I tried
once more to unload our holdings - this time for about
$335 million.
You're lucky: I again failed in my attempt to snatch defeat
from the
jaws of victory.
在稍早1996年初，我们还尚未收到积欠的股息之前，我再度尝试以3.35亿美元把
这笔投资卖掉，所幸这次的举动又没有成功，使得我们得以从胜利之神口中逃过失败
的命运。
In another context, a friend once asked me: "If you're
so rich, why
aren't you smart?" After reviewing my sorry performance
with USAir, you
may conclude he had a point.
在另外一个场合，有一位朋友问我：「你很有钱，可是为什么还这么笨? 」在进一步
检讨本人在美国航空这个案子上的表现后，你可能会觉得他说得很有道理。
Financings
财务融资
We wrote four checks to Salomon Brothers last year and
in each case
were delighted with the work for which we were paying.
I've already
described one transaction: the FlightSafety purchase in
which Salomon was
the initiating investment banker. In a second deal, the
firm placed a
small debt offering for our finance subsidiary.
去年我们总共付了四次钱给所罗门兄弟公司，而很高兴每一张支票都代表着该公司为
我们提供了不错的服务，先前我已经说明过其中的一项交易-那就是买进国际飞安公
司的交易，所罗门担任这项交易的投资银行顾问，第二个案子是所罗门帮我们旗下的
财务子公司安排了一项融资案。
Additionally, we made two good-sized offerings through
Salomon, both
with interesting aspects. The first was our sale in May
of 517,500
shares of Class B Common, which generated net proceeds
of $565 million.
As I have told you before, we made this sale in response
to the
threatened creation of unit trusts that would have marketed
themselves as
Berkshire look-alikes. In the process, they would have
used our past,
and definitely nonrepeatable, record to entice naive small
investors and
would have charged these innocents high fees and commissions.
此外，透过所罗门我们完成另外两件案子，两者也都有相当有趣的特点，一件是在五
月我们发行了517,500股的B级股，总共募得5.65亿美元的资金，关于这件案子，
先前我就已经做过相关的说明，主要是因应坊间有些模仿Berkshire的基金，避免他
们以Berkshire过去傲人的绩效记录对外吸引一些不知情的小额投资人，在收取高昂
的手续费与佣金之后，却无法提供给投资人一个令人满意的投资结果。
I think it would have been quite easy for such trusts to
have sold
many billions of dollars worth of units, and I also believe
that early
marketing successes by these trusts would have led to the
formation of
others. (In the securities business, whatever can be sold
will be sold.)
The trusts would have meanwhile indiscriminately poured
the proceeds of
their offerings into a supply of Berkshire shares that
is fixed and
limited. The likely result: a speculative bubble in our
stock. For at
least a time, the price jump would have been self-validating,
in that it
would have pulled new waves of naive and impressionable
investors into
the trusts and set off still more buying of Berkshire shares.
我相信这些仿Berkshire基金可以很容易募得大笔的资金，而我也认为在这些基金成
功募集到资金之后，一定还会有更多的基金跟进打着我们的旗号对外吸收资金，在证
券业，没有什么是卖不掉的东西，而这些基金无可避免的会将所募得的资金大举投入
到Berkshire现有少数的股票投资组合，最后的结果很可能是Berkshire本身以及其
概念股股价暴涨而泡沫化，然后股价的上涨很可能又会吸引新一波的无知且敏感的投
资人蜂拥投入这些基金，造成进一步的恶性循环。
Some Berkshire shareholders choosing to exit might have
found that
outcome ideal, since they could have profited at the expense
of the
buyers entering with false hopes. Continuing shareholders,
however,
would have suffered once reality set in, for at that point
Berkshire
would have been burdened with both hundreds of thousands
of unhappy,
indirect owners (trustholders, that is) and a stained reputation.
有些Berkshire的股东可能会发现这是一个大好的机会，因为可以利用新加入者不当
的预期而想要趁机出脱持股赚取额外的利益，但在此同时选择继续留下来的股东却必
须承担后来的苦果，因为等到回归现实后，我们会发现Berkshire会有一群成千上万
高档套牢的间接股东(亦即基金投资人)，以及受到毁损的企业清誉。
Our issuance of the B shares not only arrested the sale
of the
trusts, but provided a low-cost way for people to invest
in Berkshire if
they still wished to after hearing the warnings we issued.
To blunt the
enthusiasm that brokers normally have for pushing new issues
- because
that's where the money is - we arranged for our offering
to carry a
commission of only 1.5%, the lowest payoff that we have
ever seen in a
common stock underwriting. Additionally, we made the amount
of the
offering open-ended, thereby repelling the typical IPO
buyer who looks
for a short-term price spurt arising from a combination
of hype and
scarcity.
B级普通股的发行正可以抑止这些仿Berkshire基金的销售，同时提供小额投资人投
资Berkshire的低成本管道，如果在他们听过我之前所提出的警告后仍执意要投资的
话，而为了降低经纪人一般喜欢推销新股发行的习惯(因为这是真正有赚头的所在)，
我们刻意将承销佣金降到1.5%，这是所有发行新股承销佣金最低的比率，此外我们
对发行新股的数量不设上限，以避免一些专门投资初次上市股票抢帽子的投机客，利
用新股数量稀少而刻意炒作赚取短期股价飙涨的差价。
Overall, we tried to make sure that the B stock would be
purchased
only by investors with a long-term perspective. Those efforts
were
generally successful: Trading volume in the B shares immediately
following the offering - a rough index of "flipping"
- was far below the
norm for a new issue. In the end we added about 40,000
shareholders,
most of whom we believe both understand what they own and
share our time
horizons.
总而言之，我们希望买进B级普通股的投资人是真正希望长期投资的，事实证明我们
的做法相当成功，在公开发行后的B级普通股成交量(亦即代表换手的情形)远低于一
般初次上市的股票，结果总计我们因此新增了40,000名的股东，我相信他们大部分
都了解他们到底在投资什么，同时与我们拥有相同的经营理念。
Salomon could not have performed better in the handling
of this
unusual transaction. Its investment bankers understood
perfectly what we
were trying to achieve and tailored every aspect of the
offering to meet
these objectives. The firm would have made far more money
- perhaps ten
times as much - if our offering had been standard in its
make-up. But
the investment bankers involved made no attempt to tweak
the specifics in
that direction. Instead they came up with ideas that were
counter to
Salomon's financial interest but that made it much more
certain
Berkshire's goals would be reached. Terry Fitzgerald captained
this
effort, and we thank him for the job that he did.
在这次不常见的交易中，所罗门的表现好得不能再好了，身为我们的投资银行，他们
充分了解我们想要达成的目标，从而量身订做，提供符合我们需要的服务，事实上若
是按照一般的标准模式，所罗门应该可以赚进更多钱，有可能比现在多十倍以上，不
过他们并没有刻意引导我们这样子去做，相反地有时他们还是提出一些对自己本身利
益冲突，但却有助于Berkshire达成目的的一些建议，感谢Terry这次为我们操刀所
做的努力与贡献。
Given that background, it won't surprise you to learn that
we again
went to Terry when we decided late in the year to sell
an issue of
Berkshire notes that can be exchanged for a portion of
the Salomon shares
that we hold. In this instance, once again, Salomon did
an absolutely
first-class job, selling $500 million principal amount
of five-year notes
for $447.1 million. Each $1,000 note is exchangeable into
17.65 shares
and is callable in three years at accreted value. Counting
the original
issue discount and a 1% coupon, the securities will provide
a yield of 3%
to maturity for holders who do not exchange them for Salomon
stock. But
it seems quite likely that the notes will be exchanged
before their
maturity. If that happens, our interest cost will be about
1.1% for the
period prior to exchange.
基于这样的背景，大家不难想象当Berkshire决定发行以所持有的所罗门股份做为转
换标的的可转换票券时，我们又再度找上Terry，再一次所罗门的表现一流，卖出以
五年为期、总面额五亿美元的票券，共取得4.471亿美元的资金，每张面额1,000
美元的票券可以转换成17.65股的所罗门股份，同时有权在三年后要求以账面价值卖
回，总计原先票面折价加上1%的票面利息，此证券可以给予到期不选择转换成所罗
门股份的投资人3%的报酬率，不过我想投资人在到期前选择不转换的机率微乎其
微，若果真如此，在转换前我们实际负担的利率成本大约在1.1%左右。
In recent years, it has been written that Charlie and I
are unhappy
about all investment-banking fees. That's dead wrong. We
have paid a
great many fees over the last 30 years - beginning with
the check we
wrote to Charlie Heider upon our purchase of National Indemnity
in 1967 -
and we are delighted to make payments that are commensurate
with
performance. In the case of the 1996 transactions at Salomon
Brothers,
we more than got our money's worth.
近年来，媒体不断报导查理跟我对于支付投资银行所有的费用都很感冒，这样的报导
完全不对，事实上做过去三十年来，从1967年我们请Charlie Heider协助我们买
下国家赔偿保险公司开始，我们就很乐于签支票给他们，只要他们所提供的服务与表
现值得的话，而以1996年所罗门这次的案子来说，我们就觉得物超所值。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
Though it was a close decision, Charlie and I have decided
to enter
the 20th Century. Accordingly, we are going to put future
quarterly and
annual reports of Berkshire on the Internet, where they
can be accessed
via http://www.berkshirehathaway.com. We will always "post"
these
reports on a Saturday so that anyone interested will have
ample time to
digest the information before trading begins. Our publishing
schedule
for the next 12 months is May 17, 1997, August 16, 1997,
November 15,
1997, and March 14, 1998. We will also post any press releases
that we
issue.
虽然这个决定有点赶，查理跟我本人已决定正式跨入二十世纪，我们决定从现在开始
将在公司网络上公布每季与每年最新的Berkshire年报，大家可以透过以下这个网址
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com.找到相关的讯息，我们会固定选在星期六把
报告摆上去，主要的目的是希望大家能够有充足的时间在股市开盘做出进出的决定，
预计未来一年内公布报告的时间为1997年5月17日、8月16日、11月15日以
及1998年3月14日，同时网站上也会有我们对外发布的其它公开讯息。
At some point, we may stop mailing our quarterly reports
and simply
post these on the Internet. This move would eliminate significant
costs.
Also, we have a large number of "street name"
holders and have found
that the distribution of our quarterlies to them is highly
erratic: Some
holders receive their mailings weeks later than others.
在此同时，我们也将停止过去邮寄每季季报的习惯，而直接将它们公布在公司网站
上，此举不但可以大幅减少邮寄的成本，同时也因为我们有一些股东的股份是登记在
别人的名下，这使得季报最后送到真正股东手上的时间很不一定，有的股东收到报告
的时间整整比其它股东晚了好几个礼拜。
The drawback to Internet-only distribution is that many
of our
shareholders lack computers. Most of these holders, however,
could
easily obtain printouts at work or through friends. Please
let me know
if you prefer that we continue mailing quarterlies. We
want your input -
starting with whether you even read these reports - and
at a minimum will
make no change in 1997. Also, we will definitely keep delivering
the
annual report in its present form in addition to publishing
it on the
Internet.
当然透过网络公布也有一个很大的缺点，那就是许多我们的股东从来不使用计算机，当
然大家还是可以透过同事或朋友的帮助把它们给打印下来，如果大家觉得还是用寄得
比较好的话可以向我反应，我们很想听听大家的意见，至少在1997年还是会持续原
来的做法，另外必须强调的是，每年的年报除了在网络上公布之外，依然还是会用邮
寄的方式送到各位的手上。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1996
shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made were
$13.3 million, and 3,910 charities were recipients. A full
description
of the shareholder-designated contributions program appears
on pages 48-
49.
大约有97.2%的有效股权参与1996年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,330万
美元捐出的款项分配给3,910家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because
they
don't have their shares registered in their own names on
the prescribed
record date or because they fail to get the designation
form back to us
within the 60-day period allowed. This is distressing to
Charlie and me.
But if replies are received late, we have to reject them
because we
can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing
to make them
for others.
每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天
的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计划，
对此查理跟我感到相当头痛，不过我们必须忍痛将这些指定捐赠剔除，因为我们不
可能在拒绝其它不符合规定股东的同时，还破例让这些人参与。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A
shares that
are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the
nominee name of a
broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on
August 31, 1997,
will be ineligible for the 1997 program. When you get the
form, return
it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
想要参加这项计划者，请必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自
己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1997年8月31日之前完成
登记，才有权利参与1997年的捐赠计划，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，
以免被丢在一旁给忘记了。
The Annual Meeting
股东年会
Our capitalist's version of Woodstock -the Berkshire Annual
Meeting-
will be held on Monday, May 5. Charlie and I thoroughly
enjoy this
event, and we hope that you come. We will start at 9:30
a.m., break for
about 15 minutes at noon (food will be available - but
at a price, of
course), and then continue talking to hard-core attendees
until at least
3:30. Last year we had representatives from all 50 states,
as well as
Australia, Greece, Israel, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. The annual meeting is a time for owners
to get their
business-related questions answered, and therefore Charlie
and I will
stay on stage until we start getting punchy. (When that
happens, I hope
you notice a change.)
资本家版的伍斯达克音乐会-Berkshire股东年会将在五月五日星期一举行，查理跟我
实在是很喜欢这场盛会，所以我们很希望大家都能来，会议预计从早上9点半正式开
始，中午休息15分钟(现场备有餐点，不过必须付费)，然后会继续与许多死忠的股
东谈到下午三点半，去年全美50州都有股东代表出席，另外还有来自海外地区，如
澳洲、希腊、以色列、葡萄牙、新加坡、瑞典、瑞士以及英国等国家，股东年会是公
司股东可以得到有关公司经营所有问题解答的场合，所以查理跟我一定会竭尽所能地
回答各位提出的问题，直到我们头昏脑胀为止(如果查理跟我有异状时，希望各位能及
时发现)。
Last year we had attendance of 5,000 and strained the capacity
of
the Holiday Convention Centre, even though we spread out
over three
rooms. This year, our new Class B shares have caused a
doubling of our
stockholder count, and we are therefore moving the meeting
to the
Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 10,000 and also has
a huge parking
lot. The doors will open for the meeting at 7:00 a.m.,
and at 8:30 we
will - upon popular demand - show a new Berkshire movie
produced by Marc
Hamburg, our CFO. (In this company, no one gets by with
doing only a
single job.)
去年总共有5,000名股东与会，虽然我们预先另外准备了三间小会议室，不过还是把
当时的会场- Holiday会议中心给挤爆了，今年由于发行B级普通股的关系使得我们
的股东人数又增加了整整一倍，因此我们决定把开会的场地移到可以容纳10,000人
同时备有宽广停车场的阿肯萨本体育馆，大门会在当天早上七点开放，同时在八点
半，我们会播放由财务长Marc Hamburg制作的全新Berkshire电影短片供大家欣
赏(在Berkshire所有人都必须身兼数职)。
Overcoming our legendary repugnance for activities even
faintly
commercial, we will also have an abundant array of Berkshire
products for
sale in the halls outside the meeting room. Last year we
broke all
records, selling 1,270 pounds of See's candy, 1,143 pairs
of Dexter
shoes, $29,000 of World Books and related publications,
and 700 sets of
knives manufactured by our Quikut subsidiary. Additionally,
many
shareholders made inquiries about GEICO auto policies.
If you would like
to investigate possible insurance savings, bring your present
policy to
the meeting. We estimate that about 40% of our shareholders
can save
money by insuring with us. (We'd like to say 100%, but
the insurance
business doesn't work that way: Because insurers differ
in their
underwriting judgments, some of our shareholders are currently
paying
rates that are lower than GEICO's.)
为了克服大家对于商业气息的厌恶，我们在会场外大厅备有Berkshire各式各样的产
品供大家选购，去年我们打破记录，总共卖出1,270磅的糖果、1,143双的鞋子以
及价值超过29,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，外加700只由旗下子公司
Quikut所生产的小刀，另外在现场许多股东询问有关GEICO汽车保险的信息，如果
你想在汽车保险费上省一笔钱，记得把你现在的保单带到现场，我们估计至少有40%
的股东可以因此而节省不少保费(我很想说100%，不过保险业实务的经营并非如此，
因为每家保险业者对于风险的估计都不同，事实上，我们有些股东支付的保费就比跟
GEICO投保要来得低)。
An attachment to the proxy material enclosed with this
report
explains how you can obtain the card you will need for
admission to the
meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get both plane and
hotel
reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634)
will be happy to
help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses
servicing the
larger hotels to take you to and from the meeting, and
also to take you
to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport
after it is over.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关数据，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通(电话
800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会安排巴士接
送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝
店或是到饭店与机场。
NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile
from
Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10
a.m. to 6 p.m.
on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Come by and
say hello to
"Mrs. B" (Rose Blumkin). She's 103 now and sometimes
operates with an
oxygen mask that is attached to a tank on her cart. But
if you try to
keep pace with her, it will be you who needs oxygen. NFM
did about $265
million of business last year - a record for a single-location
home
furnishings operation - and you'll see why once you check
out its
merchandise and prices.
占地75英亩的NFM主馆距离会场约1英哩远，营业时间平日从早上10点到
下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午6点，
记得去向Rose Blumkin-B太太问好，她今年高龄103岁，有时还会戴上氧气罩在
轮椅上工作，不过如果你想要跟得上她的脚步，需要氧气的可能是你，NFM去年的
营业额高达2.65亿美元，这是全美单一家具店营业的新高记录，记得去现场查一查
商品的种类与标价，你就会知道原因了。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open
for
shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 4th. Last year
on
"Shareholder Sunday" we broke every Borsheim's
record in terms of
tickets, dollar volume and, no doubt, attendees per square
inch. Because
we expect a capacity crowd this year as well, all shareholders
attending
on Sunday must bring their admission cards. Shareholders
who prefer a
somewhat less frenzied experience will get the same special
treatment on
Saturday, when the store is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.,
or on Monday
between 10 a.m. and 8 p.m. Come by at any time this year
and let Susan
Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, and her skilled associates perform
a painless
walletectomy on you.
平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在五月四日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开放，从
中午开到下午6点，去年在星期六股东会前一天，我们打破了波仙单日的订单量与营
业额记录，当然还包括每平方英吋的参观人数记录，今年我们考量到参观人数还会再
增加，所以大家在当天一定要准备好入场证，当然不想人挤人的股东可以选择在前一
天或后一天前往参观，星期六从早上10点开到下午5点半，星期一则从早上10点
开到晚上8点，无论如何今年大家一定要来看看波仙的总裁Susan是如何施展她的
技巧将你的荷包给掏空。
My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, was sold out last year
on the
weekend of the annual meeting, even though it added an
additional seating
at 4 p.m. on Sunday. You can make reservations beginning
on April 1st
(but not earlier) by calling 402-551-3733. I will be at
Gorat's on
Sunday after Borsheim's, having my usual rare T-bone and
double order of
hashbrowns. I can also recommend - this is the standard
fare when Debbie
Bosanek, my invaluable assistant, and I go to lunch - the
hot roast beef
sandwich with mashed potatoes and gravy. Mention Debbie's
name and you
will be given an extra boat of gravy.
我个人最爱的牛排馆-Gorat's去年在股东年会的那个周末完全客满，虽然临时还在星
期天下午四点多排出的一个空档，今年该餐厅从四月一号开始接受预订(电话402-
551-3733)，我会在星期天参加完波仙珠宝的活动后到Gorat's享用我最常点的丁骨
牛排加上双份的肉丸，当然我也推荐我的宝贝助理Debbie标准的菜单-生烤牛肉三
明治外加马铃薯泥与肉汤，记得报上Debbie的名号，你就可以多得到一碗肉汤。
The Omaha Royals and Indianapolis Indians will play baseball
on
Saturday evening, May 3rd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Pitching
in my normal
rotation - one throw a year - I will start.
在前一天5月3日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家队对印
第安纳拿波里市印第安人队的比赛，一如往年轮到由我先发，每一年就投那么一球。
Though Rosenblatt is normal in appearance, it is anything
but: The
field sits on a unique geological structure that occasionally
emits short
gravitational waves causing even the most smoothly-delivered
pitch to
sink violently. I have been the victim of this weird phenomenon
several
times in the past but am hoping for benign conditions this
year. There
will be lots of opportunities for photos at the ball game,
but you will
need incredibly fast reflexes to snap my fast ball en route
to the plate.
虽然Rosenblatt球场的外观看起来与其它球场没有多大的不同，不过它的投手丘地
形却相当特殊，有时会发出特殊的重力短波，导致本来很平稳投出的球突然急速往下
坠，过去有好几次我都成为这种怪异自然现象的受害者，不过我还是希望今年的情况
会好一点，虽然当天会场有许多拍照的机会，不过我还是奉劝大家的快门要抓准一
点，才能完整捕捉由我投出向本垒板急速奔去的快速球。
Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining
tickets to
the game. We will also provide an information packet listing
restaurants
that will be open on Sunday night and describing various
things that you
can do in Omaha on the weekend. The entire gang at Berkshire
looks
forward to seeing you.
股东会数据将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，同时我们也会提供星期天晚上会开
张的餐厅信息，同时列出假日期间在奥玛哈你可以从事的活动介绍，Berkshire总部
所有成员都期待能够见到大家。
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1997 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1997年2月28日
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