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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1991 was $2.1 billion, or
39.6%. Over the last 27 years (that is, since present management
took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19
to $6,437,
or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.
1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元，较去年增加了39.6%，而总计过去27
年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值从19元成长到现在的
6,437美元，年复合成长率约为23.7%。
The size of our equity capital - which now totals $7.4
billion - makes it certain that we cannot maintain our
past rate
of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As
Berkshire
grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly
influence the company's performance constantly shrinks.
When we
were working with capital of $20 million, an idea or business
producing $1 million of profit added five percentage points
to
our return for the year. Now we need a $370 million idea
(i.e.,
one contributing over $550 million of pre-tax profit) to
achieve
the same result. And there are many more ways to make $1
million
than to make $370 million.
现在我们股东权益的资金规模已高达74亿美元，所以可以确定的是，我们可能
再也无法像过去那样继续维持高成长，而随着Berkshire不断地成长，世上所存
可以大幅影响本公司表现的机会也就越来越少。当我们操作的资金只有2,000
万美元的时候，一项获利100万美元的案子就可以使得我们的年报酬率增加
5%，但时至今日，我们却要有3.7亿美元的获利(要是以税前计算的话，更要5.5
亿美元)，才能达到相同的效果，而要一口气赚3.7亿美元比起一次赚100万美
元的难度可是高的多了。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have set
a
goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire's
intrinsic value. If our growth in book value is to keep
up with a
15% pace, we must earn $22 billion during the next decade.
Wish
us luck - we'll need it.
查理孟格-Berkshire的副主席与我一起设定，以15%做为每年公司实质价值成
长的目标，也就是说如果在未来十年内，公司要能达到这个目标，则账面净值至
少要增加22亿美元，请大家祝我们好运吧! 我们真的很需要祝福。
Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a
phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the
price-
earnings ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks
accounted for nearly $1.6 billion of our $2.1 billion growth
in
net worth last year. When we loaded up on Coke three years
ago,
Berkshire's net worth was $3.4 billion; now our Coke stock
alone
is worth more than that.
我们在1991年所经历账面数字的超额成长是一种不太可能再发生的现象，受惠
于可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀本益比的大幅飙升，光是这两家公司就合计贡献了我们
去年21亿美元净值成长中的16亿美元，三年前当我们大笔敲进可口可乐股票
的时候，Berkshire的净值大约是34亿美元，但是现在光是我们持有可口可乐
的股票市值就超过这个数字。
Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in
the
world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates
in the
years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings
in these
stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however,
the
valuations of these two companies rose far faster than
their
earnings. In effect, we got a double-dip benefit, delivered
partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so
by the
market's reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal
was warranted. But it can't recur annually: We'll have
to settle
for a single dip in the future.
可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀可说是当今世上最好的两家公司，我们预期在未来几年他
们的获利还会以惊人的速度成长，相对地我们持股的价值也会以等比例的程度增
加，然而另一方面去年这两家公司的股价上涨的幅度却远高于其本身获利增长的
幅度，所以说去年我们是两面得利，一方面是靠公司绝佳的获利能力，一方面是
市场对于公司股票的重新评价，当然我们认为这样的调整是经得起考验的，但这
种情况不太可能每年都发生，展望未来我们可能只能靠前面那点而获益。
A Second Job
第二件工作
In 1989 when I - a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry
Coke daily - announced our purchase of $1 billion worth
of Coca-
Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example
of
putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18 of last
year,
when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc, it
was a
different story: I put my mouth where our money was.
1989年当我以每天五瓶樱桃可乐的爱用者身分，宣布买进价值10亿美元的可
口可乐股票时，我曾形容这项举动其实只是将钱花在嘴巴上的最佳例证，在去年
8月18日当我被推举为所罗门公司的临时主席时，则完全是另外一件事，这次
我把嘴巴摆在我们的钱上。
You've all read of the events that led to my appointment.
My
decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but
important message: Berkshire's operating managers are so
outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time
I was
spending at the company and yet remain confident that its
economic progress would not skip a beat. The Blumkins,
the
Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins,
Stan
Lipsey, Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney (CEO of H.H. Brown,
our
latest acquisition, which I will describe later) are all
masters
of their operations and need no help from me. My job is
merely to
treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate.
Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon.
我想大家应该都已经从报上看过有关我个人任命为所罗门董事会临时主席的报
导，我之所以愿意接受这个职位具有一个深刻且重要的意义，那就是Berkshire
旗下事业的经理人是如此的优秀，让我可能很放心的时间摆在别的心思之上，而
完全不必担心公司的营运会走样，Blumkins家族、Friedman 家族、Mike
Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 、Ralph Schey
与Frank Rooney(我们最新购并的HH Brown鞋业的CEO，后面还会有详细的
介绍)等人，都是所属产业的龙头，因此根本就不需要我个人的协助，我的工作
只是要思考如何更公平合理地对待他们，同时有效地运用他们所产生出来的资
金，而这两方面都不会因为我在所罗门的工作而受到影响。
The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our
operating units can be illustrated by a story about George
Mira,
the one-time quarterback of the University of Miami, and
his
coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal
line,
Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver
but found
his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida
linebacker. The right-handed Mira thereupon switched the
ball to
his other hand and threw the only left-handed pass of his
life -
for a touchdown. As the crowd erupted, Gustafson calmly
turned to
a reporter and declared: "Now that's what I call coaching."
查理跟我在这些成功的企业所扮演的角色，可以由迈阿密大学著名的四分卫
-George Mira与他的教练-Andy Gustafson的故事来作说明，有一回在与佛
罗里达大学对抗时，在终点线前，Mira突然煞车后退并准备传球，他看到有一
个队友有空档，不过他的右手边却有一位难以摆脱的防守球员在侧，右撇子的
Mira于是将球换到左手，并丢出生平第一次的左手传球，而后达阵成功，当所
有的球迷疯狂地簇拥而上，教练Gustafson镇定地转向一位记者说到：「这都
是因为我平常训练有素的缘故！」。
Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units,
Berkshire's performance is not affected if Charlie or I
slip away
from time to time. You should note, however, the "interim"
in my
Salomon title. Berkshire is my first love and one that
will never
fade: At the Harvard Business School last year, a student
asked
me when I planned to retire and I replied, "About
five to ten
years after I die."
以我们现有的梦幻明星级的经营团队阵容来说，Berkshire的表现绝不会因为查
理或是我偶尔跷班而有所影响，大家必须知道，我在所罗门的名衔只是暂时的，
Berkshire才是我的最爱，而且是至死不渝的爱，去年在哈佛商学院，有学生问
我何时会退休，我的回答是：「大概要等到我死后五到十年吧！」。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of
Goodwill
and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are
not
charged against the specific businesses to which they apply,
but
are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure
lets
you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have
been
reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past
reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be
more
useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-
price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business
basis. The
total net earnings we show in the table are, of course,
identical
to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
A large amount of additional information about these
businesses is given on pages 33-47, where you also will
find
our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. However,
we will
not in this letter discuss each of our non-insurance operations,
as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number
- and
will continue to grow - so it now makes sense to rotate
coverage,
discussing one or two in detail each year.
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，依照一般公认会计原则所编写的格式，另外从
今年开始我们将不再像过去那样详细叙述非保险业的营运，因为我们旗下事业组
织日益庞大，且以后还会继续成长，所以实在是没有必要每年都重复讨论相同的
事情。
(000s omitted)
-----------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
---------------------- ----------------------
1991 1990 1991 1990
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(119,593) $ (26,647) $ (77,229)
$ (14,936)
Net Investment Income ... 331,846 327,047 285,173 282,613
H. H. Brown (acquired 7/1/91) 13,616 --- 8,611 ---
Buffalo News .............. 37,113 43,954 21,841 25,981
Fechheimer ................ 12,947 12,450 6,843 6,605
Kirby ..................... 35,726 27,445 22,555 17,613
Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 14,384 17,248 6,993 8,485
Scott Fetzer
Manufacturing Group .... 26,123 30,378 15,901 18,458
See's Candies ............. 42,390 39,580 25,575 23,892
Wesco - other than Insurance 12,230 12,441 8,777 9,676
World Book ................ 22,483 31,896 15,487 20,420
Amortization of Goodwill .. (4,113) (3,476) (4,098) (3,461)
Other Purchase-Price
Accounting Charges ..... (6,021) (5,951) (7,019) (6,856)
Interest Expense* ......... (89,250) (76,374) (57,165)
(49,726)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (6,772) (5,824) (4,388) (3,801)
Other ..................... 77,399 58,310 47,896 35,782
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings 400,508 482,477 315,753 370,745
Sales of Securities 192,478 33,989 124,155 23,348
Total Earnings - All Entities $ 592,986 $ 516,466 $ 439,908
$ 394,093
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group
and
Mutual Savings & Loan.
*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the
previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected
in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would
be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead
been
distributed to us.
之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈
余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公
司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所
得税。
I've told you that over time look-through earnings must
increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business
value is
to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management
took over in
1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the
identical
23% rate of gain recorded for book value.
我曾经告诉各位，长期而言，如果我们的实质价值也期望以这个幅度来成长的
话，透视盈余每年也必须增加15%，而的确过自从现有经营阶层于1965年接
手后，公司的透视盈余几乎与账面价值一样，以23%的年复合成长率增加。
Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow
at
all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline
was
precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's
report
and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through
earnings.
然而去年我们的透视盈余不但没有增加，反而减少了14%，这样的下滑主要导
源于去年年报就曾经向各位提过的两项因素，那时我就曾经警告各位那对我们的
透视盈余将会有负面的影响。
First, I told you that our media earnings - both direct
and
look-through - were "sure to decline" and they
in fact did. The
second force came into play on April 1, when the call of
our
Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into
common. The
after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been
about $45
million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination
in 1991 of
three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months
of
look-through earnings on the common.
首先我告诉各位旗下媒体事业的盈余，不管是账面直接或是间接透视一定会减
少，而事实证明确是如此，第二个因素发生在4月1号我们吉列特别股被要求
转为普通股，1990年来自特别股的税后盈余是4,500万美元，大概比1991
年一季的股利总和加上三季的普通股透视盈余还多一点。
Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look-
through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result
from
our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from
the company
were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I
said that
such a result at Wells was "a low-level possibility
- not a
likelihood." Second, we recorded significantly lower
- though still
excellent - insurance profits.
另外有二项我没有意料到的结果，也影响到我们1991年的透视盈余，首先我们
在Well-Fargo的利益大概仅维持损益两平(所收到的股利收入被其累积亏损所
抵消)，去年我说这样的可能性很低的说法，其可信度存疑，第二我们的保险业
盈余虽然算是不错，但还是比往年低。
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through
earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily
very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have
been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6,
mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数
字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益
项下)
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
----------------------- --------------------- ------------------
1991 1990 1991 1990
------ ------ -------- --------
Capital Cities/ABC Inc. ........ 18.1% 17.9% $ 61 $ 85
The Coca-Cola Company .......... 7.0% 7.0% 69 58
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 3.4%(1) 3.2%(1) 15 10
The Gillette Company ........... 11.0% --- 23(2) ---
GEICO Corp. .................... 48.2% 46.1% 69 76
The Washington Post Company .... 14.6% 14.6% 10 18
Wells Fargo & Company .......... 9.6% 9.7% (17) 19(3)
-------- --------
Berkshire's share of
undistributed earnings of major investees $230 $266
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings
(30) (35)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 316 371
-------- --------
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $516 $602
====== ======
Net of minority interest at Wesco
已扣除Wesco的少数股权
(2) For the nine months after Berkshire converted its
preferred on April 1
仅含Berkshire于4月1日申请转换为普通股后的九个月
(3) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股权比例计算
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing
on
their own look-through earnings. To calculate these, they
should
determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares
they
hold in their portfolio and total these. The goal of each
investor
should be to create a portfolio (in effect, a "company")
that will
deliver him or her the highest possible look-through earnings
a
decade or so from now.
我们也相信投资人可以透过研究自己的透视盈余而受益，在算这个东西时，他们
就会了解到其个别投资组合所应分配到的真正盈余的合计数，所有投资人的目
标，应该是要建立一项投资组合可以让其透视盈余在从现在开始的十年内极大
化。
An approach of this kind will force the investor to think
about long-term business prospects rather than short-term
stock
market prospects, a perspective likely to improve results.
It's
true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard
for
investment decisions is market price. But prices will be
determined
by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball,
to put runs
on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not
the
scoreboard.
这样的方式将会迫使投资人思考企业真正的长期远景而不是短期的股价表现，从
而藉此改善其投资绩效，当然无可否认就长期而言，投资决策的绩效还是要建立
在股价表现之上，但价格将取决于未来的获利能力，投资就像是打棒球一样，想
要得分大家必须将注意力集中到场上，而不是紧盯着计分板。
A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math
媒体产业的变化与其评价的算式
In last year's report, I stated my opinion that the decline
in
the profitability of media companies reflected secular
as well as
cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that
case: The
economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues
to
erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and
entertainment choices proliferate. In the business world,
unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always clearer than
the
windshield: A few years back no one linked to the media
business -
neither lenders, owners nor financial analysts - saw the
economic
deterioration that was in store for the industry. (But
give me a
few years and I'll probably convince myself that I did.)
在去年的报告中，我曾经表示媒体事业获利能力衰退主要是反应景气的循环因
素，但在1991年发生的情况则不是那么一回事，由于零售业形态的转变加上广
告与娱乐事业的多元化，以往曾经一度风光的媒体事业，其竞争力已受到严重的
侵蚀，然而不幸的是在商业世界中，从后照镜所看到的景象永远比挡风玻璃的还
清楚，几年前几乎没有人，包含银行、股东与证券分析师在内，会不看好媒体事
业的发展，(若是再多给我几年，我可能就能正确判断出这个产业正在走下坡)。
The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine
properties have begun to resemble businesses more than
franchises
in their economic behavior. Let's take a quick look at
the
characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise,
keeping
in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle
ground
and can best be described as weak franchises or strong
businesses.
事实是报纸、电视与杂志等媒体的行为，越来越超越身为特许行业所应该做的
事，让我们很快地看一下特许事业与一般事业在特性上的不同，不过请记住，很
多公司事实上是介于这两者之间，所以也可以将之形容为弱势的特许事业或是强
势的一般企业。
An economic franchise arises from a product or service
that:
(1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers
to have
no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation.
The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated
by a
company's ability to regularly price its product or service
aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on
capital.
Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept
managers
may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot
inflict
mortal damage.
藉由特定的产品或服务，一家公司可以成为特许的行业(1)它确有需要或需求(2)
被顾客认定为找不到其它类似的替代品(3)不受价格上的管制，一家公司到底有
没有具有以上三个特点可能从他是否能积极地为本身所提供的产品与服务订定
价格的能力，从而赚取更高的资本报酬率，更重要的特许事业比较能够容忍不当
的管理，无能的经理人虽然会降低特许事业的获利能力，但是并不会造成致命
的伤害。
In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits
only if it
is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or
service is
tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long.
With
superior management, a company may maintain its status
as a low-
cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly
faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business,
unlike
a franchise, can be killed by poor management.
相对的，一般事业想要获致高报酬就只有靠着节省成本或是当其所提供的产品或
服务供需不均之时，但是这种供给不足的情况通常维持不了多久，倒是透过优良
的管理，一家公司却可以长期维持低成本的营运，但即使是如此，还是会面临竞
争对手持续不断的攻击，而不像特许事业，一般事业有可能因为管理不善而倒闭。
Until recently, media properties possessed the three
characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both
price
aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers
looking for information and entertainment (their primary
interest
being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to
where to
find them. Unfortunately, demand can't expand in response
to this
new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour
day are all
that's available. The result is that competition has intensified,
markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost
some -
though far from all - of its franchise strength.
直到最近，媒体产业还拥有特许事业这三项特质，因此还能够订定侵略性的价格
并容忍宽松的管理，不过现在的消费大众不断地寻找不同的信息与娱乐来源，也
越来越能够接受各种不同的选择，另一方面很不幸的是消费者的需求并不会随着
供给的增加而变大，五亿只美国眼睛，一天24小时，就这么多，不可能再增加
了。所以结果可想而知竞争会变得更激烈，市场被区隔开，媒体产业因而丧失了
部份原有的特许能力。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The industry's weakened franchise has an impact on its
value
that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings.
For an
understanding of this phenomenon, let's look at some much
over-
simplified, but relevant, math.
媒体产业转为弱势，除了让短期盈余获利受到冲击之外，对其本身的价值将有更
深远的影响，为了让大家了解这种现象，让我们来看看稍微简化但却颇为相关的
数学算式。
A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper,
television or magazine property would forever increase
its earnings
at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment
of
additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges
would
roughly match capital expenditures and working capital
requirements
would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization
of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings,
which
meant that ownership of a media property could be construed
as akin
to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year.
Say, next,
that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present
value
of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that
it was
appropriate to pay a whopping $25 million for a property
with
current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax
multiplier
of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of
about 16.)
几年以来一般人都认为新闻、电视或是杂志产业的获利能力，可以永无止尽地以
每年6%左右的比率成长，而且可以完全不必依靠额外的资金，也因此每年的折
旧费用应该会与资本支出相当，而由于所需的营运资金也相当小，所以帐列盈余
(在扣除无形资产摊销前)几乎等于可以自由分配运用的盈余，也就是说拥有一家
媒体事业，每年几乎可以有6%稳定增加的纯现金流入，同时若我们以10%的折
现率来计算现值的话，等于是一次2,500万的投资，每年可以贡献100万美元
的税后净利贡献(亦即约为25倍的税后本益比，若换成税前盈余本益比则约为
16左右)。
Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million
represents "normal earning power" and that earnings
will bob around
this figure cyclically. A "bob-around" pattern
is indeed the lot of
most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their
owners are
willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of
retained
earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of
earnings,
discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million
valuation.
Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the
property's
valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2
times
pre-tax earnings).
现在假设条件改变，这家公司只拥有普通的获利能力，所以每年100万的获利
只能上上下下起伏，这种打摆子的形式就是大部分公司的状况，而公司的获利想
要有所成长，老板就必须要投入更多的资金才办得到(通常都是透过保留盈余的
方式)，经过我们将假设重新做修正，同样以10%加以折现，大概可以达到1,000
万美元的价值，结果可以看出，一项看起来不大重要的假设变动却使这家企业的
价值大幅减少至10倍税后盈余本益比(或6.5倍税前盈余本益比)。
Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the
operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in
the past
caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media
far higher
than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media
property
were expected to constantly grow (without the business
requiring
much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly
fell in
the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for
media have
moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified
example
illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations
are revised.
现金就是现金，不管今天它是靠经营媒体事业或是钢铁工厂得来的都一样，而过
去同样是一元的获利，大家之所以看重媒体事业的原因是预期他会继续成长(股
东不需要再投入额外的资金)，而钢铁业很明显会落入打摆子的那类族群，不过
现在大家对于媒体事业的看法也逐渐改为后者，而如我们刚刚所举简单的例子，
评价的结果可能因为这样的修正而有很大的改变。
We have a significant investment in media - both through
our
direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings
in The
Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC - and the
intrinsic
value of this investment has declined materially because
of the
secular transformation that the industry is experiencing.
(Cyclical
factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings,
but these
factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our
Business
Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which
we run
Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses - or investee
holdings
that we have classified as permanent - simply because we
see ways
to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did
sell
certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were
relatively small.)
我们在媒体事业有相当大的投资，不管是百分之百拥有的水牛城日报或是在华盛
顿邮报与资本城/ABC的股票投资，而这些媒体事业的价值因为前面所提到的产
业所面临的形态转变而大幅滑落，(景气循环因素也使得我们现在的透视盈余大
受影响，虽然还不致于让实质价值减少)，然而就像是我们经营Berkshire的企
业原则所揭示的，我们不会只是因为还有其它更有利的资金用途，就随便将已被
列为永恒的事业或主要投资出售，(当然之前我们也确实卖了一些媒体股，不过
规模相对较小)。
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been
moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey's
leadership,
has done far better than most newspapers and because both
Cap
Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed.
In
particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during
the late
1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly
paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities
and
Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that
they hold.
As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets
has not
been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned
media companies, our two investees are about the only ones
essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies,
through a
combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they
pursued and
shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to
five or more
times their current net income.
还好我们的实质价值受到损害的情况尚称轻微，因为水牛城日报在Stan Lipsey
的领导之下，表现远比其它报纸同业要来的优秀，另一方面资本城与华盛顿邮报
的经营也都很上轨道，特别是在1980年代许多媒体公司以高价大举并购同业
时，我们的投资事业都只是做壁上观，而资本城与华盛顿邮报两家公司的负债也
都很少，甚至于手上的现金就足以清偿所有的债务，因此公司资产的缩水并没有
因为杠杆而扩大，所以现在在所有主要的媒体事业当中，大概就只有我们投资的
这两家公司可以免于债务所苦，而早期那些透过大量购并的同业，除了盈余大幅
缩水之外，还同时背负着至少相当于年度获利能力五倍以上的负债。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap
Cities
and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these
investments than we would be with holdings in any other
media
companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to
have far
better economic characteristics than those possessed by
the average
American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof
franchises
and cornucopian economics.
总而言之，资本城及华盛顿邮报超强的资产负债表与管理阶层，持有它们的股份
使得我们比持有别家公司的股份感到更放心，而且就现阶段而言，媒体事业还是
比其它一般美国企业要来的有竞争力，只是不再像过去拥有金刚不坏之身与诱人
的暴利而已。
Twenty Years in a Candy Store
二十年的糖果店
We've just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January
3,
1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire
and later
merged into it) bought control of See's Candy Shops, a
West Coast
manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal
price
that the sellers were asking - calculated on the 100% ownership
we
ultimately attained - was $40 million. But the company
had $10
million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering
price was
$30 million. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative
of the value
of an economic franchise, looked at the company's mere
$7 million
of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high
as we would
go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted
our offer.
我们刚刚跨过历史性的一页，二十年前也就是1972年1月3日，蓝筹邮票公
司(原为Berkshire的分支机构，后来并入Berkshire)，买下喜斯糖果-西岸的一
家盒装巧克力制造与销售厂商，当时卖方所提的报价，以最后取得的100%股权
换算约为4,000万美元，但当时光是公司帐上就有1,000万美元的现金，所以
认真算起来真正出的资金只有3,000万美金，不过当时查理跟我还不是那么了
解一家特许事业所拥有的真正价值，所以在看过账面净值只有700万美元的报
表之后，竟向对方表示2,500万是我们可以出的最高上限(当时我们确实是这样
子认为)，很幸运的是卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined
from $102.5 million in 1972 to $1.2 million in 1991. But
See's
candy sales in the same period increased from $29 million
to $196
million. Moreover, profits at See's grew even faster than
sales,
from $4.2 million pre-tax in 1972 to $42.4 million last
year.
之后蓝筹邮票公司的邮票买卖收入从1972年的1亿美元下滑到1991年的
1,200万美元，但在同一期间喜斯糖果的营收，却从2,900万成长到1.96亿
美元，更甚者，其获利成长的幅度还远高于营收成长的幅度，税前获利从1972
年的420万，变成去年的4,240万美元。
For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it
must
be compared with the incremental capital investment required
to
produce it. On this score, See's has been astounding: The
company
now operates comfortably with only $25 million of net worth,
which
means that our beginning base of $7 million has had to
be
supplemented by only $18 million of reinvested earnings.
Meanwhile,
See's remaining pre-tax profits of $410 million were distributed
to
Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies
to
deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most
sense.
对于每多赚一块钱的效益评量，大家必须将其所需额外投入的资金考量进去，就
这点儿言，喜斯的表现实在是相当惊人，这家公司现在的净值只有2,500万美
元，意思是说除了原来投资时的700万美元，后来只保留了1,800万的盈余未
分配，除了之外喜斯将这20年来剩下所赚的4亿1,000万美元，在扣除所得
税之后，全部发还给蓝筹邮票与Berkshire，将资金分配到更有利的地方之上。
In our See's purchase, Charlie and I had one important
insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing
power.
Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction
was not
derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price.
Second, we
found Chuck Huggins, then See's executive vice-president,
whom we
instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal
experiences
with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the
purchase
was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation
arrangement - conceived in about five minutes and never
reduced to a
written contract - that remains unchanged to this day.
在买下喜斯时，有一点是我们已预见的，那就是它尚未被发掘的订价能力，另外
我们有两方面算是很幸运，第一整个交易还好没有因为我们愚昧地坚持2,500
万美元的上限而告吹，第二我们选中Chuck Huggins-当时喜斯糖果的副总经
理，立即走马上任，不管是在公事或是私人方面，我们与Chuck共处的经验都
相当难得，有一个例子可以说明，当购并案完成后，我们在短短五分钟内就与
Chuck协议好他担任总经理的薪资报酬，而且连书面契约都没有签，就一直延
续到今天。
In 1991, See's sales volume, measured in dollars, matched
that
of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of
that
slippage took place in the last two months of the year,
a period
that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits.
Despite the
weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax
profit margin was a record 21.6%.
1991年喜斯糖果的销售金额与前一年度相当，但是若是以销售数量来算，则减
少了4%，所有减少的部份大多来自于占年度获利80%的最后两个月，不过尽管
业绩不太好，获利还是成长了7%，税前盈益率更创下21.6%的新高记录。
Almost 80% of See's sales come from California and our
business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the
state
with particular force late in the year. Another negative,
however,
was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax
of 7%-8?
(depending on the county involved) on "snack food"
that was deemed
applicable to our candy.
喜斯糖果80%的收入都来自于加州，而我们的生意很明显地受到景气衰退的影
响，尤其在年度的后半段更是显著，另外一个负面因素是加州在年度中开始对零
食课征7%-8%的营业税(依每个市镇有所不同)，当然巧克力糖果也不能幸免。
Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings
will
enjoy California's classifications of "snack"
and "non-snack"
foods:
若是精研认识论差异的股东应该会觉得加州对于零食与非零食的分类感到相当
有兴趣。
Taxable "Snack" Foods Non-Taxable "Non-Snack"
Foods
--------------------- -----------------------------
Ritz Crackers Soda Crackers
Popped Popcorn Unpopped Popcorn
Granola Bars Granola Cereal
Slice of Pie (Wrapped) Whole Pie
Milky Way Candy Bar Milky Way Ice Cream Bar
What - you are sure to ask - is the tax status of a melted
Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does
it more
resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been
left in the
sun? It's no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California's
State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food
bill but
must now administer it, has said: "I came to this
job as a
specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should
have
elected Julia Child."
你一定会问，那融化的牛奶冰淇淋棒要不要课税呢? 在这种模拟两可的状态下，
它到底是比较像冰淇淋棒还是在大太阳底下的糖果棒呢? 也难怪Brad
Sherman-加州公平交易委员会的主席，虽然反对这项法案但还是必须负责监督
执行，他提到我以税务专家的身分到这个委员会任职，但我觉得大家要选的对
象，应该是小孩子才对。
Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our
association with Chuck and See's. The obvious ones are
that we've
earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process.
Equally important, ownership of See's has taught us much
about the
evaluation of franchises. We've made significant money
in certain
common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See's.
查理跟我有太多理由要感谢Chuck跟喜斯糖果，最明显的原因是他们帮我们赚
了那么多钱，而且其间的过程是如此令人愉快，还有一点同样重要的是拥有喜斯
糖果让我们对于强势的特许事业有更深一层的认识，我们靠着在喜斯身上所学的
东西，在别的股票投资上，又赚了更多的钱。
H. H. Brown
布朗鞋业
We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 - the H. H. Brown
Company - and behind this business is an interesting history.
In
1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased
the
company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts,
for
$10,000 and began a 62-year career of running it. (He also
found
time for other pursuits: At age 90 he was still joining
new golf
clubs.) By Mr. Heffernan's retirement in early 1990 H.
H. Brown had
three plants in the United States and one in Canada; employed
close
to 2,000 people; and earned about $25 million annually
before
taxes.
我们在1991年做了一件大型的购并案，那就是买下布朗鞋业，这背后有一段有
趣的故事，1927年时有一位29岁的年轻商人-Ray Heffernan以10,000美
元买下这家公司，并把它搬到麻赛诸赛州，从此展开长达62年的事业(当然同时
他还有其它追求的目标，高龄90岁的他现在还在加入新的高尔夫球俱乐部)，等
1990年Heffernan先生宣布退休时，布朗鞋业在美国已有三座工厂，还有另外
一座在加拿大，每年的税前获利约有2,500万美元。
Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray's daughters,
married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan
before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas
he might
have about working for his father-in-law. That was one
of Mr.
Heffernan's few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of
Melville
Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss,
from 1964
through 1986, Melville's earnings averaged more than 20%
on equity
and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from $16 to $960.
And a
few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen
ill,
asked him to run Brown.
这期间Heffernan的一个女儿Frances嫁给了Frank Rooney，当时Heffernan
严正地告诉他的女婿最好断了想要参与经营布朗鞋业的念头，但这却是
Heffernan先生所犯下的少数错误之一，Frank后来跑到另外一家鞋业Melville
担任CEO，在他从1964年到1986年担任主管的期间，Mellville每年的股东
权益报酬高达20%，而股价更从16元涨到960元(经过还原后)，而在Frank
退休多年后，Heffernan先生因为生病，才叫Frank回来经营布朗鞋业。
After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided
to
sell the company - and here we got lucky. I had known Frank
for a
few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire
as a
possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling
Brown to
a major investment banker, which failed also to think of
us. But
last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John
Loomis, a
long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder,
who is
always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing
about
the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company
should be right up Berkshire's alley, and Frank promptly
gave me a
call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and
before
long it was done.
之后在1990年Heffernan先生过世，他的家人决定要把公司卖掉，所以我们
的机会就来了，那时我们认识Frank也有好几年了，但没有好到让他认为
Berkshire是布朗鞋业合适的买主，反而他把卖公司的事交给一家投资银行来负
责，可想而知投资银行绝对不会想到我们，但是就在去年春天，Frank跟John
Loomis一起到佛罗里达打高尔夫球，John是我多年的好友，同时也是Berkshire
的股东，他总是随时注意有没有适合我们投资的对象，在听到布朗鞋业即将出售
的消息之后，John告诉Frank说这家公司应该要投到Berkshire的麾下，而
Frank也从善如流马上打了通电话给我，我当下觉得我们应该可以谈得成，果然
在不久之后，整个交易便确定了。
Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's
willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers,
he has
no financial need to work but does so because he loves
the game and
likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be "hired"
in the
normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a
concert hall
in which business artists of this class will wish to perform.
我之所以会对这项交易这么感兴趣的原因在于Frank愿意继续留下来担任
CEO，就像我们其它所有经理人一样，他不需要因为经济因素而继续工作，但他
确实热爱这项任务且做的很好，这类型的经理人可不是三言两语就可以"请"得到
的，我们能做的就是尽量提供一个够水准的演奏厅，让这些商业界的天才艺术家
可以在这里好好发挥。
Brown (which, by the way, has no connection to Brown Shoe
of
St. Louis) is the leading North American manufacturer of
work shoes
and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine
margins
on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business - of the
billion
pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85%
are
imported - and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly.
The
wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes
inventories to be heavy; substantial capital is also tied
up in
receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding
managers
like Frank and the group developed by Mr. Heffernan can
prosper.
布朗(跟圣路易的布朗鞋子完全没有关系)是北美地区工作鞋与工作靴的领导品
牌，同时拥有非凡的销售毛利与资产报酬，事实上鞋子产业竞争相当地激烈，在
全美一年10亿双的采购量中，大约有85%是从国外进口，而产业中大部分的制
造工厂表现都乏善可陈，由于款式与型号繁多导致库存压力相当重，同时资金也
绑在大笔的应收帐款，在这样的环境底下，只有像Frank这样优秀的经理人再
加上Heffernan先生所建立这样的事业才有可能生存。
A distinguishing characteristic of H. H. Brown is one of
the
most unusual compensation systems I've encountered - but
one that
warms my heart: A number of key managers are paid an annual
salary
of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of
the profits
of the company after these are reduced by a charge for
capital
employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes
of
owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don't
walk the
walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that
are long
on carrots but short on sticks (and that almost invariably
treat
equity capital as if it were cost-free). The arrangement
at Brown,
in any case, has served both the company and its managers
exceptionally well, which should be no surprise: Managers
eager to
bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability
to
bet on.
布朗鞋业有一个相当与众不同的特点，那就是它的薪资奖赏制度与我之前看到的
完全不同，不过却深得我心，公司主要的经理人每年的底薪只有7,800美元，
之后再依据公司每年的获利，乘以一个事先订定的百分比，并扣除运用资金的成
本，因此我们可以说这些经理人完全是与股东站在同一条船上，相对于一般说归
说、做归做的经理人，选择运用红萝卜长，杆子短的薪资报酬制度(总是把股东
所提供的资金当作是不用成本的)，事实证明布朗鞋业这样的安排，不论在任何
情况下，对于公司与经理人都绝对有利，胆敢依恃个人能力来做赌注的经理人，
绝对有相当的能力来下赌。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It's discouraging to note that though we have on four
occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers
were
represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only
one of
these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the
other
three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction
at some
point after the investment bank had solicited its own list
of
prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its
fee by
thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we're looking
for:
很令人失望的是虽然我们有四个主要的投资个案的卖方是透过著名的投资银行
所介绍，但却只有一家是真正由投资银行主动联系我们的，其它三个案子都是在
投资银行寻求其名单上的买主不成后，由我本人或是朋友促成最后的交易，我们
很希望中间人在赚取其佣金收入的同时，还能够想到我们的存在，以下就是我们
想要找的企业条件
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections
are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround"
situations),
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing
little or no debt,
(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we
won't understand it),
(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time
or
that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).
(1)巨额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)
(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)
(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)
(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. (With
Brown,
we didn't even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for
cash, but
will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in
intrinsic
business value as we give.
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过
五分钟)，像是布朗鞋业这样的案子根本就不要五分钟，我们倾向采现金交易，
除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern
through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer's
and
Borsheim's. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers
wish
to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for
themselves,
but often for their families or inactive shareholders.
At the same
time, these managers wish to remain significant owners
who continue
to run their companies just as they have in the past. We
think we
offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives
and
we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting
people
with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望
能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往
常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意
的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions
that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found
that if
you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people
will
call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from
a
country song expresses our feeling about new ventures,
turnarounds,
or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring,
you'll know it's
me."
另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机
股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有
一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，对于这类的事业，有首乡村歌曲其中的一句
歌词最能描述我们的感觉，「若电话不响，你就知道那是我」。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses
as
described above, we are also interested in the negotiated
purchase
of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable
to those
we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion,
and
American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving
suggestions about purchases we might make in the general
stock
market.
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股
份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空、冠军企业与美国运通这几个
Case一样的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议我们，则一
点兴趣都没有。
Insurance Operations
保险业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table
presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance
industry:
下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数
Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate
in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GDP Deflator (%)
------------- --------------- ------------- ----------------
1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 10.0
1982 ..... 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.2
1983 ..... 5.0 112.0 6.8 4.0
1984 ..... 8.5 118.0 16.9 4.5
1985 ..... 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.7
1986 ..... 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.7
1987 ..... 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.1
1988 ..... 4.4 105.4 5.5 3.9
1989 ..... 3.2 109.2 7.7 4.4
1990 (Revised) 4.4 109.6 4.8 4.1
1991 (Est.) 3.1 109.1 2.9 3.7
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses
incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums:
A
ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one
above
100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the
year.
When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding
policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into
account, a
combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces
an
overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the
funds
provided by shareholders.
综合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，比率在100
以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保
险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100
以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的
盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107-111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect
the
industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually,
even
in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower.
(Over
the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown
at a
still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially
lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount.
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期
保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10%以
上，损失一定会增加，(事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11%的速度在成
长)，若是保费收入还是大幅落后于10%的门坎，承保损失一定会继续增加。
However, the industry's tendency to under-reserve when
business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time -
and that
could well describe the situation last year. Though premiums
did
not come close to growing 10%, the combined ratio failed
to
deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved.
Loss-reserve data for the industry indicate that there
is reason
to be skeptical of that outcome, and it may turn out that
1991's
ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the
long run,
of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating
problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements
of
this kind achieve the same result as the seriously-ill
patient
who tells his doctor: "I can't afford the operation,
but would
you accept a small payment to touch up the x-rays?"
然而产业普遍存在损失准备提列不足的现象，使得企业前景不佳的情况可以获得
暂时的掩饰，这正是去年度所发生的事，虽然保费收入成长不到10%，但综合
比率非但没有像我所预测地那样恶化反而还有点改善，损失准备的统计数据显示
这样的现象实在是相当令人怀疑，这种结果也可能导致1991年的比率将更进一
步恶化，当然就长期而言，这些利用会计手法掩盖营运问题的经理人还是要面对
真正的麻烦，到最后这类的经理人会变得跟许多病入膏肓的病人对医生说的一
样：「我实在是承受不起另一次手术，不过你是否可以考虑把我的X光片给补
一补」。
Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that
make
combined ratios, our own or the industry's, largely irrelevant
to our performance. What counts with us is the "cost
of funds
developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the
cost of
float."
于是Berkshire旗下的保险事业将与公司本身或产业经营绩效越来越不相关的
综合比率做了一番修正，对我们来说真正重要的是我们从保险业所得到的资金的
成本，套句行话就是浮存金的成本。
Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the
total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves
and
unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid
acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed
reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our
underwriting loss.
浮存金-我们靠保险业所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调
整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费
用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered
the
business in 1967.
下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
(承保损失) (平均浮存金) (平均资金成本) (长期公债殖利率)
------------ ---------- --------------- -----------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967 ........ profit $17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968 ........ profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969 ........ profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970 ........ $0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971 ........ profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972 ........ profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 ........ profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 ........ 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 ........ 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 ........ profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 ........ profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 ........ profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 ........ profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 ........ profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 ........ profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 ........ 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 ........ 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 ........ 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 ........ 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 ........ 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 ........ 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 ........ 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 ........ 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 ........ 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 ........ 119.6 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
As you can see, our cost of funds in 1991 was well below
the
U. S. Government's cost on newly-issued long-term bonds.
We have in
fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we
have been
in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have
over
that time also substantially increased the amount of funds
we hold,
which counts as a favorable development but only because
the cost
of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue
to grow;
the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable
cost.
各位可以看到我们1991年的资金成本甚至比美国政府新发行的长期公债利率
还低，事实上在过去25年的保险事业经营中，我们有20年是远胜于政府公债
发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，同时所持有的浮存金数量也以惊人
的幅度成长，当然这只有在资金成本低的情况下，才称得上是好现象，展望未来，
浮存金的数量还会继续成长，对我们而言，最大的挑战是这些资金是否能有合理
的成本取得。
Berkshire continues to be a very large writer - perhaps
the
largest in the world - of "super-cat" insurance,
which is coverage
that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves
against
major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are
enormously
volatile. As I mentioned last year, $100 million in super-cat
premiums, which is roughly our annual expectation, could
deliver us
anything from a $100 million profit (in a year with no
big
catastrophe) to a $200 million loss (in a year in which
a couple of
major hurricanes and/or earthquakes come along).
Berkshire一直都是霹雳猫保单相当大的发行公司，或许规模已是全世界最大
的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所需承担
的风险，这类保险的获利情况变化相当的大，就像是去年我曾经提过的，一亿美
元的保费收入，这大约是我们预期一年所能接到的业务量，可能可以让我们有一
亿美元的获利(只要当年度没有重大灾害发生)，也可能让我们产生二亿美元的损
失(只要当年度发生连续几个飓风或地震)。
We price this business expecting to pay out, over the long
term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given
year,
however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable
or
enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAAP
accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the
catastrophe-
free years for losses that are certain to be experienced
in other
years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited
to the
nature of this business - and that is a reality you should
be aware
of when you assess our annual results.
当我们在订价时，长期而言我们预期只要支付出90%收到的保费收入，当然在
任何一个特定年度，我们可能大赚或是大亏，一部份的原因在于一般公认会计原
则并不允许我们在没有重大灾害发生的年度提拨损失准备，以弥补其它年度一定
会发生的损失，事实上以一年为期的会计期间并不适合这类的保险业务，所以换
句话说当你在评断我们公司的年度绩效时，一定要特别注意到这一点。
Last year there appears to have been, by our definition,
one
super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about
25% of our
policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting
profit from our catastrophe business to have been about
$11
million. (You may be surprised to learn the identity of
the biggest
catastrophe in 1991: It was neither the Oakland fire nor
Hurricane
Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused
the
industry an insured loss now estimated at about $4-$5 billion.
At
the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass
that
from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)
去年照我们的定义可能会有一件霹雳猫保单要付上我们年度保费收入的25%，
因此我们预计1991年这类业务的承保获利大约是1,100万美元(或许你很好奇
想要知道1991年所发生的最大灾害是什么? 它既不是奥克兰大火也不是Bob
飓风，而是九月在日本发生的台风造成的损失估计在40-50亿美元上下，若以
上限估计，这个数字将超过Hugo飓风先前所创下的最高损失记录)。
Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance
protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as
for natural
catastrophes. In the 1980's much of this reinsurance was
supplied
by "innocents" - that is, by insurers that did
not understand the
risks of the business - but they have now been financially
burned
beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all
too often
when I was personally running the insurance operation.)
Insurers,
though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes.
At some
point - probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years -
innocents
will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge
to
silly levels.
保险业者总会需要大量的再保险来规避航海与航空以及天然灾害等意外事故，在
1980年代许多再保险保单都是由外行人来承接，这些人根本就不知道这类保险
的风险有多高，所以现在他们已经被烫的不省人事，(就连Berkshire在本人经
营这项业务时也是如此)，保险业者如同投资人一样，还是会一再重复所发生的
错误，只要有一、两年意外灾害较少，就会有无知的业者跳出来以极低的价格杀
价竞争抢单。
As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however,
we will
be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing
this
product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because
of
our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know
that when
"the big one" comes, many reinsurers who found
it easy to write
policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some
reinsurers
can say what Jackie Mason does: "I'm fixed for life
- as long as I
don't buy anything.") Berkshire's ability to fulfill
all its
commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity
is
unquestioned.
然而只要市场上费率看起来合理，我们就会继续留在这一行里，而在推销这类保
单时，我们所拥有的最大竞争优势就是我们的财务实力，有远见的客户都知道许
多再保业者可以很轻松地接下保单，但是当重大的意外灾害接连发生时，要他们
支付赔偿金可能就有点困难，(有些再保业者就像Jackie Mason所说的一样，我
可以一辈子不花钱，只要我不买任何东西)，相对地Berkshire在任何极端的状
况下，都能够履行他所做出的承诺。
Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest
opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with
this
operation since he took charge and it has become a very
valuable
asset, albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision.
总的来说，保险业提供Berkshire相当大的机会，Mike Goldberg在他接手这
项业务之后，就一直缔造出优异的成绩，也使得保险子公司成为我们非常宝贵的
资产，虽然我们无法以精确的数字来衡量。
Marketable Common Stocks
有价证券股票投资
On the next page we list our common stock holdings having
a
value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments
belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than
100%.
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关
系企业所持有)。
12/31/91
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............ $ 517,500
$1,300,500
46,700,000 The Coca-Cola Company. .............. 1,023,920
3,747,675
2,495,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. .... 77,245
343,090
6,850,000 GEICO Corp. ......................... 45,713
1,363,150
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................ 600,000
1,347,000
31,247,000 Guinness PLC ........................ 264,782
296,755
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ......... 9,731 336,050
5,000,000 Wells Fargo & Company 289,431 290,000
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach
to
investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the
other seven
stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion
of our
Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six
of those we
hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal
Home
Loan Mortgage ("Freddie Mac"), in which our shareholdings
increased
slightly. Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that
the stock
market serves as a relocation center at which money is
moved from
the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in
check, I
suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned
"idle
rich" have received a bad rap: They have maintained
or increased
their wealth while many of the "energetic rich"
- aggressive real
estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc.
- have
seen their fortunes disappear.)
一如往常，以上这张表显示我们李伯大梦式的投资方式，健力士Guinness是我
们最新的投资部位，至于其它七项主要的投资都持有一年以上(如果把吉列从特
别股转换成普通股也包含在内的话)，其中六项投资甚至连持股数都没有变动，
唯一的例外是联邦家庭贷款抵押(Freddie Mac)，我们投资的股数略微增加，我
们以不变应万变的做法主要是反应我们把股票市场当作是财富重分配的中心，而
钱通常由积极的份子流到有耐性的投资人手中，(我嘴巴可能闭的不够紧，我认
为最近几件事情显示许多躺着赚的有钱人招到许多攻击，因为他们好像没做什么
事就使得本身的财富暴涨，而在此同时过去那些积极活跃的有钱人，如房地产大
亨、企业购并家与石油钻探大亨等，却眼睁睁地看着自己的财产一点一滴地缩
水)。
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant
investment in a company domiciled outside the United States.
Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion
as
Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner
most of
their profits from international operations. Indeed, in
the sense
of where they earn their profits - continent-by-continent
- Coca-
Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you'll
never
get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably
in
the Cherry Coke camp.)
我们在健力士Guinness的持股代表Berkshire第一次对海外公司进行大规模的
投资，不过Guinness所赚的钱与可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类
似，主要都是仰赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看，Guinness与可
口可乐的获利来源有相当的共通性，(但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混
掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐)。
We continually search for large businesses with
understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that
are run
by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus
doesn't
guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price
and get
business performance from our companies that validates
our
assessment. But this investment approach - searching for
the
superstars - offers us our only chance for real success.
Charlie
and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large
sums we
work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and
selling
portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think
many others
can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from
flower to
flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name "investors"
to
institutions that trade actively is like calling someone
who
repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.
我们还是持续地在寻找大型的企业，那种令人容易了解、具有持续性且让人垂涎
三尺的事业，并且由有能力才干并以股东利益为优先的经营阶层，虽然这些要求
的重点并不一定保证结果就一定令人满意，当然我们一定要以合理的价格投资并
且确保我们的被投资公司绩效表现与我们当初所评估的一致，这样的投资方法-
寻找产业的超级明星，是我们唯一能够成功的机会，查理跟我的天资实在是有
限，以我们目前操作的资金规模，实在是无法靠着买卖一些平凡普通的企业来赚
取足够的利益，当然我们也不认为其它人就有办法以这种小蜜蜂飞到西、飞到东
的方法成功，事实上我们认为将这些短线进出如此频繁的法人机构称为投资人，
就好像是把一个每天寻找一夜情的花花公子称作为浪漫情人一样。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say,
to
private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess
the long-
term economic characteristics of each business; second,
assess the
quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third,
try to
buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price.
I
certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every
business in
town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack
when
dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And
since
finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so
difficult,
why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to
say "the
real thing.") Our motto is: "If at first you
do succeed, quit
trying."
今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥玛哈地区的私人企业，那么首先我们仔细
地评估每家企业长期的竞争力，第二我会再评估经营者的特质，之后再以合理的
价格买进一小部份的股权，既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买镇上所有公司的股权，
那么为什么Berkshire在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的态度，
也因为要找到好的事业并加上好的经理人是如此的困难，那么为什么我们要抛弃
那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢? (通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色)，我们的座
右铭是如果你第一次就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。
John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor
matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a
business
associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it
all: "As
time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right
method
in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises
which
one thinks one knows something about and in the management
of
which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think
that one limits
one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about
which
one knows little and has no reason for special confidence.
. . .
One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and
there are
seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given
time in
which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence."
著名经济学家凯因斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8
月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott上面写到，随着时光的流逝，我越
来越相信正确的投资方式是将大部分的资金投入在自己认为了解且相信的事业
之上，而不是将资金分散到自己不懂且没有特别信心的一大堆公司，每个人的知
识与经验一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很难同时有两三家以上的公司可以让
我感到完全的放心。
Mistake Du Jour
实时供应的错误
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about "Mistakes
of the First
25 Years" and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences
in the
first few years of this second "semester" indicate
that my backlog
of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if
I stick to
my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden
myself in
these pages in the hope that public confession may deter
further
bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and
football
teams; why not for businesses and investors?)
在1989年的年报中，我曾经写过Berkshire头25所犯的错误，而且承诺在
2015年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得若是坚持原来的
计划的话，可能让这些记录多到难以管理，因此我决定每隔一段时间会在这里丢
出一点东西，所谓自首无罪，抓到双倍，希望我公开的忏悔能够免于大家继续对
我的轰炸(不管是医院的死后验尸或是足球队常常用到的事后检讨，我想应该也
能够适用在企业与投资人之上)。
Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission,
rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie
and me
some embarrassment, since you don't see these errors; but
their
invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa,
I am
not talking about missing out on some company that depends
upon an
esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple),
or
even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never
develop the
competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer
to
business situations that Charlie and I can understand and
that seem
clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up
sucking
our thumbs rather than buying.
通常我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部份，而是在于我们没有去做
的那部份，虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看
不到不代表我们就不必付出代价，而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了
某些革命性的新发明(就像是全录像印技术)、高科技(像是苹果计算机)或是更优秀
的通路零售商(像是威名百货)，我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的
能力，反而我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易就了解且很明显对我们有吸引力的
公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着指甲犹豫不决，就是不能下定决心把他们
买下来。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but
I
wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic: In
early 1988,
we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent
split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), which
would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had
owned the
stock some years earlier and understood the company's business.
Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie
Mae's
CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had
inherited
and had established the company as a financial powerhouse
- with
the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and
confirmed
that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a
large
position.
每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现
在举的例子不会过于极端，回顾1988年当时我们决定以3.5亿到4亿美元之
间，买进3,000万股(经过事后的分割调整)的联邦国家贷款协会，简称Fannie
Mae，我们之前曾经拥有过这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解，另外
很显然的，也很清楚David Maxwell也就是Fannie Mae的总裁，有能力处理
他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前
景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部
分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。
After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began
to
climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that,
thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose
similarly
during our purchase program). In an even sillier move,
I
surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions
and sold the
7 million shares we owned.
只不过当我们开始买进不到700万股时，该公司股价就开始上涨，失望之余，
我立刻停止买进(事后回想还好我没有在买进可口可乐时犯下相同的错误)，更有
甚者，我觉得区区700万股对我们来说实在是没有太大的意义，所以之后又把
持有的700万股全部卖掉。
I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation
for my
amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn't
one.
What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of
the
approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of
your
Chairman's mistake: about $1.4 billion.
我期盼对于我这样不具职业水准的投资行为可以给各位一个稍微合理一点的解
释，不过我实在是编不出来，不过我倒是可以跟各位报告因为本人的这项错误，
大概使得Berkshire在1991年少赚了14亿美元。
Fixed-Income Securities
固定收益证券
We made several significant changes in our fixed-income
portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette
preferred
was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to
common
stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue
that was
subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we
purchased
fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire
State
Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added
to a
small position in ACF Industries that we had established
in late
1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:
1991年我们在固定收益证券这方面的投资有很大的变动，如同先前曾提到的我
们的吉列可转换特别股被强制赎回，使得我们必须将之转换为普通股，另外我们
也出清了RJR Nabisco的债券，因为它在被转换后赎回，在另一方面我们也买
进美国运通与第一帝国-一家水牛城的银行控股公司的固定收益证券，此外还在
1990年底买进了一些ACF工业的债券，以下是截至年底我们持有的主要部位：
(000s omitted)
-----------------------------------
Cost of Preferreds and
Issuer Amortized Value of Bonds Market
------ ------------------- ------------
ACF Industries ................ $ 93,918(2) $118,683
American Express .............. 300,000 263,265(1)(2)
Champion International ........ 300,000(2) 300,000(1)
First Empire State 40,000 50,000(1)(2)
RJR Nabisco 222,148(2) 285,683
Salomon 700,000(2) 714,000(1)
USAir 358,000(2) 232,700(1)
Washington Public Power Systems 158,553(2) 203,071
(1)Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(1)公平价值是由查理跟我来判断
(2) Carrying value in our financial statements
(2)是指财务报表上的账面价值
Our $40 million of First Empire State preferred carries
a 9%
coupon, is non-callable until 1996 and is convertible at
$78.91 per
share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too
small for
Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers,
CEO of
First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.
我们在第一帝国9%收益率的特别股投资了4,000万美元，在1996年前公司无
法赎回，每股转换价格订为78.91美元，通常我会认为这样的规模对于
Berkshire来说实在是太小了，但由于我们对于该公司总裁Bob Wilmers实在
是过于崇敬，所以不管金额大小，还是希望有机会能与他一起合伙共事。
Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income
security. Rather it is a "Perc," which carries
a fixed dividend of
8.85% on our $300 million cost. Absent one exception mentioned
later, our preferred must be converted three years after
issuance,
into a maximum of 12,244,898 shares. If necessary, a downward
adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order
to limit
to $414 million the total value of the common we receive.
Though
there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock
that we
will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms
of the
preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to
extend the
conversion date by one year if the common stock is below
$24.50 on
the third anniversary of our purchase.
至于美国运通的投资则不是一般的固定收益证券，它算是一种Perc-每年可以为
我们3亿美元的投资贡献8.85%的股利收入，除了接下来会提到的一个特点，
那就是我们的特别股在发行后的三年可以转换成最多12,244,898股的普通
股，若有必要我们可转换的股份可能会向下调整，以确定我们所收到的股份总值
不能够超过4.14亿美元，虽然对于可能取得的普通股价值有其上限，但相对地
却没有下限，不过这样的特别条款还包含若是三年期限到时公司股价低于24.5
美元时，可以有权请求延长转换期限一年。
Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well,
both over the long term and recently. We have realized
large
capital gains from these holdings, including about $152
million in
1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably
exceeded
those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.
总的来说，不管最近或是是长期而言，我们在固定收益证券上的投资表现还算不
错，靠着这样的投资我们赚取大量的资本利得，在1991年这个数字大约在1.52
亿美元左右，此外我们的税后投资报酬率也远高于一般的固定收益证券。
Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater
than
the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely
in the
Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing
a
letter for inclusion in Salomon's annual report and I refer
you to
that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate
Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York,
NY
10048) Despite the company's travails, Charlie and I believe
our
Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during
1991.
Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon's common
produced this result.
不过在这期间也发生一些小意外，当然没有像所罗门事件那样让我本人都跳进
去，当我在撰写这封信时，我也同时写了一封信要放在所罗门的年度报告之内，
我顺便提出来算是对于该公司近况的一份报告，(写给纽约第七世贸大楼所罗门
公司)，虽然公司遭逢不幸，但查理跟我都相信，目前低利率的环境加上所罗门
普通股的股价回升，使我们在所罗门的特别股价值已略见增加。
Last year I told you that our USAir investment "should
work
out all right unless the industry is decimated during the
next few
years." Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period
for the
industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered
bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can
add
Continental and TWA.)
去年我曾告诉各位除非航空业的经营环境在未来几年内加速恶化，否则我们在美
国航空的投资应该可以有不错的结果，不过很不幸的随着中美、泛美与美西航空
相继倒闭，1991年正是航空业加速恶化的一年，(若是把时间延长为14个月，
则还要包括大陆航空与TWA两家航空公司)。
The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table
reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable
for
virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from
negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the
courts have
been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating.
These
carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the
industry's
costs because the bankrupts don't incur the capital costs
faced by
their solvent brethren and because they can fund their
losses - and
thereby stave off shutdown - by selling off assets. This
burn-the-
furniture-to-provide-firewood approach to fare-setting
by bankrupt
carriers contributes to the toppling of previously-marginal
carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed
to
bring the industry to its knees.
表上我们对于在美国航空投资的评价之所以如此的低，反应出整个产业目前所面
临到的获利前景不佳的风险，这个风险又因为法院鼓励已经宣布破产的航空公司
继续营运而更加提高，这些同业得以用比一般成本还低的价格，因为它们完全可
以不必在乎其它还咽咽一息的同业所需负担的资金成本，因为为了避免营运停
摆，它们可以靠着变卖资产来弥补所发生的损失，这种拆家具拿来当材火烧的做
法，有可能进一步危及其它营运还算正常的同业，然后引发骨牌效应，使得整个
产业一败涂地。
Seth Schofield, who became CEO of USAir in 1991, is making
major adjustments in the airline's operations in order
to improve
its chances of being one of the few industry survivors.
There is no
tougher job in corporate America than running an airline:
Despite
the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected
into it,
the industry, in aggregate, has posted a net loss since
its birth
after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and
experience - and Seth possesses all three of these attributes.
Seth Schofield在1991年成为美国航空公司的总裁，正对整个公司的营运做出
相当重大的调整，期能增加其成为航空业仅存的几位幸存者之一，在美国没有比
经营一家航空公司还要困难的行业，虽然大笔的资金已经投入到这个产业，但是
从小鹰号诞生开始，航空业历史累积加总所产生的损失却是相当惊人，航空公司
的经理人需要的不只是智慧、勇气还要再加上经验，而毫无疑问的，Seth 同时
具有以上三项的特质。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1991 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made through the program were $6.8 million, and 2,630 charities
were recipients.
大约有97.7%的有效股权参与1991年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约680万美
元捐出的款项分配给2,630家慈善机构。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of
our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears
on pages
48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make
sure your
shares are registered in the name of the actual owner,
not in the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not
so
registered on August 31, 1992 will be ineligible for the
1992
program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在
未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是
受托人的名下，必须在1992年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1992
年的捐赠计划。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions
that
Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses
make
contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5
million
annually. These contributions support local charities,
such as The
United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for
our
businesses.
Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计划对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每
年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在150万美元左右。
这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐
出的相当。
However, neither our operating managers nor officers of
the
parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions
to broad
national programs or charitable activities of special personal
interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders.
If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to
their alma
maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal
attachment, we believe they should use their own money,
not yours.
然而不管是旗下事业或是母公司的经理人在利用Berkshire的资金对外捐赠给
全国性组织或特别利益团体时，都是以站在股东利益立场所应该做的，相对地若
是你的员工也包含CEO在内，想要与其校友会或其它人建立个人关系的，我们
认为他们最好是用自己的钱，而不是从你的口袋里掏钱。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The faithful will notice that, for the first time in some
years, Charlie's annual letter to Wesco shareholders is
not
reprinted in this report. Since his letter is relatively
barebones
this year, Charlie said he saw no point in including it
in these
pages; my own recommendation, however, is that you get
a copy of
the Wesco report. Simply write: Corporate Secretary, Wesco
Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena,
CA
91101.
死忠的巴菲特迷可能会发现，许多年来头一次大家在年报中找不到查理孟格写给
Wesco股东的信，主要是因为他认为今年的报告相当阳春，所以没有必要附在
我们的年报中，不过我个人还是建议，想办法写信给Wesco公司的秘书，就可
以拿到Wesco的年报。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand
for
election as a director this year. But the association of
the Chace
family with Berkshire will not end: Malcolm III (Kim),
Malcolm's
son, will be nominated to replace him.
现年88岁的Malcolm Chace二世，决定从今年起不再担任本公司的董事，但
Berkshire与Chace家族的关系却不会断，他儿子也就是Malcolm三世会接替
其位置继续担任本公司董事。
In 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning
Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Co.
in 1955 to
form our present company. Two years later, Malcolm became
Berkshire
Hathaway's Chairman, a position he held as well in early
1965 when
he made it possible for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. to buy
a key
block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives.
This
purchase gave our partnership effective control of the
company.
Malcolm's immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire
stock and
for the last 27 years has had the second-largest holding
in the
company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has
been a joy
to work with and we are delighted that the long-running
relationship between the Chace family and Berkshire is
continuing
to a new generation.
1931年Malcolm进入Berkshire针织工厂工作，后来该公司在1955年与
Hathaway工业合并，成为现在的Berkshire Hathaway，之后两年他接任本公
司董事长的职位，直到1965年由他一手促成巴菲特合伙事业买下他与亲人大部
分的股权，而使得我们成功入主该公司，之后Malcolm家族在往后的27年内
继续持有本公司的股份成为仅次于巴菲特家族，本公司第二大股东，Malcolm
一直是个很容易相处的伙伴，我们很高兴Chase家族与巴菲特家族的感情能够
延续到下一代。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum
Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April
27, 1992.
Attendance last year grew to a record 1,550, but that still
leaves
plenty of room at the Orpheum.
今年的股东会预计在1992年4月27日，星期一早上9点30分在位于奥玛哈
市中心的Orpheum中心召开，去年股东会参加人数又创新高突破1,550人，
不过会场还是剩下很多座位。
We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early
at one
of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small
(88 rooms)
but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2)
the much
larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk
from the
Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about
100 yards
from Borsheim's and a twenty minute drive from downtown.
We will
have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and
8:45 for the
meeting and return after it ends.
我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在
Orpheum中心对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆(2)较大一点的Red Lion旅馆
-离Orpheum中心约五分钟路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奥玛哈西区，离波仙珠
宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返
股东会会场。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you
can
make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in
the
quality of the questions we get: We have never attended
an annual
meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high
level of
intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可
由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的
股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智慧水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can
obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting.
With
the admission card, we will enclose information about parking
facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving,
come a
little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have
to
walk a few blocks.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关数据，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说
明供大家参考。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture
Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from
there to
downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will
allow
plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both
stores.
Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart
any day of
the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays
and
from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at
the See's
Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Americans ate
26 million
pounds of See's products last year.
一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭
店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天
到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星
期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，到那里时记得到喜斯糖果摊逛逛，了解一下
为何美国人一年能够吞下2,600万磅的喜斯糖果。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will be
open
for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on
Sunday,
April 26. Borsheim's will also have a special party the
previous
evening at which shareholders are welcome. (You must, however,
write Mrs. Gladys Kaiser at our office for an invitation.)
On
display that evening will be a 150-year retrospective of
the most
exceptional timepieces made by Patek Philippe, including
watches
once owned by Queen Victoria, Pope Pius IX, Rudyard Kipling,
Madame
Curie and Albert Einstein. The centerpiece of the exhibition
will
be a $5 million watch whose design and manufacture required
nine
years of labor by Patek Philippe craftsmen. Along with
the rest of
the collection, this watch will be on display at the store
on
Sunday - unless Charlie has by then impulsively bought
it.
波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别为股东与来宾开放，4月26
日星期天从中午开到下午6点，同时前一天晚上还将为所有股东举行一个特别
的Party，(但必须事先向我们办公室的Gladys Kaiser女士登记取得邀请函)，
当晚将会展示Patek Philippe过去150年来的作品回顾，包含英国维多利亚女
皇、教宗Pius四世与爱因斯坦等历史名人所拥有的手表，另外会场中的重头戏
是一只由Patek Philippe工匠设计打造，耗时一年价值500万美元的手表，如
无意外也会随着其它物品一起展出，除非查理忍不住诱惑先买下了它。
Nicholas Kenner nailed me - again - at last year's meeting,
pointing out that I had said in the 1990 annual report
that he was
11 in May 1990, when actually he was 9. So, asked Nicholas
rather
caustically: "If you can't get that straight, how
do I know the
numbers in the back [the financials] are correct?"
I'm still
searching for a snappy response. Nicholas will be at this
year's
meeting - he spurned my offer of a trip to Disney World
on that
day - so join us to watch a continuation of this lop-sided
battle
of wits.
去年股东会Nicholas Kenner又杠上我了，他表示：「我在去年1990年报中
表示他在1990年5月11号满十岁，但事实上他那时才刚满9岁」，他接着又
用很嘲讽的语气说：「如果你连这个都搞不清楚，我如何还能相信你报告中的其
他数字是正确的」到现在我还在想如何做出一个有力的回答，今年Nicholas还
会出席，他拒绝了我邀请他当天到迪斯尼乐园玩的建议，所以请大家继续好好观
赏这一面倒的机智问答。
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1992 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1992年2月28日
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