巴菲特写给股东的信 (一九九四年)度

 


   BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%.

Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took

over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or

at a rate of 23% compounded annually.

 

1994年本公司的净值成长了14.5亿美元或是14.3%,总计过去30年以来,
也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后,每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的
10,083美元,年复合成长率约为23%。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner,

and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer,

however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come

close to matching the performance of the past.

查理.孟格-Berkshire的主要合伙人跟我本身很少做预测,不过有一点我们倒
是很确定,那就是Berkshire未来的表现将很难再像过去那样的辉煌。

The problem is not that what has worked in the past will

cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that

our formula - the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that

have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able

people - is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect,

therefore, to keep on doing well.

问题不在于过去的方法在以后会不管用,相反的,我们认为我们的成功方程式-
那就是以合理的价格买进具有产业竞争优势同时由诚实有才干的人经营的做
法,在往后同样能够获致令人满意的结果,我们预估应该可以继续保持这种好成
绩。

A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment

results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion

compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage

the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever,

it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential

in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly

reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not

worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only

if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given

that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk

dramatically.

然而皮夹子太厚,却是投资成果的大敌,目前Berkshire的净值已高达119亿
美元,还记得当初查理跟我开始经营这家公司时,公司的净值只有2,200万美
元,虽然还是一样有许多好的公司,但却很难在找到规模够大的对象,(就像是
查理常常说的,如果一件事情不值得去做,那么就算是你把它做的再好也没有用)
现在我们只考虑买进至少一亿美元以上的投资,在这样的高门坎下,Berkshire
的投资世界,一下子缩小了许多。

Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us

here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in

The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be

a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the

first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out

of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250

hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for

opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."

尽管如此,我们才是会坚持让我们成功的方法,绝对不会放宽原有的标准,Ted
Williams在我妻子的故事中写到,我个人的看法是如果你想成为一个优秀的打
击者的话,首先你得先相中一颗好球来打,这是教科书里的第一课,如果强迫自
己在不中意的好球带挥棒,我绝对无法成为打击率3成44的强打者,而可能变
成2成5的普通球员,查理跟我都很同意这样的看法,所以我们宁愿静静的等
待球儿滑进我们喜欢的好球带。

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts,

which are an expensive distraction for many investors and

businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the

huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two

oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of

the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or

treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

对于坊间一般投资人与商业人士相当迷信的政治与经济的预测,我们仍将保持视
而不见的态度,三十年来,没有人能够正确地预测到越战会持续扩大、工资与价
格管制、两次的石油危机、总统的辞职下台以及苏联的解体、道琼在一天之内大
跌508点或者是国库券殖利率在2.8%与17.4%之间巨幅波动。

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the

slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did

they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses

at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let

a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of

capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when

apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the

foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

不过令人惊讶的是,这些曾经轰动一时的重大事件却从未让班哲明.葛拉罕的投
资哲学造成丝毫的损伤,也从没有让以合理的价格买进优良的企业看起来有任何
的不妥,想象一下,若是我们因为这些莫名的恐惧而延迟或改变我们运用资金的
态度,将会使我们付出多少的代价,事实上,我们通常都是利用某些历史事件发
生,悲观气氛到达顶点时,找到最好的进场机会,恐惧虽然是盲从者的敌人,但
却是基本面信徒的好朋友。

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next

30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit

from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we

have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little

effect on our long-term results.

在往后的三十年间,一定还会有一连串令人震惊的事件发生,我们不会妄想要去
预测它或是从中获利,如果我们还能够像过去那样找到优良的企业,那么长期而
言,外在的意外对我们的影响实属有限。

What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that

during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie

and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will

you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation

arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside

than the downside.

而就像我曾经承诺过的,除了获利没办法像以前那么好之外,你们在Berkshire
股权所得到的待遇将会与查理和我一完全致,如果你遭受损失,我们也不好过,
如果我们吃香的,那么你们也就跟着喝辣的,而且我们绝对不会靠任何奖金报酬
制度让我们多占点便宜而破坏这样美好的关系。

We further promise you that our personal fortunes will

remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will

not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money

elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment

portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many

friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in

the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.

此外我们也向大家保证我个人绝大部份的身家都将继续摆在Berkshire的股份
之上,我们不会在央求各位参与我们投资的同时,还把自己的钱摆在别的地方,
甚至于巴菲特家族以及查理跟我在1960年代经营合伙企业时期的老朋友,所拥
有的投资绝大部份也都是以Berkshire股份为主。

Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years

ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities

having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire

share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those

securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only

about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various

manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were

almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses

in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest

expense.

值得庆幸的是,我们可以在一个很好的基础上努力打拼,十年前,也就是在1984
年,Berkshire的保险子公司持有价值17亿美元的股票投资组合,每股约当有
1,500美元的投资,扣除这部份的收益与资本利得不算,Berkshire当年的税前
盈余只有区区的600万美元,没错,虽然我们在制造、零售以及服务事业方面
依然有不错的利润,但是大部分的盈余都被保险事业的承保损失、营业费用以及
利息支出所抵消掉。

Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000

per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these

securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million.

During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000

(including eleven people at World Headquarters).

时至今日,我们持有的股票投资组合价值超过180亿美元,每股约当有15,000
美元,若是再一次我们将这些股票投资所产生的收益扣除的话,我们在1994年
的税前盈余是3.84亿美元,十年来,雇用的员工人数从原先的5,000人增加到
22,000人,(包含企业总部的11人在内)。

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps

of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some

ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing

a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows

hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.

之所以能有这样的成果,要归功于旗下这群特别的经理人,是他们让那些看起来
很普通平凡的事业能有不凡的结果,Casey曾经把他带领一支棒球队的工作,形
容为靠着别人击出全垒打赚钱过活,这也是我在Berkshire维生的方式。

The businesses in which we have partial interests are

equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will

illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280

billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on

each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of

Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings,

which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200

million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has

a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by

revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250

million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion

bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire

Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.

我们持有少数股权企业的贡献,对Berkshire来说也功不可没,从一些统计数字
中,可以看出他们的重要性,1994年可口可乐总计卖出2,800亿罐八盎斯饮
料,每罐大概能赚一美分,不过积沙成塔,若按Berkshire拥有7.8%可口可乐
的股权比例,我们大概可以分配到210亿罐,总计光是饮料贡献给我们的盈余
就有二亿美元;同样的,透过对于吉列的持股,Berkshire大概可以分得全世界
刮胡刀7%的市场占有率(以营收而非销量计算),约为2.5亿美元的销售额;另
外在拥有530亿美元资产的富国银行,我们持有13%的股权大概就等于是一家
拥有70亿美元资产同时每年获利一亿美元的银行。

It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope

diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just

mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't

limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a

growing collection.

我们宁愿拥有天然钻石的一小部份,也不要有100%的人工钻石,而刚刚提到的
那些公司堪称为天然的稀有宝石,更难得的是我们不是只拥有现在这一些,以后
还会得到更多更多。

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply

- and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time,

however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of

businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a

satisfactory rate.

股票价格仍会持续波动,有时幅度会很大,同时经济景气的循环也会上上下下,
然而就长期而言,我们相信所拥有的这类优良企业的价值很有可能还会继续以稳
定的速度成长。

Book Value and Intrinsic Value

账面价值与实质价值

We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily

calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly,

we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is

impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.

我们会固定公布每股的账面价值,虽然它的用处不大,但这总算是一个比较容易
计算的数字,就像是我们一再提醒各位真正重要的是实质价值,虽然这个数字没
有办法准确计算但却有必要将以估算。

For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that

Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that

figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since

all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable

textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern

nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964,

then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance

sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a

Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the

liabilities are solid."

例如我们可以很确定的告诉大家1964年每股的账面价值是19.46美元,不过
这个数字很明显的高于其实质的价值,因为公司的资产主要集中于获利不怎么理
想的纺织事业,我们纺织资产的继续经营或清算价值都远比不上账面价值,所以
任何想要了解1964年Berkshire资产负债表健全性的人士,得到的答案跟恶名
昭彰的好莱坞大亨可能给你的答案一样,「放心好了,所有的负债都如假包
换!」。

Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the

businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying

value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette,

are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you

book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough,

albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's

intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in

concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate

gain in intrinsic value also.

如今Berkshire的情况已完全倒转,我们掌控的许多企业其实际的价值远高于帐
面价值,(至于无法掌控的公司,如可口可乐或吉列刮胡刀则是以目前市价列
示),不过我们还是照旧提供各位账面价值的数字,因为虽然这项数字被严重低
估,但仍然可以被当作为追踪Berkshire实质价值的一项指针,事实上,以去年
来说,这两项数字以颇为一致的速度变动,账面价值增加了13.9%,而实质价
值大概也是以这个速度成长。

We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the

cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining

life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up

with a highly subjective figure that will change both as

estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates

move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-

important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative

attractiveness of investments and businesses.

我们将实质价值定义为一家企业在其生涯中所能产生现金流量的折现值,任何人
在计算实质价值都必须特别注意未来现金流量的修正与利率的变动都会影响到
最后计算出来的结果,虽然模糊难辨,但实质价值却是最重要的,也是唯一能够
作为评估投资标的与企业的合理方法。

To see how historical input (book value) and future output

(intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of

investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost

as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should

include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he

chose college rather than a job.

为了了解历史投入的账面价值与未来产出的实质价值会有怎样不同的演变,让我
看看另外一种不同形式的投资-大学教育,假设把教育成本当作是账面价值,再
算的仔细一点,还要包含学生因为读书而放弃工作收入的机会成本。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic

benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic

value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate

will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an

estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his

education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must

then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to

graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic

value of the education.

在这里,我们姑且先不论非经济的效益而只专注于经济效益,首先,我们必须先
估计这位毕业生在毕业后终其一生的职场生涯所能得到的收入,然后再扣除要是
他没有接受这项教育,原本可以得到的收入,从而我们可以得到因为这项投资,
他可以获得的额外收入,当然之后还要利用一个适当的利率加以折现,得到截至
毕业日止的折现值,所得到的数字也就等于这场教育所能够带来的实质经济价
值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their

education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever

paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other

cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its

book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In

all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an

indicator of intrinsic value.

有些毕业生可能会发现其账面成本可能远高于计算出来的实质价值,这就代表着
不值得他去接受这样的教育,相对地,要是接受教育所产生的实质价值远高于投
入的成本,那么就表示这样的投资是明智的抉择,不过不管怎样,有一点很明确
的,那就是实质价值的多寡跟账面投入成本一点关系都没有。

Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an

example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not

only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic

value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that

I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've

chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to

be a huge winner.

若各位觉得这种说法学究气太重,就让我们以Berkshire本身实际投资史考特飞
兹的经验当做具体的例证,在这里我们不但可以解释账面价值与实质价值之间的
关系会有多大的变化,同时可以藉此替大家上一课期待已久的会计学,当然这次
我选择说明的对象是一个相当成功的购并投资案。

Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986.

At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and

today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no

disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby,

and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important

contributors to earnings as well.

Berkshire是在1986年初买下史考特飞兹的,在当时这家公司拥有22项不同
的事业,时至今日我们没有新增,也没有处分其中任何一项,史考特飞兹主要的
营运集中在世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与Campbell空压机,当然其余的事业对
盈余的贡献也相当重要。

We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time

had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we

handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic

value was close to double its book value.

当时我们斥资3.152亿美元买下账面价值1.726亿美元的史考特飞兹,超过的
1.426亿美元溢价,代表着我们认为这家公司的实质价值大概是其账面价值的两
倍。

In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer,

as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.

下表显示的是自我们买下史考特飞兹后,历年来的账面价值以及它的获利与股利
收入。

(1) (4)

Beginning (2) (3) Ending

Year Book Value Earnings Dividends Book Value

---- ---------- -------- --------- ----------

(In $ Millions) (1)+(2)-(3)

1986 ............... $172.6 $ 40.3 $125.0 $ 87.9

1987 ............... 87.9 48.6 41.0 95.5

1988 ............... 95.5 58.0 35.0 118.6

1989 ............... 118.6 58.5 71.5 105.5

1990 ............... 105.5 61.3 33.5 133.3

1991 ............... 133.3 61.4 74.0 120.7

1992 ............... 120.7 70.5 80.0 111.2

1993 ............... 111.2 77.5 98.0 90.7

1994 ............... 90.7 79.3 76.0 94.0

Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott

Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in

1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that

we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance

sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when

we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used

by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants

and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like.

Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a

conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.

因为在购并交易完成当年,公司帐上有多余的现金,所以虽然史考特飞兹1986
年的获利只有4,030万美元,但却能够支付Berkshire 1.25亿美元的股利,另
外还有一点我必须强调的是,在史考特飞兹我们并没有运用任何的财务杠杆,事
实上,该公司在我们购并之初的负债便相当有限,之后甚至还掉了所有的债务(除
了财务子公司的借款),同时我们也没有把工厂卖掉再租回来或是出售应收帐款
之类的举动,在我们拥有的这几年,史考特飞兹一直以相当保守的财务杠杆经营
并且维持相当高的流动性。

As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased

steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown

commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was

exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly

extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by

comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500,

a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.

大家可以看到,史考特飞兹的盈余在我们买下之后持续稳定的增加,不过在此同
时净值却未呈等比例的增加,也因此在我们买下该公司时,就已经相当不错的股
东权益报酬率,到现在又变得更加优异,我们甚至可以拿它与财星五百大作比
较,事实上以史考特飞兹的规模,若单独计便得以列入五百大之林。

Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest

available for inspection - the company's return on equity would

have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top

three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord

Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none

of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those

they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in

bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating

windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it

first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed,

Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company

ranking tenth.

以所能得到最新的1993年五百大名单来说,该公司的股东权益报酬率可以名列
第四,故事还没结束,前三名分别是Insilco、LTV与Gaylord,全部都是因为
当年度脱离破产边缘,除了当年因为债务获得免除致使盈余暴增之外,其它年度
的获利皆乏善可陈,因此若扣除这些没什么营运的烂果子的话,史考特飞兹的股
东权益报酬率足以名列财星五百大首位,远远比其它对手抛在脑后,甚至是第十
名的两倍之多。

You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be

explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic

position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather,

the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO

Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.

或许你会认为史考特飞兹的成功不过是盈余循环的高峰、独占垄断或是靠财务杠
杆,不过全都不对,这家公司真正成功的原因在于总裁Ralph Schey优异的管
理技能,这点在后面我们还会详加报告。

First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we

paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer,

that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet.

I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid

out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the

bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in

almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges

that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings

statement.

接下来是之前说过的会计课,我们支付超过史考特飞兹账面价值1.426亿美元
的溢价,将会被记录在Berkshire的资产负债表上,详细的细节我就予以省略(这
些在我们1986年年报的附录都有),而溢价在登录之后,不管怎样都必须按年
摊销当作成本,并显现在每年的盈余报表之上。

The following table shows, first, the annual charges

Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer

acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our

books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay,

and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many

accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for

us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so

that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott

Fetzer actually employs in its business.

下表显示,第一栏是Berkshire每年必须慢慢地摊销购买史考特飞兹所产生的溢
价的余额,第二栏是每年必须摊销的金额,这些费用对现金部位或税负支出都不
会有影响,同时就我们的观点而言,也没有任何实质的经济意义(虽然很多会计
师可能不同意我们的看法),这不过是让我们的帐列投资成本能够慢慢减少,到
最后终与史考特飞兹本身帐列净值一致的方法而已。

Beginning Purchase-Premium Ending

Purchase Charge to Purchase

Year Premium Berkshire Earnings Premium

---- --------- ------------------ --------

(In $ Millions)

1986 ................ $142.6 $ 11.6 $131.0

1987 ................ 131.0 7.1 123.9

1988 ................ 123.9 7.9 115.9

1989 ................ 115.9 7.0 108.9

1990 ................ 108.9 7.1 101.9

1991 ................ 101.9 6.9 95.0

1992 ................ 95.0 7.7 87.2

1993 ................ 87.2 28.1 59.1

1994 ................ 59.1 4.9 54.2

Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to

$54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's year-

end book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which

is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's

books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for

the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now

earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic

value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have

just as consistently marked down its carrying value through

purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and

net worth.

大家可能注意到截至1994年底为止,帐列的溢价还剩下5,420万美元,这个
数字若再加上史考特飞兹当年底的净值9,400万美元的话,就等于Berkshire
帐上持有该公司的投资成本1.482亿美元,这个数字甚至不到当初我们买下它
时的一半不到,然而史考特飞兹现在每年所赚的钱,却是当时的二倍,很明显的,
其实质价值一直都在成长,然而透过溢价摊销,Berkshire帐上持有的投资成本
却一再向下调整。

The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and

its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I

mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit

for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart

and high-grade manager.

史考特飞兹实质价值与其在Berkshire帐上的账面价值差距越来越大,如同先前
我曾经提到而现在也很高兴在重申一次,这种不对称的现象完全都要归功于
Ralph Schey-这位专注、聪明且高格调的经理人。

The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben

Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not

necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary

results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this

statement holds true in business management as well. What a

manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted.

That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals

and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side,

Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and

is self-confident without being self-important.

Ralph之所以能够成功的原因并不复杂,我的老师葛拉汉四十五年前就告诉我,
画蛇不必添足,尔后在我个人的投资生涯,我相当惊讶地发现,这道理也适用在
企业管理之上,经理人真正应该做的是把基本工夫做好而不分心,这正是Ralph
的做事方法,在设立好正确的目标后,并毫不犹豫放手去做,至于在私底下,
Ralph也是很好共事的人,对于问题他坦率直言,自信却不自大。

He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I

do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At

Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie

and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's

picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a

mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.

我忘了经验丰富的Ralph今年真正的岁数? 但我确信他跟我们旗下其它许多经
理人一样,老早就过了65岁,在Berkshire,我们注重的是绩效,而不是年资,
查理今年71岁,而我64岁,两人都把拳王George Foreman的照片摆在桌上,
你可以记下,我们对于强制退休年龄的反感将会与日俱增。

Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation

实质价值与资金分配

Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers

as it is for investors. When managers are making capital

allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares -

it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share

intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle

may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when

misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.

了解实质价值,对经理人来说,其重要性与投资人一般,当经理人本身在做资金
分配的决策时-也包含决定买回股份,必须确定这些举动能够增加公司的实质价
值,并尽量避免损害实质价值的举动,这原则看来理所当然,但是违反的情况却
屡见不鲜,而只要不当的决策形成,股东的权益立即就会受到伤害。

For example, in contemplating business mergers and

acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the

transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings

per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book

value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going

back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old

first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic

interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA

student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger

of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer

would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what

could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?

举例来说,在思考企业合并与购并活动时,许多经理人都会专注于每股盈余是会
被稀释或是反稀释(或是在金融机构,则是每股账面价值),过分强调这点是相当
危险的,回到我们先前所举大学教育的例子,假设一位25岁MBA一年级的学
生,考虑将他个人未来的经济利益与另一位25岁的工人做结合,他会发现如果
现在尚无谋生能力的他,要是现在与工人做一比一的合并的话,他往后几年的赚
钱能力将会立即大幅提升,但是你想这位MBA会笨到接受这样的提议吗?

In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-

be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective

acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of

non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At

Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase

opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term

earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value.

Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice:

"Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a

result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer

than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.

谈到企业购并,对于可能的买主来说,只专注于现在的获利情况却不管潜在的卖
方拥有不同的前景、不一样的非营业资产或不同的资本结构,是一件很愚蠢的
事,在Berkshire我们不知拒绝了多少那种虽然会让短期盈余美观但却可能损及
每股实质价值的合并案或投资机会;总之我们的方式乃效法Wayne Gretzky的
建议,要紧盯小精灵的去向而不是它现在的位置,结果长期下来比起运用一般的
投资标准方法,我们的股东因此多赚了好几十亿美元。

The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an

egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of

the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the

acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the

investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But,

alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders,

often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer

typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that

enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and

"you are running a chain letter in reverse."

很遗憾的是,大部分的购并交易案都充满了不公平性,对于被购并方来说,算是
得到解脱,购并一方的管理阶层则名利双收,旁边的投资银行家与专业顾问也都
能跟着大捞一笔,只不过真正受害的却是购并方背后全体的股东,他们损失惨
重,原因在于购并公司最后所得到的实质价值通常远比得到的低,就像是
Wachovia公司已退休的领导人John Medlin说,这种事做太多,就好像是在倒
写连锁信一样。

Over time, the skill with which a company's managers

allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's

value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates

far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use

internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money

to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But

often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or

investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make

sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you

need a $50,000 rug.

就长期而言,公司经理然滥用公司资金将会对企业的价值有很大的影响,我们认
为一家好公司所能贡献出的现金(至少是在早期),一定会超过其本身内部所需,
而公司当然可以透过分配股利或买回股份的方式回馈给股东,但是通常企业的
CEO会要求公司策略企划部门、顾问或是投资银行,做出购并一、两家公司的
必要性报告,这样的做法就好像是问你的室内设计师,你是否应该增添一条五万
美元的地毯。

The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological

bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they

possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive

is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be

acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't

disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged

by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a

teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex

life. It's not a push he needs.

这类购并问题又因为隐藏在背后的生物原始本能而变得更复杂,许多CEO之所
以能够做到这个位置,部份的原因在于他们先天拥有相当丰富的动物本能与自
尊,当然我们必须承认一位主管拥有这样的特质,有时对他们有极大的优势,然
而这种本能在他们爬上顶峰之后并不会消失,而当CEO被其顾问们鼓励去进行
购并交易时,我想他的反应跟一位青少年被父亲鼓励可以拥有正常的性生活一
样,这样的做法未免有点揠苗助长。

Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be

said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals.

This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining

to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life

insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through

the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he

abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply

said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."

几年前,我的一位CEO朋友半开玩笑地在无意间透露出许多大交易的病态心
理,我这位朋友经营的是一家产物意外险公司,当时他在董事会上向所有的成员
解释为何公司必须要取得一家人寿保险公司,在就经济与策略面解释了半天理由
之后,突然间他停止了演说,同时露出顽皮的眼神说道:「好吧!我承认,谁叫
其它人也都有一家。」

At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn

extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses.

As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy

their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left,

they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those

funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal

will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we

believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying

economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and

trust.

在Berkshire,我们的经理人不断地透过看似平凡普通的事业,赚取惊人的报
酬,这些经理人的第一步是先寻找可以充分利用其盈余的最佳方法,之后再把剩
余的资金交回给查理跟我,然后我们会试着为这些资金寻找更好的出路以创造出
更多的实质价值,我们的目标是取得我们熟悉了解、有持续竞争力且由我们喜
爱、崇拜与信任的经理人所经营的公司的部份或全部所有权。

Compensation

薪资报酬

At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as

about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey

based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of

Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible

for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock

option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally

capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting

home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at

Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over.

Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon

Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire

but Scott Fetzer is lagging?

在Berkshire,有关薪资报酬这方面,我们试着采取与处理资金分配时一样合理
的做法,举例来说,我们给付给Ralph Schey的报酬是根据他在史考特飞兹而
非Berkshire的成绩而定,这样的方式再合理不过了,因为他负责的是单一部门
而非全Berkshire的营运,若是将他的报酬全部锁在Berkshire的荣枯身上,对
Ralph Schey来说,其报酬将会显得不公平,比如说有可能他在史考特飞兹击出
全垒打但查理跟我却在Berkshire把事情给搞砸了,最后使得他的功劳与我们的
过错相抵销,而万一要是Berkshire别的部门大放异彩的同时,史考特飞兹的表
现却平平,那么Ralph Schey又有什么理由跟其它人一样分享Berkshire的获
利与奖金呢?


In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of

large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to

results in the area that a manager controls. When capital

invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge

managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and

credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.

在设定薪资报酬标准时,我们不会吝啬提出重赏的承诺,但绝对必须是在各个经
理人的职权范围内论功行赏,当我们决定对某项营运投入大笔资金时,我们会将
高额的资金利息成本算在其经理人的头上,相对地,当他们将多余的资金释回给
我们时,我们也会对等的利息收入记在其经理人的功劳簿上。

The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely

visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds

at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when

earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge.

But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental

investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly

to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-

way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to

send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his

business.

这种资金有价的游戏规则,在史考特飞兹决策上再清楚也不过了,如果Ralph
可以运用额外的资金创造出高额的报酬,那么他就绝对有理由这么做,因为当公
司的投资报酬超过一定的门坎后,他本身所获得的奖金也会跟着水涨船高,不过
我们的奖励方式可是赏罚分明,相对地,要是额外的投入的资金没有办法贡献足
够的报酬,Ralph本身连同Berkshire都将一体受害,另一方面,要是Ralph
能将多余用不到的资金送回奥玛哈给我们的话,他将可以因而获得丰厚的奖金报
酬。

It has become fashionable at public companies to describe

almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of

management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment

means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside.

Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms

of "heads I win, tails you lose."

最近上市公司很流行强调管理阶层的利益与公司的股东是一致的,不过在我们的
赏罚簿上,所谓的"一致"是对等的,而不是只有当公司营运顺利时才如此,许多
公司的一致性就不符合我们的标准,因为表面上虽是如此,但其实骨子里玩的却
是"正面我赢,反面你输"的游戏。

A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock

option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the

option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings

are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the

combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and

compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has

done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even

note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to

the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this

vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders

to approve an option plan.

这种不一致的情况最明显的莫过于员工认股权了,因为认股权的认购价格并没有
定期予以检视调整,这等于是漠视公司本身随着盈余的累积自动可增加的获利能
力,假设一家公司给予员工十年的认股权,又该公司股利发放的比例很低,则经
理人就很有可能会得到超过其本身应得的报酬,计较一点的人甚至会发现,每年
支付给股东的盈余越来越少,但经理人透过认股权行使所得到的利益却越来越
多,到目前为止,我还没有在一般公司股东会的投票议案里,看到有要求股东表
决是否核准认股权计划案的。

I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement

with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes,

immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the

"help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement

embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored

by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they

have established that you have a large problem (and one, of

course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with

Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in

1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with

the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though

the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic

characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some

cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.

我忍不住要提到我们与史考特飞兹总裁Ralph Schey所做的薪资协议,在我们
正式买下史考特飞兹之后,只花了五分钟就达成这项协议,这中间没有律师或人
力资源顾问的"协助",这些条件仅仅包含了几个简单的概念,与那些不得不提出
复杂的条款否则就无法附上高昂的账单的人力资源顾问有很大的不同(而且这些
条款每年还须定期检视以决定是否有修正的必要),反观我们与Ralph的协议到
目前为止从未更动过,当初在1986年我们双方认为公平合理的,至今仍然是如
此,同样的我们与旗下事业其它经理人的协议也都相当简单,当然依照产业特性
的不同以及部份经理人同时拥有部份所有权等情形,而有所变化。

In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that

pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal

accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who,

after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements

are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus

on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally,

irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative

behavior at subsidiaries.

在所有的个案中,我们强调的是公平合理,当然经理人对于高的不合理,或是名
不符实的报酬通常都来者不拒,必竟没有人会拒绝免费的热透彩,但是这类的安
排,对于公司的资源来说是一种浪费,同时也会导致经理人忘记他真正应该关心
的事,此外,母公司脱序的行为等于是间接鼓励旗下子公司起而效尤。

At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial

responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the

only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of

what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a

compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed

both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with

people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few

boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of

the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the

heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't

expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we

have no possible need.

在Berkshire,只有查理跟我对公司整体的经营负全责,因此我们两人是唯一应
该以公司整体的表现作为薪资报酬的依据,即便如此,那也不是我们两人真正想
要的方式,我们花了相当的时间塑造我们的公司与工作模式,好让我们可以与我
们欣赏的人一起做我们想做的事,同时也让我们可以不会被迫去做一些无聊或是
不想做的工作,当这些物质与精神的报酬流向企业总部时,我们是最大的受惠
者,在这种田园诗歌般的工作环境下,我们不期望股东们还需要额外给予一些我
们不太需要的多余报酬。

Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be

delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe

to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work

never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."

事实上,就算不领薪水,查理跟我还是会乐在我们现在这种舒适的工作,最起码,
我们效法里根总统的信条,辛勤的工作不太可能要一个人的命,但我在想为何要
冒这个险呢。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table on the next page shows the main sources of

Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-

premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis

of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to

which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown

separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our

businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased

them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to

investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires

purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The

total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to

the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源,在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来,单独加总列示,之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况,不因我们的投资而有所影响,过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式,较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整,不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说,更有帮助,当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

------------------- -------------------

1994 1993 1994 1993

-------- -------- -------- --------

(000s omitted)

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............... $129,926 $ 30,876 $ 80,860 $ 20,156

Net Investment Income ...... 419,422 375,946 350,453 321,321

Buffalo News ................. 54,238 50,962 31,685 29,696

Fechheimer ................... 14,260 13,442 7,107 6,931

Finance Businesses ........... 21,568 22,695 14,293 14,161

Kirby ........................ 42,349 39,147 27,719 25,056

Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 17,356 21,540 8,652 10,398

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 39,435 38,196 24,909 23,809 #9;

See's Candies ................ 47,539 41,150 28,247 24,367

Shoe Group ................... 85,503 44,025* 55,750 28,829

World Book ................... 24,662 19,915 17,275 13,537

Purchase-Price Premium Charges (22,595) (17,033) (19,355) (13,996)

Interest Expense** ........... (60,111) (56,545) (37,264) (35,614)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions ............. (10,419) (9,448) (6,668) (5,994)

Other ........................ 36,232 28,428 22,576 15,094

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings ............. 839,365 643,296 606,239 477,751

Sales of Securities ............ 91,332 546,422 61,138 356,702

Decline in Value of

USAir Preferred Stock ..... (268,500) --- (172,579) ---

Tax Accruals Caused by

New Accounting Rules ...... --- --- --- (146,332)

-------- --------- -------- --------

Total Earnings - All Entities .. $662,197 $1,189,718 $494,798 $688,121

======== ======= ======= =======

* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,

November 7, 1993.

*Dexter的盈余仅含购并日1993年11月7日以后的盈余

**Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

**不含商业与消费金融公司的利息费用。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given

on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings

reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have

rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-

GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and

I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the

financial information that we would wish you to give us if our

positions were reversed.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制,详细的部门别信息,至于我们
的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时,应该必要的资
讯。

"Look-Through" Earnings

透视盈余

In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which

we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than

does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings

consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous

section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major

investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our

profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by

Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been

distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here

exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major

restructuring charges.

之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余,比起一般公认会计原则的数字,这是我们认为它
更能反应Berkshire本身实际的获利状况,其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到
的帐列盈余,加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余,按一般公认会计原则未反应
在我们公司帐上的盈余,扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时,估计可能
要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企
业调整的主要支出。

If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%,

our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about

that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I

told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate

look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've

since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85

billion.

长期而言,如果我们的实质价值想要以每年15%的幅度来成长的话,那么透视
盈余每年也必须增加以这个幅度来成长,几年前我第一次提到这个观念时曾表
示,到公元2000年为止,Berkshire若要以15%的目标,透视盈余必须成长
18亿美元以上,而由于1993年我们又发行了一些新股,所以现在的门坎提高
到18.5亿美元。

We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but

to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance

business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line

expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving

due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target

but that, of course, is no sure thing.

到目前为止,我们稍微超越目标进度,但其中有一项很重要的原因是我们的霹雳
猫保险近年来的表现超乎预期的好 (有关这部份在下一段我还会详加叙述),虽
然即使扣除这项不正常部份,我们还是符合当初预期,但还是不能保证一定达的
到。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through

earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very

rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been

included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly

under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的,不过我还是要提醒各位这些数
字有点粗糙,(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益
项下)。

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees 9; Ownership at Yearend (in millions)

----------------------- ---------------------- -----------------

1994 1993 1994 1993

------ ------ ------ ------

American Express Company ...... 5.5% 2.4% $ 25(2) $ 16

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ...... 13.0% 13.0% 85 83(2)

The Coca-Cola Company ......... 7.8% 7.2% 116(2) 94 9;

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.3%(1) 6.8%(1) 47(2) 41(2) 9;

Gannett Co., Inc. ............. 4.9% --- 4(2) ---

GEICO Corp. ................... 50.2% 48.4% 63(3) 76(3)

The Gillette Company .......... 10.8% 10.9% 51 44 9;

PNC Bank Corp. ................ 8.3% --- 10(2) ---

The Washington Post Company ... 15.2% 14.8% 18 15 9;

Wells Fargo & Company ......... 13.3% 12.2% 73 53(2)

------ ------

Berkshire's share of undistributed

earnings of major investees $ 492 $422

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed

investee earnings(4) (68) (59) #9;

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 606 478

------- ------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $1,030 $ 841

(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest

at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少数股权

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

以年平均持有股权比例计算

(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both

recurring and significant
扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得,

(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays

on the dividends it receives

适用的税率为14%,这是Berkshire收到现金股利时的平均税率。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our

insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and,

second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In

an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require

that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually

takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.

就像我们在过去年报跟各位解释过的,保险事业最重要的关键,第一是保险浮存
金的数量,第二是它的成本,浮存金是我们持有并非我们所有,保险事业营运之
所以能有浮存金的原因在于大部分的保单都要求保户必须预付保险费,另外更重
要的是保险公司在被知会并真正理赔之前,通常都要经过好长的一段时间。

Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover

the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an

"underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.

通常保险公司实际上收到的保费并不足以支应发生的损失与费用,所以大多会产
生承保的损失,而这就是浮存金的成本。

An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of

float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to

obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of

its float is higher than market rates for money.

长期而言,保险公司的浮存金成本若能低于其它资金管道所需的成本就能获利,
但是要是其浮存金成本高于货币市场利率的话,其是否有存在的价值就有疑问。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's

insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we

have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts

relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss

adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances,
prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges
applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by
our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an

underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been

negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding

underwriting profit to float income.

如同下表中的数字所显示的,Berkshire的保险事业大获全胜,表中的浮存金,
系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后,再扣除应付佣
金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用,相对于我们的保费收入总额,我们的浮
存金部位算是相当大的,至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而
定,在某些年度由于我们有承保利益,所以换句话说,我们的资金成本甚至是负
的,此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利
益。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ------------- ------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 .......... profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 .......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 .......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 .......... $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 .......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 .......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 .......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 .......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 .......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 .......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 .......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 .......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 .......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 .......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 .......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 .......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 .......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 .......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 .......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 .......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 .......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 .......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 .......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 .......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 .......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 .......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993 .......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

1994 .......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%

Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and

are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our

message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we

have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently

looks.

查理跟我对于1994年的浮存金能够继续成长都感到相当高兴,更有甚者,这些
资金都是完全免费的,但是我们还是要像去年那样再强调一次,虽然我们的保险
事业经营得不错,但实际上并没有外界想象中的好。

The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat"

business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance

companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-

catastrophes) was again highly profitable. Since truly major

catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be

expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to

record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our

super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994

should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant

losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add

that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995

Kobe earthquake.

我们之所以一再强调这一点的原因在于我们的霹雳猫业务(也就是专门提供保险
公司与再保公司规避重大天然灾害风险的保单)今年再度赚大钱,由于真正重大
的灾害并不常发生,所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后,突然发
生重大的损失,换句话说,我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几
年才有办法看清,当然1994年绝对是相当好的一年,唯一的重大灾害要算是一
月所发生的加州大地震,另外在这里我要特别声明1995年初发生的神户大地震
对我们造成的损失并不大。

Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-

standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business

requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto

policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire

has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose

underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply

enormous.

霹雳猫保单有数量少、金额高且非制式化的特性,因此,要承接这类业务必须仰
赖相当专业的判断,而不像一般的汽车保险有庞大的数据库可供参考,就这点而
言,Berkshire拥有一张王牌-Ajit Jain,他是我们霹雳猫业务的经理人,拥有最
精细的承保技巧,他可以说是我们的无价之宝。

In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-

cat business because of our towering financial strength, which

helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its

protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion

windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in

California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows

that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery

is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default.

There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will

evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that

Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of

unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.

此外,在霹雳猫业务,Berkshire还拥有一项特殊的优势,那就是我们雄厚的财
务实力,这对我们有相当大的帮助。首先,谨慎小心的保险公司都会希望对于真
正天大的灾害-比如说像是纽约长岛发生飓风或加州大地震这类可能造成五百亿
美元损失发生时,可以得到相当确切的依靠,但是保险公司也相当清楚,这类会
造成本身财务需要支持的灾害,同样也有可能导致许多再保公司自顾不暇而破
产,所以它们不太可能笨到将保费付出后,却换得无法兑现的承诺,也因此
Berkshire可以确保在不可预期的天灾发生时,仍然有办法拿得出钱来理赔的稳
当保证,就成为我们最佳的竞争优势。

The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can

write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For

example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term

policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we

wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world

who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for

their own account.

再者雄厚的财务实力让我们可以签下别人想都不敢想的大额保单,举例来说,
1994年,有一家保险业者临时想要买一张金额高达4亿美元的加州地震险保
单,我们二话不说立刻接下来,我们敢说全世界除了我们以外,可能没有人敢独
立接下这样的保单。

Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts

by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at

best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In

the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a

risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-

being. At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for

coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked

to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.

一般来说,保险经纪人通常倾向将大额的保单拆成数张小额的保单以分散负担,
但是这样的作业安排却颇耗费时间,同时也使得本来想要寻求再保分散风险的保
险公司并须被迫面对它本来不愿意承担的风险,进而危及保险公司本身的利益,
相对地在Berkshire,我们对单一保单的投保上限最高可以到达5亿美元,这是
其它同业所做不到的。

By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose

Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to

us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-

optimum strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings.

By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher

long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.

虽然接下这类大额的保单,会使得Berkshire的经营成果变得很不稳定,但我们
完全可以接受这样的结果,通常保险同业(其实其它的行业也一样)总是倾向采取
比较保守的做法,使得营运数字可以平滑稳定一点,但是就这点而言,我们的做
法比较不一样,选择接受变动较大的前景,我们可以获致比前景确定的方式更高
的长期投资报酬。

Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our

"worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge

what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island

hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same

year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-

insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses

from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be

accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's,

Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.

在承受这类风险时,Ajit跟我总是会将焦点摆在最坏的状况下,虽然我们知道实
在是很难去衡量,大家可以想象如果同一年发生长岛飓风、加州地震以及霹雳猫
X时,会是怎样的一个光景,此外,保险损失通常会伴随非保险的问题,例如假
设我们因为加州大地震而承受大量的霹雳猫损失,在此同时股市的大跌很有可能
也会伴随而来,此举将会使得我们在喜斯糖果、富国银行与弗迪麦的持股价值大
减。

All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance

loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an

amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from

other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of

exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after

the inevitable mega-catastrophe.

在考虑过所有的状况之后,我们认为在最坏的情况下,我们在霹雳猫保险所可能
产生的损失大约在6亿美元的上下,稍稍超过Berkshire每年从其它事业的盈
余,如果你对于这样的风险感到不自在,那么现在是你卖出Berkshire股份的最
佳时机,而不是等到这种无可避免的大灾难发生。

Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices

for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent

of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few

years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their

adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important

group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of

business in 1995.

我们霹雳猫的业务量在1995年很有可能会下滑,因为保险的价格略微下滑,原
因在于几年前新加入再保市场的资金,正以不合理的价格竞逐保单,尽管如此,
我们还是拥有一些重要的客户群,可以稳定的贡献我们1995年业绩。

Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results

in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers'

compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card

operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's

traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster

- all of these generated significant underwriting profits

accompanied by substantial float.

Berkshire其它保险事业1994年的营运表现皆相当杰出,由Rod领导的住宅
保险、Brad带领的员工退休保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务,以
及由Don所领导的国家产险所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面,总的来
说,这四类业务都表现的相当不错,不但有承保获利,还贡献了相当大金额的保
险浮存金。。

We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all,

we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will

be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value

that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact,

than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

总而言之,我们可以做出与去年同样的结论,我们拥有第一流的保险事业,虽然
他们的经营成果变化相当的大,但是其实质价值却远超过其账面的价值,而事实
上,在Berkshire其它事业的身上也有类似的情况。

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over

$300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过三亿美元以上的普通股投资,一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关
系企业所持有。

12/31/94

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

27,759,941 American Express Company. .......... $ 723,919 $ 818,918

20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... 345,000 1,705,000

100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............. 1,298,888 5,150,000

12,761,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

("Freddie Mac") ................. 270,468 644,441

6,854,500 Gannett Co., Inc. .................. 335,216 365,002

34,250,000 GEICO Corp. ........................ 45,713 1,678,250

24,000,000 The Gillette Company ............... 600,000 1,797,000

19,453,300 PNC Bank Corporation ............... 503,046 410,951

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........ 9,731 418,983

6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company .............. 423,680 984,727

 

Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in

concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in

a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive

advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When

these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible

prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage

to overcome).

我们的投资组合持续保持集中、简单的风格,真正重要的投资概念通常可以用简
单的话语来作说明,我们偏爱具有持续竞争力并且由才能兼具、以股东利益为导
向的经理人所经营的优良企业,只要它们确实拥有这些特质,而且我们能够以合
理的价格买进,则要出错的机率可说是微乎其微(这正是我们一直不断要克服的
挑战)。

Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed

using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count.

If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent

on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and

enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed

an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting

and complex variables.

投资人必须谨记,你的投资成绩并非像奥运跳水比赛的方式评分,难度高低并不
重要,你正确地投资一家简单易懂而竞争力持续的公司所得到的回报,与你辛苦
地分析一家变量不断、复杂难懂的公司可以说是不相上下。

We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it

is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose

long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries

about an economy or a stock market that we know to be

unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an

uninformed guess?

对于买进股份我们注意的只是价格而非时间,我们认为因为忧虑短期不可控制的
经济或是股市变量而放弃买进一家长期前景可合理的预期的好公司是一件很愚
蠢的事,为什么仅是因为短期不可知的猜测就放弃一个很明显的投资决策呢?

We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972,

Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott

Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available

and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In

each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what

the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach

as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety,

why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of

wonderful businesses in the stock market?

我们分别在1967年买进国家产险公司、1972年买下喜斯糖果、1977年买下
水牛城日报、1983年买下内布拉斯加家具店、1986年买下史考特飞兹,而我
们都是趁它们难得求售时才得以买进,当然也因为它们的开价我们认为可以接
受,当初在评估每个案子时,我们关心的不是道琼指数的走势、联准会的动向或
是总体经济的发展,而是这些公司本身未来的前景;而如果我们觉得这样的方式
适用于买下整家公司的话,那么每当我们决定要透过股市买进一些好公司部份的
股权时,为什么就必须采取不一样的做法呢?

Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old

ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well

pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic

interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to

add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor

frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in

businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by

enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.

在寻找新的投资标的之前,我们选择先增加旧有投资的部位,如果一家企业曾经
好到让我们愿意买进,我想再重复一次这样的程序应该也是相当不错的,若是能
够我们很愿意再增加在喜斯糖果或是史考特飞兹的持股,但要增加到100%的比
例实在是有困难,不过在股票市场中,投资人常常有很多的机会可以增加他有兴
趣的公司持股,像是去年我们就扩大了我们在可口可乐与美国运通的持股数。

Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact,

fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of

past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised

70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I

sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100

shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything

I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major

stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In

another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my

initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the

1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position

in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola,

my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a

six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents.

It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money

was in the syrup.

我们投资美国运通的历史可以追溯到相当早的时期,而事实上也符合个人过去的
经验,举个例子在1951年,当时我还是年仅二十岁的股票业务员,GEICO保
险占我个人投资组合的70%,同时它也是我第一次卖掉的股票,我将100股的
GEICO股份卖给我的阿姨Alice,基本上只要是我建议的她都照单全收,二十五
年后,趁着该公司面临倒闭的危机,Berkshire买下GEICO一大部分的股份,
另一个例子就是华盛顿邮报,1940年代,我的第一笔投资资金有一半是来自发
送该报的收入,三十年后,Berkshire趁该公司上市两年后的股价低档买下一大
部分的股权,至于可口可乐,可以算得上是我生平从事的第一笔商业交易,1930
年当我还是个小孩子的时候,我花了25美元买了半打的可乐,然后再以每罐5
美分分售出去,而直到五十年后,我才终于搞懂真正有赚头的还是那糖水。

My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In

the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's

infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership

Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the

partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave

us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write

this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion.

(Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)

我个人在美国运通的投资历史包含好几段插曲,在1960年代中期,趁着该公司
为色拉油丑闻所苦时,我们将巴菲特合伙企业40%的资金压在这只股票上,这
是合伙企业有史以来最大的一笔投资,总计花了1,300万美元买进该公司5%的
股份,时至今日,我们在美国运通的持股将近10%,但帐列成本却高达13.6亿
美元,(美国运通1964年的获利为1,250万美元,1994年则增加至14亿美
元)。

My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about

a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I

first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly

and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot

of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report

- do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1

through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.

我对美国运通IDS部门的投资可以追溯更早,该部门目前占公司整体获利来源的
三分之一,我在1953年第一次买进成长快速的IDS股份,当时的本益比只有三
倍(在那个年代,结实累累的果子垂手可得),为此我甚至还特别写了一篇长篇报
告(不过印象中我好像没有写过短的),并在华尔街日报刊登广告,以一美元对外
公开销售。

Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American

Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from

what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term

familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in

evaluating it.

当然很显然的美国运通与IDS(最近已更名为美国运通财务顾问)今日的营运模式
与过去已有很大的不同,但是我还是发现对于该公司与其提供的产品内容长久以
来的熟悉度,仍然有助于我们的评估。

Mistake Du Jour

新鲜出炉的错误

Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our

mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the

decision become obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year

with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to

tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie.

But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to

grow.

错误通常在做决策时就已经造成,不过我们只能将新鲜错误奖颁给那些很明显的
愚蠢决策,照这种标准,1994年可算是竞争相当激烈的一年,在这里我必须特
别指出以下大部分的错误都是查理造成的,不过每当我这样说时,我的鼻子就会
跟着开始变长。

And the nominees are . . .

获得提名的有. . .

Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at

year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5

million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating

the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in

1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings

at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss

to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender.

Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.

1993年底,我将1,000万股资本城股份以每股63美元卖出,不幸的是到了
1994年底,该公司股价变成85.25美元,(我可以直接告诉各位我们损失了
2.225亿美元的差价,如果你心痛到不愿去算的话);而当我们在1986年以每
股17.25美元买进该公司股份时,就曾经向各位报告,在更早之前,也就是在
1978年到1980年间,我就曾经以每股4.3美元卖掉该公司股份,并强调对于
个人这样的行为感到心痛,没想到现在我却又明知故犯,看起来我似乎应该要找
个监护人来好好监管一下。

Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a

silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago

that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir

preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September.

In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an

"unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the

investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a

case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the

fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever

the reason, the mistake was large.

更不幸的是,资本城一案只能得到银牌,金牌的得主要算是我在五年前就犯下的
一项错误,但直到1994年才爆发出来,那就是我们在美国航空3.58亿美元的
特别股投资,去年九月,该公司宣布停止发放特别股股息,早在1990年,我就
很准确地形容这项交易属于非受迫性的失误,意思是说,没有人强迫我投资,同
时也没有人误导我,完全要归咎于我个人草率的分析,这项挫败导因于我们过于
自大的心态,不论如何,这是一项重大的错误。

Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems

that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high

and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-

threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected

from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high

costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were

also high.

在做这项投资之前,我竟然没有把注意力摆在一直为航空深深所苦、居高不下的
成本问题之上,在早年,高成本还不致构成重大的威胁,因为当时航空业受到法
令的管制,航空业者可以将成本反映在票价之上转嫁给消费者。

When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change

the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that

the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing

fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems

largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were

non-sustainable became further embedded.

在法令松绑的初期,产业界并未立即反应此状况,主要是由于低成本的业者规模
尚小,所以大部分高成本的主要业者仍然勉力维持现行的票价结构,不过随着时
间慢慢地发酵,在长久以来隐而未见的问题逐渐浮现的同时,旧有业者完全无竞
争力的高成本结构却早已积重难返。

As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their

fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their

own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by

infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a

fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated

commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive

levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious

to your Chairman, but I missed it.

随着低成本营运业者座位容量的大幅扩增,超低的票价迫使那些高成本的老牌航
空公司也不得不跟进,然而额外资金的挹注(也包含我们在美国航空的那笔投
资),延迟这些老牌航空公司发现这项问题的时机,然而终究到最后,基本的经
济法则还是战胜一切,在一个没有管制的商品制式化产业,一家公司不是降低成
本增加竞争力,就是被迫倒闭关门,这道理对于身为公司负责人的我,可说是再
清楚也不过了,但是我竟然疏忽了。

Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct

the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not

managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with

a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having

obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted

from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings.

(As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said:

"Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.")

Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline

employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will

resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to

clear.

美国航空的总裁-Seth Schofield一直致力于改正该公司长久以来的成本结构问
题,不过到目前为止,仍然力有未殆,一部份的原因在于,他所面对的是一个不
断变动的目标,因为部份航空业者幸运地取得劳资双方的协议,另一些业者则受
惠于破产法令的保护,可以有一个全新出发的成本,(就像是西南航空的总裁-
Herb Kelleher所说的破产法对于航空业者来说,就好像是得到了一次健康的
spa),此外,对于哪些在合约上受到保护得以获得高于市场水准薪资的劳工来
说,只要他们发现自己的薪资支票仍能按时兑现,就会全力地抵制减薪的提议。

Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the

cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But

it is far from sure that will happen.

尽管面临目前的困境,美国航空还是有可能完成降低成本的任务,以维持长期继
续生存的能力,不过到目前为止,还很难确定一定能够成功。

Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5

million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation

reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value

fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the

stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we

will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it

back the way that you lost it.

因此,在1994年底,我们将美国航空账面的投资金额调降为8,950万美元,
当初一美元的投资等于仅剩下25美分的价值,这样的举动反应出将来我们的特
别股有可能完全或大部分地恢复其价值,但同时也有可能到后来变得一文不值,
不论最后的结果为何,我们必须谨记一项投资的基本原则,那就是你不一定要靠
那些已失去的赚回来。

The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated.

Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry

all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value.

Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were

carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In

other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for

USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.

本次打销美国航空投资价值的会计影响有点复杂,根据一般公认会计原则的规
定,保险公司在资产负债表上必须将它们的投资以市价列示,因此截至去年第三
季止,我们在美国航空投资的账面价值是8,950万美元,大概只有原始成本3.58
亿美元的25%,换句话说,在当时我们的净值就已反应了这项调整。

But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in

value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that

judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through

our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter

effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the

diminution of value had already been reflected.

不过到了第四季,我们认为这种下跌的情况,套句会计的专有名词,并非属于暂
时性的,所以我们必须将这笔向下调整的金额反应在损益表之上,然而这个动作
对于本公司的净值并不会再造成任何的影响,因为早在第三季我们便已反应过
了。

Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board

at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with

us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.

在即将召开的美国航空年度股东会中,查理跟我决定不再续任董事,当然要是
Seth总裁觉得有任何需要我们帮忙的地方,我们愿意提供任何咨询服务。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire

shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC

and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very

tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as

managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these

periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects.

Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and

left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our

gratitude.

去年有两位对Berkshire贡献卓著的经理人决定退休,分别是资本城/ABC的
Dan Burke与富国银行的Carl Reichardt,Dan与Carl近年来在各自的产业都
面临到相当大的挑战,但他们杰出的管理能力使得他们经营的事业在这段期间内
仍能保有出色的盈余,并赋予公司光明与璀璨的前景,此外,对于他们的离开,
Dan与Carl都已作好准备,将公司交由能干的人才接手,我们对他们报以深深
的敬意。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities

were recipients.

大约有95.7%的有效股权参与1994年的股东指定捐赠计划,总计约1,040万
美元捐出的款项分配给3,300家慈善机构。

Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the

program because they either do not have their shares registered in

their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail

to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period

allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when

requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old

read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions

program that appears on pages 50-51.

每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下,或是没能在60天
的期限内,将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们,而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计划,
凡是不符合规定者,都不能参加这项计划,也因此我们敦促不管是原有或新加入
的股东,仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容,

To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995

program.

想要参加这项计划者,请确定您的股份是登记在自己而非股票经纪人或保管银行
的名下,同时必须在1995年8月31日之前完成登记,才有权利参与1995年
的捐赠计划。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small

retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates

remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or

mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.

1994年我们只进行了一项小型的购并案-那是一家鞋业的连锁店,然而对于寻
找好的候选对象,我们的兴致与过去一样热烈,对于买进与购并标准请参阅附
录。

Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-

controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible

preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this

episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to

authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move

quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear.

Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a

large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms

set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I

will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that

we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.

去年春天,我们曾经对一家大型的家族企业提出购并的提议,交易的内容包含发
行Berkshire可转换的特别股,虽然后来双方未能达成协议,但这次的经验提醒
我们必须先取得Berkshire股东们的同意,授权董事会发行特别股,好让我们在
合适的购并机会出现时,可以做出快速的响应,因此,在今年的股东会议案中,
包含了一项授权董事会在适当的时机发行特别股的提案,当然大家可以百分之百
地相信,除非我们认为所得到的实质价值跟我们所付出的相当,否则查理跟我绝
对不会轻易地发行这些股份。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a

new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's

seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30

a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The

main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we

will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of

handling another 1,000 people.

查理跟我很希望各位都能够来参加今年的股东会,由于去年参加的人数稍微超过
了Orpheum中心2,750的座位容量,因此今年股东会我们决定于1995年5
月1日,星期一早上9点30分在新的场地-Holiday会议中心召开,新场地的
大厅可以容纳3,300人,若有必要,藉由视听器材的辅助,旁边还有一个可以
容纳1,000人的会议室。


Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the

meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs

of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications.

All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like

to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember

that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the

collection plate.

去年我们在会场上展示了一些Berkshire的产品,结果总计卖出了800磅的糖
果、507双的鞋子以及价值超过12,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品,
今年这些商品会再度与会,虽然我们认为这次会议的意义主要在于精神层面,但
我们不要忘记,即使是最神圣的宗教典礼,也包含的奉献捐献的仪式。

Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video

tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic

nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our

cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom

Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I

urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you

that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate

attire.

当然大家绝对不能错过的是1995年橘子杯的录像带,本人利用晚上的时间观看
这场经典的赛事,甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节,我们以今年封面的颜色表
示对内布拉斯加美式足球队教练-Tom Osborne以及其所带领的全美最佳队伍
-Cornhuskers队的敬意,我敦促大家一定要穿Huskers队的红色出席今年的
股东会,而我也可以向各位保证Berkshire的经营双人组会有50%以上穿着正
确的服色出席。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the

meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be

downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the

Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the

much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of

the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118

rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is

the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from

Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be

buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the

meeting and return after it ends.

由于预期会有相当多的人与会,我们建议大家最好先预订房间,想要住在市中心
的人(距离会场约6英哩)可以选择拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆-Radisson-
Redick旅馆或是旁边较大一点的Red Lion旅馆,至于会场附近则有Holiday
Inn (403个房间)、Homewood Suites (118个房间)或Hampton Inn (136个
房间),另一个推荐的旅馆是位在奥玛哈西区的Marriott,离波仙珠宝店约100
公尺,距离会场约10分钟的车程,届时在哪里将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会
会场。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A

good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who

stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be

able to walk to the meeting.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关数据,跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证,
当天会场有相当大的停车场,住在Holiday Inn 、Homewood Suites或
Hampton Inn的人可以直接走路过来开会。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska

Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you

from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a

special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has

opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells

electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio

equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you

will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their

display on the floor.

一如往年,会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭
店与机场,我希望大家特别能到内布拉斯加家具店参观,因为今年新开幕的超大
卖场,贩卖各式家电、电子信息、CD唱片、摄影机与视听产品,自开幕以来,
销售业绩惊人,到了现场之后,你绝对会对产品的多样与展示方式印象深刻。

The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre

site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from

10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and

noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello

to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's

Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that

matter, an hour.

位于NFM主馆旁边的超级大卖场距离会场约2英哩远,营业时间平日从早上
10点到下午9点,星期六从早上10点到下午6点,星期日则从中午开到下午
6点,到了那里记得向高龄101岁的B太太Say hello,她每天都会到B太太仓
库工作,或者应该说是每个小时。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This

is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises.

Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more

reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.

平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝,在股东会当天会特别为股东与来宾开放,从中午
开到下午6点,这天总是相当的特别,我们会试着让大家得到一些意外的惊喜,
而通常那天也是该店全年营业额最高的一天,这也是查理跟我希望能在那里看到
各位的主要原因之一。

On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game

at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo

Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob

Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to

entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a

capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not

the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will

need plenty of vocal support.

在前一天4月29日,星期六晚上,Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家
队对水牛城水牛队的比赛,水牛队的老板是我的好朋友-Mindy跟Bob,我希望
他们也能参加,若他们真的来了,我会引诱Bob与我在投手丘上来一场对决,
Bob可以称得上是资本家的强森巨投,年轻、健壮且精力充沛,绝对是你在球季
中不会想要遇到的对手,所以届时我希望大家都能到场给予我声援。

The proxy statement will include information about obtaining

tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event

last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a

strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What

many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my

fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be

all smoke.

股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票,去年大约有1,400位股东出席这
项盛会,当晚开赛前,我投出一只时速高达8英哩的好球,只是许多球迷在当
场并没有看到我不顾的捕手要求投出快速球的指示反而祭出我的上飘球,至于今
年我要投出的球路至今仍然是个谜。

Warren E. Buffett

March 7, 1995 Chairman of the Board

华伦.巴菲特

董事会主席

1995年3月7日


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