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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over
the last 29 years (that is, since present management took
over)
book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of
23.3%
compounded annually.
1993年本公司的净值成长了14.3%，总计过去29年以来，也就是自从现有经
营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的8,854美元，年复合成
长率约为23.3%。
During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5
billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive
non-
operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain
them
here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel
free
to fast-forward through this discussion:
回顾过去一年，Berkshire的净值增加了15亿美元，主要受到两项负面以及两
项正面非营业的因素所影响，为了做完整的表达，我将它们条列如下，若是大家
对于会计有点感冒，大可直接跳过本段不看。
1. The first negative was produced by a change in
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
having to do with the taxes we accrue against
unrealized appreciation in the securities we
carry at market value. The old rule said that
the tax rate used should be the one in effect
when the appreciation took place. Therefore,
at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34%
on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after
1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains
generated before that. The new rule stipulates
that the current tax rate should be applied to
all gains. The rate in the first quarter of
1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%.
Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains
reduced net worth by $70 million.
第一个负面因素是由于一般公认会计原则变动所造成，主要与
帐上依照市价计算的未实现增值利益所估列的所得税有关，原来规
定税率必须按照涨价所发生时点来计算，因此在1992年底，我们
的未实现利益也64亿美元系按照34%计算，其余12亿则按28%
计算；而新的规定则改成全部依照现行税率计算，故1993年第一
季所适用的税率则为34%，包含1987年以前的未实现利得在内全
部适用，此举将使得我们的净值因此减少7,000万美元。
2. The second negative, related to the first, came
about because the corporate tax rate was raised
in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%. This
change required us to make an additional charge
of 1% against all of our unrealized gains, and
that charge penalized net worth by $75 million.
Oddly, GAAP required both this charge and the
one described above to be deducted from the
earnings we report, even though the unrealized
appreciation that gave rise to the charges was
never included in earnings, but rather was
credited directly to net worth.
2.第二个负面因素与第一个也有关，因为从1993年开始企业税率提
高为35%，此举又使得我们必须为帐上未实现利得多提1%的税负，
导致我们的净值又减少7,500万美元，奇怪的是一般公认会计原则要
求这两项变动皆须列入损益表，却不顾当初这些未实现利得根本就从
未列入盈余之内，而是直接当作是净值的增加。
3. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value
at which we carry the securities that we own.
In recent years, both the common stocks and
certain common-equivalent securities held by
our insurance companies have been valued at
market, whereas equities held by our non-
insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company
were carried at their aggregate cost or market,
whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all
common stocks should be carried at market, a
rule we began following in the fourth quarter
of 1993. This change produced a gain in
Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172
million.
3.1993年另外一个会计原则的变动影响的则是我们帐上持有的这些
有价证券的价值，近几年来，我们保险公司所持有的不管是普通股或
是约当普通股，都是按市价计算，至于母公司或是其它非保险业子公
司所持有的的股票则以成本与市价孰低法计算，现在一般公认会计原
则则改成全部都按市价计算，这个规定将从1993年的第四季开始实
施，此举将使得Berkshire的净值增加1.72亿美元。
4. Finally, we issued some stock last year. In a
transaction described in last year's Annual
Report, we issued 3,944 shares in early
January, 1993 upon the conversion of $46
million convertible debentures that we had
called for redemption. Additionally, we issued
25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe, a
purchase discussed later in this report. The
overall result was that our shares outstanding
increased by 29,147 and our net worth by about
$478 million. Per-share book value also grew,
because the shares issued in these transactions
carried a price above their book value.
4.最后去年我们又发行的一些股份，在一项去年曾提过的购并交易
中，我们在1993年一月将4,600万美元的可转换债券赎回，而发行
了3,944股，此外在买下Dexter鞋业时，(后面报告还会详加叙述)
我们又发行了25,203股，总计一共新发行了29,147股，增加4.78
亿美元的净值，每股账面净值也因发行价格高于原先账面每股净值而
提升。
Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value,
that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures
the
capital, including retained earnings, that has been put
into a
business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of
the
cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining
life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated.
Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though
significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful
device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure
grew
by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory
but
unexciting.
当然真正重要的是每股实质价值而非账面净值，账面净值是一个会计名词，用来
衡量一家公司所投入的资本，也包含未分配的盈余在内，实质价值则是对于一家
企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数
字大多不相关，不过Berkshire算是一个例外，我们的账面净值，虽然远低于实
质价值，但却是追踪实质价值相当好的一项指标，在1993年两项数值大约皆以
14%左右的比率增加，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。
These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger
gain
- 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course,
market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the
same
destination. But in the short run the two often diverge
in a
major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two
years
ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours,
enjoyed
market price increases that dramatically outpaced their
earnings
gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks
of
these companies could not continuously overperform their
businesses.
这些利得比起Berkshire本身股价39%的涨幅来说还是略微逊色，当然就长期
而言，Berkshire的市价与实质价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的
变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主
要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的盈余成长，在1991年
的年报中，我便说过这些公司的股票市价不可能永远持续超越其本业。
From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual
operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively,
but
their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other
words,
the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that
no doubt
partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand
names.
Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings
performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire
will
also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.
从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38%
与37%，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11%与6%，换句话说，这些公司的
表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于华尔街对于品牌有很深的疑虑，但是不管
怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本身的获利情况，如果他们经营顺利，Berkshire
也就跟着水涨船高，虽然不是依照一步步稳定的方式前进。
Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919
at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly
reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the
stock down
by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single
share,
with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million.
As
Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is
a voting
machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires
only
money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in
the long-
run, the market is a weighing machine."
接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919年可口可乐股票以每股40美元公开上
市，到了1920年由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看法相当冷淡，而将股价下修一
半至19.5美元，然而时至今日，1993年底，若是将收到的股利再重复投资下
去，则当初股票的价值将变成210万美元，就像葛拉罕所说：「短期而言，市
场是投票机器，投资人不须靠智慧或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票，
但就长期而言，股票市场却是一个体重机。」
So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market
last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at
a higher
percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was
the
case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in
a world
of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market
price
was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that
this is
a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman,
and I can
attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's
per-share
intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have
not
retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we
have for
many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15%
an
ever-more difficult target to hit.
所以我们应该如何看待Berkshire去年的股价超越本质的表现呢? 很明显的在
1993年底Berkshire的股价占实质价值比重较年初为高，另外一方面，在长期
利率只有6%到7%的投资环境下，同时若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能让
Berkshire的实质价值每年达到15%的成长的话，你就知道Berkshire去年这样
的股价表现实在是有点反常，虽然对于这样的目标我们从不妥协，但我们必须再
一次强调，随着资本规模的日益扩大，想要达到这个目标的困难度也与日俱增。
What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-
sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics
ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance
ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries
about
this group.
不过另一方面，伴随我们的是由一些相当规模且拥有竞争优势的企业，并且由杰
出的经理人所经营，对于这样的梦幻组合大家大可以放心。
The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the
parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver
to us,
has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new
businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite
that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we
are
happy to report an important success in 1993.
倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所贡献资金所作的资金分配工作，所面临的不
确定性就比较高，要找到像我们现在拥有一样好的企业并不容易，但是虽然难度
高，查理跟我却绝对不会放弃追寻，而很高兴在1993年我们能有相当成功的斩
获。
Dexter Shoe
Detxter 鞋业
What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of
H.
H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots
and
other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we
had
high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been
considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler
and the
talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence
in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end
of
1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's
and
nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again,
results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly
jumped
at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter,
Maine,
which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes.
Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of
the
best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business
lifetimes.
去年我们所做的乃是基于1991年买进HH布朗鞋业-一家管理良善的鞋子、靴
子制造公司的续曲，布朗鞋业成为一家真正成功的赢家，虽然一开始我们就对他
就有相当高的标准，但是在Frank与其它经理人的努力之下，这家公司的表现
甚至还超过我们的预期，基于我们对Frank团队的信心，接着在1992年年底
我们又买下Lowell鞋业，Lowell是一家女鞋与护士鞋的老牌制造公司，不过他
的管理还需要改进，再一次他的表现又超乎我们的预期，所以我们立刻又再接再
厉在去年又趁机买下缅因州的Dexter鞋业，一家专门制造高级男女鞋的品牌，
这次我可以向大家保证Dexter并不需要改造，Dexter是查理跟我在职业生涯
中，所见过最好的公司之一。
Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at
25
cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with
$10,000
of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his
nephew.
The two of them have since built a business that now produces
over
7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made
in Maine
and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the
domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable
to
compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone
forgot
to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and
H. H.
Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together
make the
U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against
all
comers.
话说Harold Alfond从20岁以时薪25美分开始到制鞋工厂做工，并在1956
年靠着一万美元的资本创立Dexter，1958年他的侄子Peter加入，从此两人
建立起年产750万双鞋子的企业，大部分的鞋子都在缅因州生产，其余的则在
波多黎各，就像大家都知道的，国内的制鞋业，一般被认为无法与国外进口低价
产品竞争，但是大家似乎忘记提醒布朗鞋业与Dexter经营团队有这么一回事，
是他们让两家公司位于美国的工厂拥有高度的竞争力以对抗外来的入侵者。
Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located
primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major
manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S.
output.
Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional
shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels:
Last
year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards
upon
Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.
Dexter还包含77家的零售门市，主要集中在西北地区，该公司同时也是高尔
夫球鞋的主要制造商，全美的市场占有率约为15%，不过他的主要业务还是传
统通路商的传统鞋类，这也是它最擅长的领域，去年Dexter还获得Nordstrom
与JC Penny所颁发的年度最佳供货商奖项。
Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of
merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe
operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and
we would
not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these
businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no
thought
of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that
industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe
Business" as
I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.
Berkshire只能从1993年11月7号购并日后开始计入Dexter的业绩，在1994
年我们预计Berkshire光是在鞋类方面的销售额就达到5.5亿美元，而总计税前
获利极有可能超过8,500万，记得在五年前我们根本就没想到会跨进鞋类这一
行，现在光是在这个产业所雇用的员工就超过7,200人，现在我每天上班，都
会边开车边唱，没有一个行业会像卖鞋这一行，策略计划还有很多发挥的空间。
At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates
what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we
think
it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders
if it
embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision.
We
prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics
of
businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics
of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to
hope we
get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter,
we did.
在Berkshire，对于将来会进入那个产业，我们并没有特定的看法，事实上，我
们常在想对于一家大型企业的股东来说，与其追求具有远景的新创事业有时反而
有害，所以我们比较偏爱专注于那些我们想要拥有的经济型态以及我们喜爱一起
共事的经理人，剩下的就只看我们有没有足够的运气，找到同时拥有这两项特点
的组合了，在Dexter我们确实找到了。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned
a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who
were not
interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging
their
Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in
effect,
was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business
for a
smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses.
They
incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security
that can
be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that
can be
converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own
choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they
can
pursue varying financial paths without running into the
complications that often arise when assets are concentrated
in a
private business.
接下来让我们休息一下，进段小广告，虽然他们拥有商业界的宝石，但我们也相
信Harold与Peter(他们对于现金都不感兴趣)做了一个正确的决定，将Dexter
的股份转为Berkshire的股份，他们所做的，实际上等于将一家规模小的好公司
的全部权益转成一家大规模好公司的一部份权益，这样的转换并不会产生租税负
担，同时还可享有依个人意愿随时进行赠与或变现的好处，如果他们的家族成员
有意愿，他们可以依照自己的想法追求不同的目标，而不必像过去那样所有的资
产全部绑在一家私人的企业。
For tax and other reasons, private companies also often
find
it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire,
in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their
ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a
reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter
now have
non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling
shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners
and
that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect
to
retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result
from the
merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result.
Since I
have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life
to
Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me
neither
restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation
will
always match that of all other owners.
基于租税规划以及其它理由，私人企业通常很难透过延伸本业以外的投资达到分
散风险的目的，相对的，在Berkshire我们可以很轻易地就多角化，因此藉由经
营权移转至Berkshire，Dexter的股东可以很轻易地就解决转投资的问题，更
重要的是，虽然Harold与Peter现在持有的是Berkshire无控制权的股份，而
不是原先Dexter具控制权的股份，但他们很清楚自己将被视为真正的合伙人，
同时我们也会以经营者的心态参与，所以一旦他们决定将自己的投资转为
Berkshire的股份，那么从合并那天开始，他们就可以确定本身的投资成果将会
与我个人的投资成果相当，而因为我个人绝大部份的身家都摆在Berkshire，也
因为我个人从不会自公司身上取得特殊的股份或员工认股权，所以我个人的成败
得失也将与其它所有公司股权持有人一致。
Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we
can
keep our promises: There will be no changes of control
or
culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally,
and of
paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that
they will
get to run their business - an activity they dearly love
-
exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we
do not
tell .400 hitters how to swing.
此外，Harold与Peter也相当了解，在Berkshire我们言出必行，在可见的未
来几十年内，Berkshire的控制权与文化将不会有所改变，最后同时也是最重要
的一点，Harold与Peter可以确定将能够继续经营原来的企业，这是他们最喜
爱的工作，这点不会因为合并案完成而有任何的改变，在Berkshire，我们不会
鸡婆地去提醒打击率高达四成的强打者应该要如何挥棒。
What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense
for a few other owners of large private businesses. So,
if you
have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our
acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page
22.
我想这些的道理同样也适合其它大型私人企业的所有者，所以如果你有公司的情
况符合我们的标准的，请务必让我知道，在年报的后段有我们拟购并企业的标
准。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of
Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments
are not charged against the specific businesses to which
they
apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately.
This
procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses
as they
would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've
explained in past reports why this form of presentation
seems to
us to be more useful to investors and managers than one
utilizing
GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made
on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show
in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in
our
audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
(000s omitted)
------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
-------------------- ------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
---------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $ 30,876 $(108,961) $ 20,156
$(71,141)
Net Investment Income ...... 375,946 355,067 321,321 305,763
H. H. Brown, Lowell,
and Dexter ............... 44,025* 27,883 28,829 17,340
Buffalo News ................. 50,962 47,863 29,696 28,163
Commercial & Consumer Finance 22,695 19,836 14,161
12,664
Fechheimer ................... 13,442 13,698 6,931 7,267
Kirby ........................ 39,147 35,653 25,056 22,795
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 21,540 17,110 10,398 8,072
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 38,196 31,954 23,809 19,883
See's Candies ................ 41,150 42,357 24,367 25,501
World Book ................... 19,915 29,044 13,537 19,503
Purchase-Price Accounting &
Goodwill Charges ......... (17,033) (12,087) (13,996) (13,070)
Interest Expense** ........... (56,545) (98,643) (35,614)
(62,899)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............ (9,448) (7,634) (5,994) (4,913)
Other ........................ 28,428 67,540 15,094 32,798
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 643,296 460,680 477,751
347,726
Sales of Securities ............ 546,422 89,937 356,702
59,559
Tax Accruals Caused by
New Accounting Rules ........ --- --- (146,332) ---
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities .. $1,189,718 $ 550,617 $688,121
$407,285
* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was
acquired,
November 7, 1993.
*Dexter的盈余仅含购并日1993年11月7日以后的盈余
**Excludes interest expense of Commercial and Consumer
Finance
businesses. In 1992 includes $22.5 million of premiums
paid on
the early redemption of debt.
**不含商业与消费金融公司的利息费用，另外1992年部份还包含2,250万提前赎回债券的溢
价。
A large amount of information about these businesses is
given
on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings
reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59,
we have
rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments
on a non-
GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way
Charlie and
I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you
with the
financial information that we would wish you to give us
if our
positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们
的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资
讯。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which
we
believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire
than does
our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the
previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected
in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would
be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead
been
distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of
which we speak here
exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major
restructuring charges.
之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈
余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公
司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所
得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业调整的
主要支出。
Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at
about
15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that
rate. Last
year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings
to about
$1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15%
goal.
Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount
needed has
risen to about $1.85 billion.
长期而言，如果我们的实质价值想要以每年15%的幅度来成长的话，那么透视
盈余每年也必须增加以这个幅度来成长，去年我曾经提到，到公元2000年为
止，Berkshire若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长到18亿美元，而由于1993
年我们又发行了一些新股，所以现在的门坎提高到18.5亿美元。
That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold
us
to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice
of
shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the
target,
centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit.
We will
instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting
later.
这是一个高难度的目标，不过也希望大家能够继续支持我们，在过去我们常常批
评有些管理阶层总是先把箭射出去后再划上准心，不管这箭射得有多歪，因此关
于这点我们宁愿先标出准心，然后再瞄准目标射箭。
If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that
allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible
terms.
Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will
- change
in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime,
we'll
try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply
because we are long on cash. There's no use running if
you're on
the wrong road.
如果我们想要命中靶心，那么我们绝对需要有能以合理价格买到好的公司与股份
的市场，不过对我们来说，现在市场上的情况并不理想，当然这种情况随时都有
可能会改变，在此同时，我们也会尽量避免手上闲钱太多而去做那些浪费工夫的
蠢事，若方向不对，再怎么努力冲刺也是白费力气。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through
earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily
very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have
been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8,
mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数
字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益
项下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
------------------------ --------------------- --------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
------ ------ ------ ------
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ..... 13.0% 18.2% $ 83(2) $ 70
The Coca-Cola Company ........ 7.2% 7.1% 94 82
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.8%(1) 8.2%(1) 41(2)
29(2)
GEICO Corp. .................. 48.4% 48.1% 76(3) 34(3)
General Dynamics Corp. ....... 13.9% 14.1% 25 11(2)
The Gillette Company ......... 10.9% 10.9% 44 38
Guinness PLC ................. 1.9% 2.0% 8 7
The Washington Post Company .. 14.8% 14.6% 15 11
Wells Fargo & Company ........ 12.2% 11.5% 53(2) 16(2)
Berkshire's share of undistributed
earnings of major investees $439 $298
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed
investee earnings(4) (61) (42)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 478 348
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $856 $604
(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest
at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少数股权
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股权比例计算
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both
recurring and significant
扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire
pays
on the dividends it receives
适用的税率为14%，这是Berkshire收到现金股利时的平均税率。
We have told you that we expect the undistributed,
hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce
at least
equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date,
we have
far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we
bought
three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50
per share
and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630
per
share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized
a $297
million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight
years
we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities
attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower
14% in
accordance with our look-through method - were only $152
million.
In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our
look-
through presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless
realized
a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable
to
these shares.
我曾告诉过各位，我们预估这些已依估计税率调整过的未分配盈余至少可以为
Berkshire创造出同等的实质价值，而到目前为止，其真正的结果甚至超乎我们
的预期，举例来说，我们在1986年以每股172.5美元的价格买进300万股资
本城/ABC公司的股份，去年我们以每股630美元的价格处分了其中的三分之
一，在支付35%的资本利得税后，我们实现2.97亿美元的税后盈余，相对地，
在我们持有这些股份的八年期间，经由这些股份资本城公司分配给我们的透视盈
余在扣除估计14%的所得税之后，只有1.52亿美元，换句话说，透过出售这些
股份，所获取的利益，即便在扣除较高的所得税负之后，还是比原先透过持股所
分配到的盈余还要高出许多。
We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the
future
and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a
conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic
earnings.
而我们也预期这样的情况在未来还会持续发生，因此我们相信Berkshire所计算
的透视盈余，算是相当保守的表达方式。
Taxes
税负
As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial
payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay
1993
federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million
of that
attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to
realized
capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal
and
foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over
$400
million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements
but
that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's
1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1%
of the total
paid last year by all American corporations.
就像是刚刚提到的资本城股份出售案，Berkshire可以说是联邦政府的缴税大
户，总计在1993年，我们总共缴了3.9亿美元的所得税，其中2亿属于本业
获利，另外1.9亿则源自于资本利得，此外我们的被投资公司另外向联邦政府与
国外政府又缴交了超过4亿美元的所得税，这是你在本公司的财务报表上看不
到，但却又确实存在的，直接再加上间接合计，Berkshire占去年所有美国企业
缴给联邦政府所得税总额的1.5%。
Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely
no
complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based
economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than
it does
the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater
benefit
to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress
this
inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.
对于这个比例，查理跟我本人一点怨言也没有，我们知道我们是在一个市场导向
的经济社会，我们努力所收到的报酬，其比例甚至比一些对这个社会有更多贡献
的人还要多，透过租税政策，多多少少可以降低这种不合理性，不过即便是如此，
我们还是认为自己受到特别优厚的待遇。
Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay
a
much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership
or "S"
corporation, two structures often used for business activities.
For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire
to do.
However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated
-
though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing
for the
long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy
even
if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest
way
to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities.
A
third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact
that taxes
are due only when gains are realized.
虽然Berkshire若是以合伙或S型企业的形式来经营，(在美国许多商业活动确
实是以这两种形态在运作)，Berkshire跟其所有的股东，总的来说可以大大减少
所需负担的税负，但基于许多理由，那样的做法并不适合Berkshire的运作，所
幸我们以企业形态运作的模式所受到的租税惩罚，因为我们采取长期投资的策略
而稍稍减轻，虽然就算是证交所得免税，查理跟我还是会坚持遵照买进并持有的
策略，这是我们认为最好的投资方式，同时也最符合我们的个人特质，当然第三
个好处就是因为这样做可以使我们只有在实现资本利得时才需要缴税。
Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance
during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though
I
missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel
superior,
Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life
in
Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New
York
temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying
her
because he had only a single silver dollar and she was
interested
solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem
to Old
Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the
sage:
Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours
(1, 2,
4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).
经由我个人最喜爱的漫画短片，Li'l Abner，我有机会可以体会到延迟支付所得
税的好处，虽然当时我没有好好地利用那次机会，为了让他的读者觉得自己很优
越，Li'l Abner一直快乐地维持单身，直到他为纽约一位女演员Appassionatta
深深地着迷，但由于她只对百万富翁有兴趣，因此一贫如洗的Abner可以说是
一点希望都没有，在遭到拒绝之后，Abner跑去智慧老人Mose那里请他指点
迷津，结果这位圣贤对Abner说，很简单你只要能够将身上仅有的一块钱，复
制20次，Appassionatta自然就会投入到你的怀抱(1,2,4,8,….,1,048,576)。
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse,
dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a
jackpot that
spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following
Mose's
advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find
his next
double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben
Graham.
我记得这段漫画的最后一段是Abner跑到一家旅馆，将他仅有的一块钱投入吃
角子老虎中，结果竟然中了七星，一时之间奖金掉满地，没想到他老兄一丝不苟
遵照Mose老人的旨意，只捡起了其中的两块钱之后，就出发去寻找下一次复制
的机会，看到这里我便舍弃了Abner，并开始研读葛拉汉的理论。
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to
anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he
also
forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the
35%
federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed
one double
annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated
$22,370.
Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles
and paying a
35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more
to reach the
$1 million required to win Appassionatta.
Mose很显然地不配当他人的精神导师，除了低估Abner对于他的指示过于盲
从的程度，他也忘了考虑到可能的税负，假设今天Abner也像Berkshire一样
必须负担高达35%的联邦所得税的话，而且他每年只能成功地复制一次的话，
就算连续20年都如他所愿，他也只能累积到22,370元，当然若是他能持之以
恒地保持这样的记录的话，他则还须多等上七年半，才能累积到所需的100万
以赢得Appassionatta的芳心。
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single
investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2
times? In
that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax
or,
after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about
$130
million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled
to
Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how
Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on
$130 million
is another question.
然而要是Abner只将资金放在单一不变的投资之上，同时连续27年半都能保
持每年倍数成长的记录的话，这样到最后，他在税前可以累积高达二亿美元的获
利，或是在扣除7,000万美元的所得税之后，得到税后1亿3,000万美元的利
益，届时可能会换做是Appassionatta爬着来求他了，当然等到27年后，一
个坐拥1亿多美元的富翁会怎么看待年华老去的Appassionatta，则又是另外
一回事了。
What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors
will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment
that
compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession
of
investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect
many
Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.
这宗小故事告诉我们必须负担税负的投资人从每年固定以一个比率成长的单一
投资上，可以获得比每年更换投资对象所得的多的多，即便是两者成长的幅度一
样也是如此，不过我怀疑许多Berkshire的股东老早就已经知道这个道理了。
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运
At this point in the report we've customarily provided
you
with a table showing the annual "combined ratio"
of the insurance
industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares
total
insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue
from
premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100,
a level
indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry
has taken
in less money each year from its policyholders than it
has had to
pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred
during
the year.
接下来到这里我们通常会准备一张表来说明保险业过去十多年来的综合比率，综
合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，多年以来，比
率在100以下代表有承保的损失，也就是说，保险业者当年度从客户那里收到
的保费，不足以支应必须支付给保户的理赔款以及营运所需的费用开支。
Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers
get
to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before
paying
it out. This happens because most policies require that
premiums
be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes
time to
resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines
of
insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice,
many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.
当然若是两者能够相等，将会是一个很令人高兴的结局，因为保险业者在真正支
付给客户理赔金之前，通常有一段时间可以将这笔钱好好地运用，因为大部分的
保单都是先向客户收取保费，更重要的是，通常得花上一段时间才会将损失理赔
款给付出去，尤其是像产品责任险或是专门职业执行业务不当等保险，通常要花
上好几年的时间，才能将理赔损失定案。
To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds
prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-but-
not-yet-paid claims is called "the float." In
the past, the
industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to
111 and
still break even from its insurance writings because of
the
earnings derived from investing this float.
再讲白一点，这些保户预付的保险费加上那些已经发生但还未理赔的资金统称为
保险浮存金，在过去，利用这些浮存金创造投资收益，使得整个保险业即使面临
高达107到111的综合比率，却依然可以维持损益两平。
As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float
has
substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have
provided
in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons
of
industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined
ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive
business
than it did then.
不过随着利率下滑，保险浮存金的价值大幅滑落，因此过去我们提供的比率已经
无法用来衡量保险业者每年的获利状况比较，今天一家拥有相同综合比率的保险
公司比起1980年代来说，已无法同日而语。
Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting
results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from
float
can one evaluate the true economics of the business that
a
property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual
investment
results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float
and
stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should
be
carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial
performance. But that should be a separate analysis from
the one
we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect,
their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation
to
the investment operation - should be determined simply
by the risk-
free, long-term rate of interest.
我们认为只有将保险业的承保结果与保险浮存金可以获得的无风险盈余做分
析，才有办法正确地评估一家产物意外险公司真正的价值，当然一家保险公司利
用其浮存金与股东资金所能创造的投资收益也相当重要，这点也是投资人在该公
司的经营表现时，必须特别注意的，只不过那需要分开另外分析，而不是我们现
在要讨论的主题。事实上，保险浮存金的价值，关键在于其从保险营运移转至投
资营运的转拨价格，这点可以简单的以长期无风险的资金利率作为标准。
On the next page we show the numbers that count in an
evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate
our
float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative
to our
premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment
reserves
and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's
balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges
applicable
to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined
by our
underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have
had an
underwriting profit, which includes 1993, our cost of float
has
been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings
by
adding underwriting profit to float income.
下一页我们将会列出如何计算出Berkshire保险事业价值，首先先计算浮存金总
额-相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的，将所有的损
失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成
本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而
定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负
的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利
益。
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ----------- -------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967 profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968 profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969 profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970 $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971 profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972 profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993 profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we
had
the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid
$31
million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds.
This sounds
good - is good - but is far from as good as it sounds.
大家应该看得出，去年我们保险事业的营运结果，等于是让我们可以免费利用
26亿美元的浮存金，而事实上，应该还要再加上3,100万美元的承保利益，这
看起来相当不错，不过实际上并没有想象中的那么好。
We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume
of
"super-cat" policies (which other insurance and
reinsurance
companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer
from mega-
catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of
consequence
from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic
Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses,
the
reason being that very few flood policies are purchased
from
private insurers.
我们试着大家冷静一下，因为我们接下的生意其中有一大部分属于霹雳猫保单
(这是其它保险公司或再保公司专门买来分担他们在发生重大意外灾害时，所可
能造成的损失)，同时去年这类的业务并没有出现重大的损失，意思是说，就连
发生在1993年真正严重的中西部水灾也没有触及霹雳猫损失理赔的门坎，原因
在于很少有私人保险公司会去购买水灾险。
It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this
single-
year result that the super-cat business is a wonderful
one, or even
a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the
fallacy:
Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every
century.
If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence
that year,
you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed,
you may
go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You
also will
eventually go broke.
这样很容易会产生错觉，并做出单一年度霹雳猫的成绩是相当不错且令人满意的
一年，一个简单的例子足以说明一切，假设每个世纪平均都会发生25次重大的
意外事件，而你每年都以以一赔五的比率赌它今年不会发生，则你赌对的年份可
能远比赌错的年份多出许多，甚至你有可能连续赌对六年、七年，甚至是更多年，
但我必须说，不管怎样，到最后你一定会以破产作为结局。
At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate
premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there
is no way
for us - or anyone else - to calculate the true odds on
super-cat
coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find
out
whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.
在Berkshire，我们直觉地相信我们已经收到合理的保费，以类似以一赔三又二
分之一的赌率接受赌注，当然没有人可以真正正确地算出霹雳猫保险真正的赔
率，事实上，可能要等到几十年后，我们才能知道当初的判断是否正确。
What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely
to be a
lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer
losses
from the super-cat business equal to three or four times
what we
earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992,
we
paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded
our
super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us
$600
million.
不过我们确实知道，当损失真正降临时，铁定是件轰动的事，以后可能会发生三
倍或四倍于我们在1993年所赚到的盈余那样大的意外事件，1992年Andrew
飓风发生的那次，我们总共赔了1.25亿美元，时至今日由于我们已大幅扩大在
霹雳猫保险的业务量，所以同样规模的飓风可能会造成我们六亿美元左右的理赔
损失。
So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter,
we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles
earthquake
will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead
of a 6.8,
it would have been a different story.
1994年到目前为止，我们还算是幸运，在我写这封信时，我们因为洛杉矶大地
震所造成的损失还算在正常范围之内，不过要是当时地震发生的规模不是6.8
而是7.5的话，那么最后的结果就完全不是那么一回事了。
Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies.
In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business.
Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous
capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger
than that
of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge
resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify
the
risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to
reduce
concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in
the super-
cat business. So these competitors are forced into offering
far
smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder,
they
would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe - or a confluence
of
smaller catastrophes - would wipe them out.
Berkshire本身很适合从事霹雳猫保险的业务，我们有业界最优秀的经理人Ajit
Jain，此外从事这行需要相当雄厚的资金实力，在这点我们公司的净值大概是其
他主要竞争对手的10到20倍，对大部分的保险业务而言，背后所拥有的资源
还不是那么地重要，一家保险公司可以很轻易地就把它所承担的风险分散出去，
若有必要，也可以降低险种集中度以减低风险，但是对霹雳猫保险这种特殊的保
险就没有办法这样子做，所以其它的竞争同业只能被迫降低理赔的上限来因应，
而要是他们胆敢承担更高的风险，则一个超大型的意外灾害或是连续发生几个较
小型的灾害，就有可能让他们粉身碎骨。
One indication of our premier strength and reputation is
that
each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world
buys
very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better
than
anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a
reinsurer
is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying
circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when
things
look rosy.
有一件事情可以显示我们超强的竞争力与卓越的声誉，那就是全世界前四大再保
公司全部都向Berkshire投保巨额的霹雳猫保险，这些大公司比谁都清楚，对于
再保公司来说，真正要考验的是他们在困难的状况下，愿意且能够支付理赔金的
能力与意愿，而绝对不是在太平时期勇于接受保费收入的意愿。
One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase
in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity
capital has
been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed
entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write
business so that they can justify the projections they
utilized in
attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our
1994
operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business
written
in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration.
If
this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced
volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large,
sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with
large
capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.
值得注意的是，近年来愿意接受再保业务的供给量大幅增加，再保业者总共募集
了近50亿美元的资金来进军这类业务，且大部分都是新成立的公司，很自然的
这些新进的业者急欲承接业务以证明当初他们吸收资金时所作的预估，这些新加
入的竞争并不会影响我们1994年的营运，因为我们早已经接满了生意，主要是
在1993年签下的，不过我们已经看到保费价格有恶化的趋势，如果这种情况持
续下去，我们将会大幅降低承接的业务量，但随时准备好接下大型且复杂的保险
业者所欲寻找确定能够理赔损失的保证。
In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate
operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation
business,
headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed
by the
Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto
and general
liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent
results. In combination, these four units produced a significant
underwriting profit and substantial float.
在我们其它保险业务方面，我们由Rod领导的住宅保险、Brad带领的员工退休
保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以及由Don所领导的国家产险
所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当
不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。
All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though
its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses
an
intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large
amount -
larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire
business.
总而言之，我们拥有第一流的保险事业，虽然他们的经营成果变化相当的大，但
是其实质价值却远超过其账面的价值，而事实上，在Berkshire其它事业的身上
也有类似的情况。
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of
over
$250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs
to
subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们超过二亿五千万美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于
Berkshire关系企业所持有)。
12/31/93
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
2,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 345,000
$1,239,000
93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920
4,167,975
13,654,600 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................... 307,505 681,023
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713
1,759,594
4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 94,938
401,287
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000
1,431,000
38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019
270,822
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company. ......... 9,731
440,148
6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423,680
878,614
Considering the similarity of this year's list and the
last,
you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose.
But we
continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with
an
interest in a business that is both understandable and
durably
wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too
hard to
replace.
看到今年所列的投资与去年竟如此的相似，你可能会认为本公司的管理阶层实在
是昏庸到无可救药的地步，不过我们还是坚持相信离开原本就熟悉且表现优异稳
定的公司，实在是非常不智之举，这类的公司实在是还难找到更好的替代。
Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble
understanding that point when they are focusing on a business
they
operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb
long-
term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless
of
price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should
I part with my crown
jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running
his personal
investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously
-
move from business to business when presented with no more
than
superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst
of
these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit."
Can you
imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell
a star
subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also
makes
sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small
piece
of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that
an owner
would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
有趣的是企业经理人在认定何者才是自己本业时，从来就不会搞不清楚情况，母
公司是不会单纯因为价格因素就将自己旗下最优秀的子公司给卖掉，公司总裁一
定会问，为什么要把我皇冠上的珠宝给变卖掉，不过当场景转换到其个人的投资
组合时，他却又会毫不犹豫地，甚至是情急地从这家公司换到另一家公司，靠的
不过是股票经纪人肤浅的几句话语，其中最烂的一句当属，你不会因为获利而破
产，你能想象要是一家公司的总裁用类似的方式建议董事会将最有潜力的子公司
给卖掉时，就我个人的观点，适用于企业经营的原则也同样适用于股票投资，投
资人在持有一家公司的股票所展现的韧性应当与一家公司的老板持有公司全部
的股权一样。
Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have
been
achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919.
In 1938,
more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and
long after
the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune
did
an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph
the
writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty
and serious
investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's
record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he
is looking
too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise
before
him."
先前我曾经提到若是在1919年以40美元投资可口可乐会获得怎样的成果，
1938年在可乐问世达50年且早已成为代表美国的产品之后，财富杂志对该公
司做了一次详尽的专访，在文章的第二段作者写到：每年都会有许多重量型的投
资人看好可口可乐，并对于其过去的辉煌记录表示敬意，但也都做下自己太晚发
现的结论，认为该公司已达巅峰，前方的道路充满了竞争与挑战。
Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well.
But
it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207
million
cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted
into the
192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993
it sold
about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical
volume
from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its
very major
industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor:
Though
the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends
reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh
$40 then
invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000
by yearend
1993.
没错，1938年确实充满了竞争，而1993年也是，不过值得注意的是1938年
可口可乐一年总共卖出二亿箱的饮料(若是将当时加仑装改成现在192盎斯的箱
子)，但是到了1993年该公司一年卖出饮料高达107亿箱，对这家当时已经成
为市场领导者的公司，在后来将近50的期间总共又成长了50倍，对于1938
年加入的投资者来说，Party根本还没有结束，虽然在1919年投资40美元在
可口可乐股票的投资人(含将所收到的股利再投资)，到了1938年可获得3,277
美元，但是若是在1938年重新以40美元投资可口可乐股票，时至1993年底，
还是照样可以成长到25,000美元。
I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story:
"It would be hard to name any company comparable in
size to Coca-
Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product
that can
point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's."
In the 55
years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened
somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description
still fits.
我忍不住想要在引用1938年财富杂志的报导，「实在是很难在找到像可口可乐
这样规模而且又能持续十年保持不变的产品内容」，如今又过了55个年头，可
口可乐的产品线虽然变得更广泛，但令人印象深刻的是这种形容词还依旧适用。
Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime
it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions.
That
judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital
mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly
affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted
a
strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart
at that
- only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one
good
idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)
查理跟我老早以前便明了要一个人的投资生涯中，做出上百个小一点投资决策是
件很辛苦的一件事，这种想法随着Berkshire资金规模日益扩大而益形明显，而
放眼投资世界中，可以大幅影响本公司投资成效的机会已越来越少，因此我们决
定采取一种只要求自己在少数的时候够聪明就好，而不是每回都要非常的聪明，
所以我们现在只要求每年出现一次好的投资主意就可以了，(查理提醒我今年该
轮到我)。
The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard
diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say
the
strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional
investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio
concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it
should,
both the intensity with which an investor thinks about
a business
and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics
before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define
risk,
using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss
or injury."
我们采取的这种策略排除了依照普通分散风险的教条，许多学者便会言之凿凿说
我们这种策略比起一般传统的投资风险要高的许多，这点我们不敢苟同，我们相
信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加
强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，
与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。
Academics, however, like to define investment "risk"
differently, averring that it is the relative volatility
of a stock
or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared
to
that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases
and
statistical skills, these academics compute with precision
the
"beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in
the past - and then
build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories
around this
calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to
measure
risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It
is better
to be approximately right than precisely wrong.
然而在学术界，却喜欢将投资的风险给予不同的定义，坚持把它当作是股票价格
相对波动的程度，也就是个别投资相较于全体投资波动的幅度，运用数据库与统
计方法，这些学者能够计算出一只股票"精确"的Beta值，代表其过去相对波动
的幅度，然后根据这项公式建立一套晦涩难解的投资与资金分配理论，为了渴望
找出可以衡量风险的单一统计值，但他们却忘了一项基本的原则，宁愿大概对，
也不要完全错。
For owners of a business - and that's the way we think
of
shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far
off the
mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example,
under
beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply
compared
to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it
in 1973 -
becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it
was at the higher
price. Would that description have then made any sense
to someone
who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced
price?
对于企业的所有权人来说，这是我们认为公司股东应该有的想法，学术界对于风
险的定义实在是有点离谱，甚至于有点荒谬，举例来说，根据Beta理论，若是
有一种股票的价格相对于大盘下跌的幅度更高，就像是我们在1973年买进华盛
顿邮报股份时一样，那么其风险远比原来高股价时还要更高，那么要是哪天有人
愿意以极低的价格把整家公司卖给你时，你是否也会认为这样的风险太高，而予
以拒绝呢?
In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham
explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor.
There he
introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who
shows up every day
to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish.
The
more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities
available to the investor. That's true because a wildly
fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will
periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible
to
see how the availability of such prices can be thought
of as
increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free
to
either ignore the market or exploit its folly.
事实上，真正的投资人喜欢波动都还来不及，班哲明．葛拉汉在智能型投资人一
书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面
前，只要你愿意都可以从他那里买进或卖出你的投资，只要他老兄越沮丧，投资
人拥有的机会也就越多，这是由于只要市场波动的幅度越大，一些超低的价格就
更有机会会出现在一些好公司身上，很难想象这种低价的优惠会被投资人视为对
其有害，对于投资人来说，你完全可以无视于他的存在或是好好地利用这种愚蠢
的行为。
In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining
what a
company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how
much
borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer
not to
know the company's name. What he treasures is the price
history of
its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the
price
history and instead will seek whatever information will
further our
understanding of the company's business. After we buy a
stock,
consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed
for a
year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position
in
See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then,
should
we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?
在评估风险时，Beta理论学者根本就不屑于了解这家公司到底是在做什么，他
的竞争对手在干嘛，或是他们到底借了多少钱来营运，他们甚至不愿意知道公司
的名字叫什么，他们在乎的只是这家公司的历史股价，相对地，我们很愿意不管
这家公司过去股价的历史，反而希望尽量能够得到有助于我们了解这家公司的资
讯，另外在我们买进股份之后，我们一点也不在意这家公司的股份在未来的一、
两年内是否有交易，就像是我们根本就不需要持有100%股权的喜斯糖果或是布
朗鞋业的股票报价来证明我们的权益是否存在，同样地我们也不需要持有7%的
可口可乐每日的股票行情。
In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess
is
whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment
(including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective
holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power
as he
had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that
initial
stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering
precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree
of accuracy
that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation
are:
我们认为投资人应该真正评估的风险是他们从一项投资在其预计持有的期间内
所收到的税后收入加总(也包含出售股份所得)，是否能够让他保有原来投资时拥
有的购买力，再加上合理的利率，虽然这样的风险无法做到像工程般的精确，但
它至少可以做到足以做出有效判断的的程度，在做评估时主要的因素有下列几
点︰
1) The certainty with which the long-term economic
characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
1)这家公司长期竞争能力可以衡量的程度
2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated,
both as to its ability to realize the full potential of
the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
2)这家公司管理阶层发挥公司潜能以及有效运用现金可以衡量的程度
3) The certainty with which management can be counted on
to channel the rewards from the business to the
shareholders rather than to itself;
3)这家公司管理阶层将企业获得的利益确实回报给股东而非中饱私囊可
以衡量的程度
4) The purchase price of the business;
4)买进这家企业的价格
5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be
experienced and that will determine the degree by which
an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his
gross return.
5)投资人的净购买力所得，须考虑税负与通货膨胀等因素必须从投资收
益总额中扣除的部份
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably
fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base
of any kind.
But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters
does not
negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as
Justice
Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity
but
nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it,"
so also can
investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see"
the risks inherent
in certain investments without reference to complex equations
or
price histories.
这些因素对于许多分析师来说，可能是丈二金刚摸不着头脑，因为他们根本无法
从现有的数据库中找到这些信息，但是取得这些精确数字的难度高并不代表他们
就不重要或是无法克服，就像是司法正义一样，Stewart法官发现他根本无法找
到何谓猥亵的标准，不过他还是坚称，只要我一看到就知道是不是，同样地对于
投资人来说，不需靠精确的公式或是股价历史，而只要运用不太精确但却有用的
方式，就可以看到潜藏在某些投资里的风险。
Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and
Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term
than,
say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke
sells about
44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60%
share (in
value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum,
in which
Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses
in
which the leading company has long enjoyed such global
power.
就长期而言，可口可乐与吉列所面临的产业风险，要比任何计算机公司或是通路商
或小得多，可口可乐占全世界饮料销售量的44%，吉列则拥有60%的刮胡刀市
场占有率(以销售额计)，除了称霸口香糖的箭牌公司之外，我看不出还有那家公
司可以像他们一样长期以来享有傲视全球的竞争力。
Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased
their
worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of
their
brand names, the attributes of their products, and the
strength of
their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive
advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic
castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle
daily
without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says,
stocks
of companies selling commodity-like products should come
with a
warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to
human wealth."
更重要的，可口可乐与吉列近年来也确实一点一滴地在增加他们全球市场的占有
率，品牌的力量、产品的特质与配销通路的优势，使得他们拥有超强的竞争力，
就像是树立起高耸的护城河来保卫其经济城堡，相对的，一般公司却要每天耗尽
心思去打没有意义的游击战，就像是彼得．林区所说的，对于那些只会销售量贩
式产品的公司来说，大家应该在其股票上加印这句警语-「竞争可能有害于人类
的利益」。
The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious
to
even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their
stocks
is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies
who
possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude
from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke
and
Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being
measured?
Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of
a company
- its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk
inherent
in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion
makes
sense and that equating beta with investment risk also
makes no
sense.
可口可乐与吉列的竞争力在一般产业观察家眼中实在是显而易见的，然而其股票
的Beta值却与一般平庸、完全没有竞争优势的公司相似，难道只因为这样我们
就该认为在衡量公司所面临的产业风险时，完全不须考虑他们所享有的竞争优势
吗? 或者就可以说持有一家公司部份所有权-也就是股票的风险，与公司长期所
面临的营运风险一点关系都没有，我们认为这些说法，包含衡量投资风险的Beta
公式在内，一点道理都没有。
The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for
differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product
toy
company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another
toy
company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's
quite
possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions
if they
have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and
the
factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness.
Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining
himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases,
a reasonably
intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment
risks with a useful degree of accuracy.
Beta学者所架构的理论根本就没有能力去分辨，销售宠物玩具或呼拉圈的玩具
公司与销售大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司，所隐藏的风险有何不同? 但对一般普
通的投资人来说，只要他略懂得消费者行为以及形成企业长期竞争优势或弱势的
原因的话，就可以很明确的看出两者的差别，当然每个投资人都会犯错，但只要
将自己集中在相对少数，容易了解的投资个案上，一个理性、知性与耐性兼具的
投资人一定能够将投资风险限定在可接受的范围之内。
In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine
whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a
"Barbie." We
couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were
to spend
years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our
own
intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding,
and in other cases the nature of the industry would be
the
roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with
fast-moving
technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations
of
its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago
what
would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer
industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors
and
corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.)
Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict
the
future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick
instead
with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in
a haystack
when one is sitting in plain sight?
当然有许多产业，连查理或是我可能都无法判断到底我们在玩的是宠物玩具或芭
比娃娃，甚至在花了许多年时间努力的研究这些产业之后，我们还是无法解决这
个问题，有时是因为我们本身智识上的缺陷，阻碍了我们对事情的了解，有时则
是因为产业特性的关系，例如对于一家随时都比须面临快速变迁技术的公司来
说，我们根本就无法对其长期的竞争力做出任何的评断，人类在三十年前，是否
就能预知现在电视制造或计算机产业的演进，当然不能，就算是大部分钻研于这方
面领域的投资人与企业经理人也没有办法，那么为什么查理跟我要觉得应该要有
去预测其它产业快速变迁前景的能力呢? 我们宁愿挑些简单一点的，一个人坐的
舒舒服服就好了，为什么还要费事去挨稻草里的针呢?
Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our
efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification.
If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall
risk
should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-
independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase
a
risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility
of
causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain,
weighted
for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably
weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar,
but
unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ
this
strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you
should
adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel,
which
will want to see lots of action because it is favored by
probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge
bet.
当然，有些投资策略，例如我们从事多年的套利活动，就必须将风险分散，若是
单一交易的风险过高，就比须将资源分散到几个各自独立的个案之上，如此一
来，虽然每个个案都有可能导致损失或伤害，但只要你确信每个独立的个案经过
机率的加权平均能够让你获致满意的报酬就行了，许多创业投资者用的就是这种
方法，若是你也打算这样做的话，记得采取与赌场老板搞轮盘游戏同样的心态，
那就是鼓励大家持续不断的下注，因为长期而言，机率对庄家有利，但千万要拒
绝单一一次的大赌注。
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs
when
an investor who does not understand the economics of specific
businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to
be a long-
term owner of American industry. That investor should both
own a
large number of equities and space out his purchases. By
periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the
know-
nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment
professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money
acknowledges its
limitations, it ceases to be dumb.
另外一种需要分散风险的特殊情况是，当投资人并没有对任何单一产业有特别的
熟悉，不过他却对美国整体产业前景有信心，则这类的投资人应该分散持有许多
公司的股份，同时将投入的时点拉长，例如，透过定期投资指数基金，一个什么
都不懂的投资人通常都能打败大部分的专业经理人，很奇怪的是，当愚昧的金钱
了解到自己的极限之后，它就不再愚昧了。
On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor,
able
to understand business economics and to find five to ten
sensibly-
priced companies that possess important long-term competitive
advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense
for you.
It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your
risk. I
cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to
put money
into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply
adding
that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands
best
and that present the least risk, along with the greatest
profit
potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too
much of a
good thing can be wonderful."
另一方面，若是你是稍具常识的投资人，能够了解产业经济的话，应该就能够找
出五到十家股价合理并享有长期竞争优势的公司，此时一般分散风险的理论对你
来说就一点意义也没有，要是那样做反而会伤害到你的投资成果并增加你的风
险，我实在不了解那些投资人为什么要把钱摆在他排名第20的股票上，而不是
把钱集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同时风险最小，获利可能最大的投资之上，
或许这就是先知梅西卫斯特所说的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。
Corporate Governance
企业治理
At our annual meetings, someone usually asks "What
happens to
this place if you get hit by a truck?" I'm glad they
are still
asking the question in this form. It won't be too long
before the
query becomes: "What happens to this place if you
don't get hit by
a truck?"
在年度的股东会上，有人常常会问︰「要是那天你不幸被车撞到，该怎么办?」
我只能说很庆幸他们还是在问这样的问题，而不是「要是那天你不被车撞到，我
们该怎么办?」。
Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to
discuss
corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year.
In
general, I believe that directors have stiffened their
spines
recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat
more
like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators
on
corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction
among
three fundamentally different manager/owner situations
that exist
in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility
of
directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect
change
differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on
the first
case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since
Berkshire
falls into the second category, however, and will someday
fall into
the third, we will discuss all three variations.
这样的问题让我有机会谈谈近年来相当热门的话题-公司治理，首先我相信最近
许多公司的董事们已开始试着把他们的腰杆打直，而现在的投资人比起以前来
说，也慢慢地被公司当作真正的拥有人来对待，但是评论专家并没有仔细地去区
别目前公开上市公司三种截然不同的经营权与所有权形态，虽然在法律上，董事
们应该承担的责任是责无旁贷的，但他们能发挥影响力进行改变的程度却有很大
的不同，大家通常都把注意力摆在第一类的案例之上，因为这是目前一般企业的
常态，但由于Berkshire本身是属于第二类，甚至有一天会变成第三类，所以在
这里我们有必要讨论一下三者的不同。
The first, and by far most common, board situation is one
in
which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In
that case,
I believe directors should behave as if there is a single
absentee
owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further
in all
proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives
directors a lot of
wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability
to think
independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders
while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest.
But
assume the board is functioning well and must deal with
a
management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have
the
responsibility for changing that management, just as an
intelligent
owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy
managers
over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders'
pockets, directors must slap their hands.
首先是第一类，也是目前最普遍的一类，在公司的股权结构中，并没有一个具掌
控能力的大股东，在这种情况下，我相信董事会的行为应该要像是公司有一个因
事未出席的大股东一样，在各种情况下，都要能够确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利
益不会受到损害，然而很不幸的是，所谓的长期利益，反而给了董事会很大的弹
性操作空间，而假设董事会运作尚称顺畅，不过经营阶层却很平庸甚至差劲时，
那么董事会就必须负起责任将经营阶层换掉，就好像一般公司老板会做的决定一
样，另外要是经营阶层能力尚可，只不过过于贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里
捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告。
In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something
he
doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors
of his
views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle
to make
the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy
director
can't get other directors to agree with him. He should
then feel
free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors
seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors
would
in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that
sort. But I
see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues
are
serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect
a vigorous
rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that
should
discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational
causes.
在这种一般常见的情况下，当个别董事发觉有不合理的现象时，应该试着说服其
他董事有关他的看法，若能够成功，那么董事会就有能力做出适当的决定，但是
假设要是这位落寞的董事孤掌难鸣，无法获得其它董事的支持，那么他就应该要
让没能出席的股东知道他的看法，当然很少有董事真的这样做，很多的董事事实
上并没有足够的胆识敢做这样大胆的动作，但我却认为这样的举动并没有什么不
妥，当然假设问题真的很严重的话，自然而然发出不平之鸣的董事一定会遭到其
他不认同看法的董事严正的驳斥，认为反对的董事不要在枝微末节或是非理性的
原因上捣乱。
For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors
ought
to be relatively few in number - say, ten or less - and
ought to
come mostly from the outside. The outside board members
should
establish standards for the CEO's performance and should
also
periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate
his
performance against those standards.
对于前述讨论的董事会形态，我认为董事的人数不必太多，最好是十个以内，同
时大部分成员应该从外部遴选，而外部董事应该要能够建立对CEO表现的评核
制度，并定期聚会，在CEO不在场的情况下，依据这些原则评断其表现。
The requisites for board membership should be business
savvy,
interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often,
directors
are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity
to
the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes
in
selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments
are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director
need never
worry about job security.
至于董事会成员遴选的条件，并须具备商业经验、对这项角色有兴趣同时以股东
利益为导向，只是目前大部分被遴选出来的董事，大多是因为他们的社会地位或
只是为了增加董事会成员的多样化，这样的做法是错误的，更有甚至，这种错误
还有后遗症，因为董事被任命之后就很难再加以撤消，好说话且没有意见的董事
是不怕找不到位置的。
The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the
controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies,
this
arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes
of stock
endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations,
it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between
owners
and management and that the directors cannot effect chang
，e except
through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is
mediocre or
worse - or is over-reaching - there is little a director
can do
about it except object. If the directors having no connections
to
the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well
have some
effect. More likely it will not.
第二种就像是发生在Berkshire的，具控制权的大股东本身也是经营阶层，在某
些公司，经过特殊的安排，将公司的股权按投票权重的不同分成两类，也会产生
这种情况，在这种情况下，很明显的董事会并非所有权人与经营阶层之间的中
介，且除非经由劝说，否则董事会很难发挥改变的影响力，也因此要是老板经营
者本身的能力平庸或很差劲或不顾他人，则董事除了表示反对以外，别无他法，
而要是与老板经营者没有关系的董事碰巧做出相同的结论，有时或许还有用，但
大部分的状况下是无济于事的。
If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently
serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation
will signal their doubts about management, and it will
emphasize
that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's
shortcomings.
而要是公司无法做出改变，且情况演变的很严重时，外部董事就应该要辞职，外
部董事的辞职等于是对现有的经营阶层投下反对票，同时凸显外部董事没有能力
纠正老板经营者缺失的现象。
The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling
owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples
of
which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside
directors
in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy
with
either the competence or integrity of the manager, they
can go
directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and
report
their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside
director, since he need make his case only to a single,
presumably
interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the
argument
is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only
that
single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about
a
critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.
第三种情况是公司拥有具控制权的大股东，但却不参与公司经营，这种特殊个案
在现实社会中有Hershey食品与道琼公司等例子，公司能够充分运用外部董事
的能力，若是董事们对于经营阶层的能力或品格感到不满意，他们可以直接向大
股东反应(当然大股东可能也是董事成员)，这种环境相当适合外部董事的发挥，
因为他只需要将情况向单一且关心公司前景的所有权人报告，同时只要论点理由
充分就可以马上发挥改变的效果，但即便如此，有意见的董事也只能有这样的选
择管道，若是他对于特定事情的处理结果不满意，他还是只能辞职而别无其它选
择。
Logically, the third case should be the most effective
in
insuring first-class management. In the second case the
owner is
not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors
often
find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild
over-
reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority
of
the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly
if
management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious -
their hands
are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in
situations
of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying
around
they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds
unfettered.
理论上，第三种情况最能够确保一流的经营阶层存在，因为第二种情况，老板不
可能把自己给Fire掉，而第一种情况，董事们通常很难与表现平庸又难以驾驭
的经理人打交道，而除非那些有意见的董事能够获得董事会多数的支持，这是一
件很困难的协调沟通任务，尤其是经营阶层的表现虽然可恨但却罪不至死的时
候，基本上他们的手脚是被绑的死死的，实务上，面临这种现象的董事通常会说
服自己留在董事会，至少还能有所图，但在此同时，经营阶层却还是同样可以为
所欲为。
In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself
nor
burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can
also
insure that outside directors are selected who will bring
useful
qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will
know that
the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather
than
being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling
owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions
in
respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder.
Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily
correct any mistake he makes.
在第三种情况下，老板本身不必衡量自己的表现也不必费心去取得多数人的支
持，同时他也可以确保所遴选出来的外部董事将可对董事会的素质有所提升，而
这些被选中的董事，也可以确定所提出的建议会真正被听进去，而不是被消极抵
制的经营阶层当作是耳边风，而若是大股东本身够聪明且有自信，那么他就能够
找到以股东利益为优先的菁英经理人，还有一点更重要的是，他能够随时准备改
正本身所犯的错误。
At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will
for as
long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is
excellent.
For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager
for some time.
在Berkshire，我们现在是以第二种情况在做营运，而且在我有生之年都会是如
此，至于我个人的健康状况，我必须要强调，实在是好极了，不管是好或坏，大
家都必须继续接受我担任大股东兼经营者。
After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie,
should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before
I do.
In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale
of
consequential amounts of stock.
直到我死后，我拥有的所有股份将会归我内人Susie拥有，要是她比我长寿的
话，不过要是她比我早死，所有的股份将会捐给一个基金会，且不论如何都不会
因为遗产或赠与税而必须被迫出售相当的股份。
When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the
foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode,
going
forward with a vitally interested, but non-management,
owner and
with a management that must perform for that owner. In
preparation
for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years
ago, and
in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family
members
will not be managers of the company in the future, but
they will
represent the controlling interest should anything happen
to me.
Most of our other directors are also significant owners
of
Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation.
All in
all, we're prepared for "the truck."
而当我的股份移转到我内人或是基金会之后，Berkshire将会进入第三种公司治
理情况，变成一个关心公司但却不参与经营的大股东搭配完全为股东设想的经理
人，为了预先做准备，Susie在几年前已经被选为公司的董事，而1993年我的
儿子豪尔也紧接着加入董事会，这些家族成员以后将不会担任公司的经理人，但
要是万一我不在时，他们将继承控制公司的权力，当然公司其它的董事本身也都
是主要的股东，且皆有很强的股东利益导向，总而言之，对于那辆卡车可能到来，
我们已经作好了准备。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股东指定捐赠计划
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities
were
recipients.
大约有97%的有效股权参与1993年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约940万美
元捐出的款项分配给3,110家慈善机构。
Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy
- as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions
that are
clearly related to the company's business activities -
differs
significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations.
There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to
the wishes
of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures),
employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through
matching
gifts or requests they make of the CEO).
Berkshire在自由乐捐方面的做法，(不同于具有特定商业目的的捐赠)，与其它
公开上市公司的做法有很大的不同，因为大部分的公司所作的捐赠大多是依照
CEO的意愿(他们通常背负许多社会压力)，员工(透过相对赠与)或董事(透过相对
赠与或是对于CEO的要求)。
At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the
owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation,
partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds
are to be
given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities,
it is
the charities favored by our owners that should receive
them.
We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally
fund the
charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should
they foot
the bill for his picks?
不过在Berkshire我们相信公司所有的钱都是属于股东的，就像是在私人家族合
伙企业一样，因此只要这些捐赠资金与公司本身商业活动无关的话，那么就应该
要由股东们所想要赠与的慈善机构收到这些款项，就像是我们还没看到过有
CEO愿意拿自己的钱，依照股东们的意愿进行乐捐，那么又有什么理由，让股
东为公司的CEO买单呢?
Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last
fall,
for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity
to
help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500
registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate
program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far
greater
administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead
is
less than half the size of our charitable contributions.
(Charlie,
however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our
$4.9 million
overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)
而我必须说明的是我们这项计划执行起来并不困难，去年秋天，我们从国家产险
公司借调一个人为期两个月，帮我们处理来自7,500位股东的捐款指示，而我
也相信其它公司花在处理相同捐赠规模所发生的成本铁定比我们高出许多，事实
上，我们公司每年所有的行政费用甚至不到我们每年捐赠金额的一半，(查理坚
持我必须向大家报告，总计490万美元的营业费用当中，有140万是发生在公
司的企业专机-无可辩解号之上)。
Below is a list showing the largest categories to which
our
shareholders have steered their contributions.
(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, one-
third religious) received 525 gifts
(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the
humanities received 447 gifts
(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split
about equally between Christian and Jewish) received
411 gifts
(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40%
youth-related) received 759 gifts
(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart
Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received
320 gifts
下表显示股东指定捐赠的前十大慈善机构
(a)347个教堂与犹太教堂收到569笔善款
(b)283所大专院校收到670笔善款
(c)244所K-12学校收到525笔善款(三分之二是普通学校，另外三分之一属教会学校)
(d)288所艺术、文化或人类学研究机构收到447笔善款
(e)180所宗教性社福机构(犹太教与基督教各半)收到411笔善款
(f)445所民间社福机构(其中四成与青少年相关)收到759笔善款
(g)153所医疗机构收到261笔善款
(h)186所与医疗相关的机构(如美国心脏学会，美国癌症协会等) 收到320笔善款
Three things about this list seem particularly interesting
to
me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose
to give
money to when they are acting of their own accord, free
of pressure
from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second,
the
contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost
never
allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these
institutions are what many shareholders would like to support.
Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting
philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations
that
believe in making abortions readily available for women
and 30
gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches)
that
discourage or are opposed to abortion.
在这之中，有三点我认为特别有趣，首先，某种程度可以显示出当人们系依个人
意志而非迫于募款人的压力或募款机构感性的诉求时，所可能做出的选择，第
二，一般大公司的捐赠计划从未将教堂或犹太教堂列入考虑，但这却是股东心目
中最佳的选择之一，第三，股东们所做出的决定有时有明显的冲突，有130笔
捐款给支持堕胎的机构团体，而另外有30笔的捐款指定要给反堕胎的机构团体
(扣除宗教机构不算)。
Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the
amount
that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designated-
contributions program and asked for your comments. We received
a
few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the
grounds
that it was our job to run the business and not our job
to force
shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the
shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency
of the
plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several
shareholders who have given stock to their children or
grandchildren told me that they consider the program a
particularly
good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about
the
subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive
the
program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic,
tool. The
bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from
$8 per
share to $10.
去年我曾经告诉大家我考虑提高Berkshire股东指定捐赠计划的额度，并询问大
家的意见，不过我们却收到一些股东来信反对整个计划，他们认为我们的责任是
将公司经营好而不是去强迫股东做一些慈善捐赠，当然大部分的股东还是支持这
项计划，认为这种做法可以享受租税优惠，并敦促我们提高捐赠的额度，有好几
位把部份股份移转给子女或孙子女的股东告诉我，他们认为这是让下一代了解施
比受有福最好的教育方法，因此最后我们还是决定将下限从每股8美元提高到
每股10元。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions
that
Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions,
including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually.
These contributions support local charities, such as The
United
Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our
businesses.
Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计划对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每
年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在250万美元左右。
这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐
出的相当。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of
our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears
on pages
50-51. To participate in future programs, you must make
sure your
shares are registered in the name of the actual owner,
not in the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not
so
registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the
1994
program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在
未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是
受托人的名下，必须在1994年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1994
年的捐赠计划。
A Few Personal Items
几件私人事务
Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin - had her 100th birthday on December
3,
1993. (The candles cost more than the cake.) That was a
day on
which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening.
Mrs. B,
who works seven days a week, for however many hours the
store
operates, found the proper decision quite obvious: She
simply
postponed her party until an evening when the store was
closed.
B太太在12月3日渡过她100岁的生日，(光是蜡烛钱就比蛋糕还贵)，本来当
天家具店预计营业到晚上，对于每周工作七天的B太太来说，二话不说，等到晚
上店关门之后，才开始她的生日宴会。
Mrs. B's story is well-known but worth telling again. She
came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak
English and
devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska
Furniture Mart with $500. Last year the store had sales
of $200
million, a larger amount by far than that recorded by any
other
home furnishings store in the United States. Our part in
all of
this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the
business
to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining
audited financial statements, checking real estate records,
or
getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough
for us.
虽然B太太的传奇故事已广为人知，但我还是不厌其烦地再说一次，77年前她
逃到美国来，不会说英文也没有受过正式的教育，1937年她以500美元创立
内布拉斯加家具店，截至去年该店的年营业额达到2亿美元，远远超过全美其
他单一家具店的业绩，我们与她的关系肇始于十年前，B太太将大部分的股权卖
给Berkshire，当然双方既没有看会计师的财务报表、也没有对房地产权状或是
提供任何保证，简而言之，B太太的一诺值千金。
Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday
party.
After all, she's promised to attend my 100th.
当然我很高兴能受邀参加她100岁的生日宴会，另外她还答应以后要来参加我
100岁的生日宴会。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Katharine Graham retired last year as the chairman of The
Washington Post Company, having relinquished the CEO title
three
years ago. In 1973, we purchased our stock in her company
for
about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a
year in
dividends and is worth over $400 million. At the time of
our
purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the company
were
good. But equally important, Charlie and I concluded that
Kay
would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat
all
shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly
important because The Washington Post Company has two classes
of
stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.
华盛顿邮报的发行人-凯瑟琳葛兰姆女士在去年决定正式退休，1973年我们斥
资1,000万美元买进她公司的股份，时至今日我们每年从该公司取得700万美
元的股利，而持有股票的市值已超过4亿美元，当初在决定买进该公司的股份
时，我们便看好该公司的前景，但另外一点同样重要的是，查理跟我都认为凯萨
琳将会证明自己是位杰出的经理人，同时能够诚实地对待所有的股东，后面那一
点尤其重要，因为该公司股份分成两种，而这种架构常常遭到许多经理人滥用。
All of our judgments about this investment have been validated
by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this
past
year when she was elected by Fortune's Board of Editors
to the
Business Hall of Fame. On behalf of our shareholders, Charlie
and
I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame.
而我们做这项投资的正确判断可由许多事件获得证明，凯瑟琳杰出的表现使得她
获得财富杂志编辑群选为商业名人堂，而对于身为股东的我们来说，查理跟我早
就把她列入Berkshire的名人堂之中。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Another of last year's retirees was Don Keough of Coca-Cola,
although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted "about
14 hours."
Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've
ever known -
a man of enormous business talent, but, even more important,
a man
who brings out the absolute best in everyone lucky enough
to
associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present
at
the happy times of a person's life. Don Keough, as an individual,
invariably increases the happiness of those around him.
It's
impossible to think about Don without feeling good.
另外一位在去年退休的人是可口可乐的Don Keough，虽然如同他本人所说的
他的退休只维持了14个小时，Don是我认识最优秀的人类之一，他不但拥有绝
佳的商业天分，同时更重要的是使得每个幸运能够与他共事的人发挥其潜能，可
口可乐希望其产品能够伴随每个人一生最快乐的时光，而Don这个人却带给周
围的人无限的欢乐，每当想起Don时，没有不让人会心一笑的。
I will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for
my
neighborhood in Omaha: Though Charlie has lived in California
for
45 years, his home as a boy was about 200 feet away from
the house
where I now live; my wife, Susie, grew up 1 1/2 blocks
away; and we
have about 125 Berkshire shareholders in the zip code.
As for Don,
in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street
from mine.
He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small
income.
在介绍我如何结识Don时，顺便介绍一下我在奥玛哈的街坊邻居，虽然查理住
在加州长达45年，但他儿时的老家距离我现在住的地方不到100公尺，而我
的内人苏珊从小就住在对街，Berkshire有125个股东住在同一个邮政编码，
而Don在1958买的房子就在我家的正对面，当年他还是一个收入微薄，却必
须养一大家子的咖啡销售员。
The impressions I formed in those days about Don were a
factor
in my decision to have Berkshire make a record $1 billion
investment in Coca-Cola in 1988-89. Roberto Goizueta had
become
CEO of Coke in 1981, with Don alongside as his partner.
The two of
them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the
previous
decade and moved it from $4.4 billion of market value to
$58
billion in less than 13 years. What a difference a pair
of
managers like this makes, even when their product has been
around
for 100 years.
当年我对Don的印象是我在1988到1989年间，决定替Berkshire买下10
亿美元可口可乐股票的因素之一，Roberto Goizueta在1981年当上可口可乐
总裁时，Don是他的副手，两人连手接掌这家业务已停滞成长10多年的公司，
短短13年期间将这家原本44亿市值的公司变成为580亿美元，虽然所贩卖的
产品已经问世100年，这两个人却还能让这家公司产生如此大的变化。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Frank Rooney did double duty last year. In addition to
leading H. H. Brown to record profits - 35% above the 1992
high -
he also was key to our merger with Dexter.
Frank Rooney从去年开始做了双份的工作，除了领导的HH布朗鞋业在去年创
下获利历史新高，较去年同期增加35%之外，他也是购并Dexter鞋业的主要灵
魂人物。
Frank has known Harold Alfond and Peter Lunder for decades,
and shortly after our purchase of H. H. Brown, told me
what a
wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get
together
and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and
Peter that
Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate "home"
for Dexter, and
that assurance undoubtedly contributed to their decision
to join
with us.
Frank认识Harold与Peter有好几十年了，在买下布朗鞋业不久之后，他向我
提到这家由他们管理良善的公司，他积极地把我们凑在一起，过了不久之后，我
们便达成协议，Frank告诉Harold与Peter说，Berkshire将会是Dexter企
业最理想的归宿，而这种安全感无疑的是他们最后决定加入我们最关键的因素。
I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary record
in
building Melville Corp. during his 23 year tenure as CEO.
Now, at
72, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank
has a
low-key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When
he
swings, the ball disappears far over the fence.
过去我曾向各位提过Frank在Melville企业23年总裁期间的杰出表现，如今
高龄72岁的他在Berkshire的速度甚至比以前还快，虽然Frank有个低调又闲
散的Style，但千万不要被他的外表所骗，当他大棒一挥时，球儿可是会一飞冲
天、消失在围墙之外呢！
The Annual Meeting
年度股东会
This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum
Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April
25, 1994.
A record 2,200 people turned up for the meeting last year,
but the
theater can handle many more. We will have a display in
the lobby
featuring many of our consumer products - candy, spray
guns, shoes,
cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites
slated to
be there is a See's candy assortment that commemorates
Mrs. B's
100th birthday and that features her picture, rather than
Mrs.
See's, on the package.
今年的股东会预计在1994年4月25日，星期一早上9点30分在位于奥玛哈
市中心的Orpheum中心召开，去年股东会参加人数又创新高突破2,200人，
不过这个会场还可以容纳更多的人，会场中将展示我们所销售的许多产品，包含
糖果、水枪、鞋子、刀叉、百科全书等，其中喜斯糖果为了庆祝B太太100年
生日所推出的纪念礼盒是我的最爱，不同于原本喜斯太太的画像，礼盒上所附的
是B太太的画像。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at
one
of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small
(88 rooms)
but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2)
the much
larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk
from the
Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about
100 yards
from Borsheim's, which is a twenty-minute drive from downtown.
We
will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30
and 8:45
for the meeting and return after it ends.
我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在
Orpheum中心对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆(2)较大一点的Red Lion旅馆
-离Orpheum中心约五分钟路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奥玛哈西区，离波仙珠
宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返
股东会会场。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can
obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting.
With
the admission card, we will enclose information about parking
facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving,
come a
little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have
to walk
a few blocks.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关数据，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
由于开会当天会场不好停车，如果你开车过来，记得早一点到，否则附近的车位
很快就会停满，你可能就必须要停远一点，再走路过来。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture
Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from
there to
downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving
early
can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is
open from
10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30
p.m. on
Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will
be open
for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on
Sunday,
April 24.
一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭
店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天
到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星
期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，在4月24
号当天会特别为股东与来宾开放。
In past trips to Borsheim's, many of you have met Susan
Jacques. Early in 1994, Susan was made President and CEO
of the
company, having risen in 11 years from a $4-an-hour job
that she
took at the store when she was 23. Susan will be joined
at
Borsheim's on Sunday by many of the managers of our other
businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.
过去几年若你去过波仙，应该都碰到过Susan Jacques， 23岁那年她进入公
司从4美元时薪的小妹做起，经过11年的工作生涯，在1994年初Susan成
为波仙珠宝公司的总裁，星期天Susan连同Berkshire旗下许多经理人以及查
理和我都会出席。
On the previous evening, Saturday, April 23, there will
be a
baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals
and
the Nashville Sounds (which could turn out to be Michael
Jordan's
team). As you may know, a few years ago I bought 25% of
the Royals
(a capital-allocation decision for which I will not become
famous)
and this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a
home stand
at Annual Meeting time.
在前一天4月23日，星期六晚上，在Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇
家队对Nashville (就是麦可乔登后来加入的那只棒球队)，或许大家知道，几年
前我个人买下皇家队25%的股权(一个我自己不太好意思让大家知道的资金分配
决策)，今年联盟特地将主场安排在Berkshire股东年会期间。
I will throw the first pitch on the 23rd, and it's a certainty
that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance.
On
that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my "sinker"
and
I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot.
This
year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of what
the
catcher signals, so bring your speed-timing devices. The
proxy
statement will include information about obtaining tickets
to the
game. I regret to report that you won't have to buy them
from
scalpers.
我将会担任开场的先发投手，而我绝对保证将一雪去年差劲的表现，记得当时捕
手突然向我做出投出下沈球的指示，我遵照指示投出却差点砸到我自己的脚，今
年不管捕手做出什么暗号，我都将祭出个人最拿手的上飘速球，所以大家最好把
测速器都带来，股东会数据将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票，大家千万不要向黄
牛买门票。
Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1994 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1994年3月1日
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