BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:

　　Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to
$2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

　　本公司1988 年的净值增加了五亿六千九百万美元，较去年增加了20.0% ，而过去24 年以来( 自从现有经营阶层接手后) ，每股净值从19 元成长到现在的2,974 美元，年复合成长率约为23.0% 。
We�ue emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are
worth. By our calculations, Berkshire�r intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in
1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.

　　在过去的年报中我们一再强调真正重要的是企业的真实价值，它代表着我们旗下企业组成份子到底值多少钱？这个数字绝对是个估计数，根据我们内部的估算，目前Berkshire 真实的价值已大幅超越其账面价值，过去24 年以来，企业价值成长的速度一直要比账面价值成长的幅度要高一点，但在1988 年情况有点不同，后者增加的幅度略高于前者。

Berkshire�r past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences
makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.

过去Berkshire 真实与账面价值成长的背景，与现在有很大的不同，若搞不清楚其间的差异，就好像是一位棒球教练在判断高龄42 岁的中外野手未来潜力时，以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。

Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of usinesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The ashington Post Company - Berkshire�r three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.

　　今日我们所面临不利的因素主要有︰(1) 目前的股票市场过热，股价相对偏高(2) 企业投资利益的税负过高(3) 企业被购并的价格偏高(4) Berkshire 主要三大投资事业( 约占本公司净值的一半) 资本城/ABC 、GEICO 汽车保险与华盛顿邮报，个别的产业状况多多少少不若以往，虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产，但以目前的股价来看，他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。

　　The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You�ue heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it �Oolved.?

　　然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说明，不过这个问题就好像是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流逝，问题也越严重，( 当然在这种情况下，我们是希望这个问题越严重越好)

Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits
of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, erkshire�r Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)

四年前我曾告诉各位若在未来十年，Berkshire 想要每年维持15% 的报酬，我们总共约要有39 亿美元的获利，时至今日，这个数字暴增到103 亿美元，对查理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，( 当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人)

As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.

虽然资金规模会影响到最后的投资报酬率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有 的优势，过去我们大部分的资金都被绑在没有多大经济效益的纺织事业之上，如 今部份的资金已转移到一些相当不错的事业。

去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒�水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具量贩店、史考特费兹制造集团、喜斯糖果及世界百科全书等，今年七圣徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实 在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股东权益报酬率高达67% 。

　　Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven:
Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See�r, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on
average equity capital.
　　In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

虽然其中一部分的企业本身就是属于强势的企业，但优良的管理却是绝对必要的条件，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。

In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We�kl need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15%
goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.

根据我个人的判断，这些企业总的来说，应该还会持续有好的表现，我们想要在 往后年度继续维持15% 报酬率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的资金。

In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim�r, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in
this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It�r a great way to start the year.

在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥玛哈Borsheim 珠宝80%的股权，这项购并案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由 我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营，今年有一个好的开始。

Accounting Changes
会计原则变动

We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.

1988 年开始有一项重要的会计原则变动开始适用，展望1990 年还会有一项变动，当经济现况没有改变，但会计账面却必须将数字搬来搬去，我们一定会花一番工夫讨论一下影响层面。首先我习惯性的提出拒绝声明，虽然一般公认会计原则确有缺点，但我却必须坦 承没有能力重新订出一套新的规则，虽然这套原则确有其先天性的限制，却不必就此废除，CEO 大可以也应该将一般公认会计原则当作是对股东与债权人尽告 知义务的开始而非结束；若他们只是提供阳春的财务报表，却没有附上经营分析所必要的关键讯息，部门经理人会发现会被总经理修理的很惨，同样的母公司的总经理是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东所有人，报告必要有用的信息。

First, I�kl offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation�r CEO. Why, then, should the CEO
himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the shareholder-owners of the corporation?
What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?

真正需要的是数据�不管是一般公认、非一般公认或是一般公认以外，可以帮助 财务报表使用者可以了解三个问题︰(1) 这家公司大概价值多少?(2) 它达到未来目标的可能性有多大?(3) 在现有条件下，经理人的工作表现如何?

In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are
somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the
minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too
complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe
economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those
operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.

大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用一套简单的规则有效地来解释企业的经济实质状况，尤其是像Berkshire 这种由许多各种不同产业组成集团。

Further complicating the problem is the fact that many
managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an
obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly
assist them. (�卭w much,?says the client, �Es two plus two??
Replies the cooperative accountant, �攈at number did you have in
mind?? Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes
stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will
more appropriately describe their performance. Both the
smoothing of earnings and the �焛g bath?quarter are �Shite lie?
techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.

更复杂的是许多管理阶层不把一般公认会计原则当作是应该达到的标准，而是应该要克服的阻碍，且大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等于几? 配合的会计师可能会回答︰「那要看你想要多少? 」即使是诚实且正直 的管理阶层有时也会超越一般公认会计原则，以使得报表数字更符合他们认为应该有的表现，不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季特别突出，都是还算正直的经营阶层经常运用的做帐技巧。

Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and
defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP
results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules
�Emaginatively?and record business transactions in ways that
technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic
illusion to the world.

另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用一般公认会计原则来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很清楚许多投资人与债权人把一般公认会计原则当作圣经朝拜，所以这些骗徒运用丰富的想象力技巧性让交易记录符合一般公认会计原则，但却与实际的经济实质背道而驰。

As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated
institutions - place fancy valuations on reported �Aarnings?that
march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and
promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter
what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have
observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of
the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been
censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen
than small sums with a gun.

只要投资人，包含看起来复杂的专业投资机构，迷信稳定向上攀升的盈余数字，我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用一般公认会计原则来满足投资人的需求，多年以来查理跟我看到许多会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。

Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have
been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our
balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual
Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company
that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby
products) were consolidated on a �Kne-line?basis. That meant we
(1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-
entry asset on Berkshire�r consolidated balance sheet and (2)
included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a
single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of
earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset
and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each
item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.

1988 年一般公认会计原则有一个很重大的转变，依新规定Berkshire 必须将子公司与关系企业的资产与损益完全并到母公司的财务报表之上，在过去互助储贷与史考特费兹金融( 主要从事世界百科全书与寇比吸尘器分期付款的信用公司) ，只须一次认列投资损益即可，意思是说(1) 仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例以投资权益显示在Berkshire 的合并资产负债表之上(2) 仅将被投资公司年度损益按投资比例以投资利益显示在Berkshire 的合并损益表之上，但是现在我们必须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。

This change underscores the need for companies also to
report segmented data: The greater the number of economically
diverse business operations lumped together in conventional
financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and
the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed
earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated
figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the
other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.

这项转变低估了公司也要报告部门别信息，企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个问题，事实上在Berkshire 我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部规定，查理跟我看的则是另一套部门别的信息。

Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP
statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary
information that we think will help you measure both business
value and managerial performance. (Berkshire�r ability to
discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we
listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In
these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow
GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will
attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid
analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give
you important information in a form that we would wish to get it
if our roles were reversed.

现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理当局的表现，Berkshire 将责任转移给债权人的能力�我们提到的第三个问题，应该很明确，不管是在看什么样的报表，在这些补充信息中，我们不一定会依照一般公认会计原则，甚至不会以公司别来区分，相反地我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总有助于大家分析而不是被一大堆信息所掩没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重要的讯息。

On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and
earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-
type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer
Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major
investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing
and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating
assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-
other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily
marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as
various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent
companies.

下表我们依(1) 金融事业，包含互助储贷与史考特财务公司(2) 保险事业，依投资部位分门别类3) 制造、出版、零售事业，去除某些非营业资产与购买法会计调整数(4) 其它项目，包含前述非营业资产( 主要是有价证券投资) 及Wesco 与　Berkshire 母公司所持有的资产与负债

If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four
segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP
statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new
presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors,
who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don�s
want to ask.)

如果将以上四类的盈余与净值加总，你将得到与一般公认会计原则一致的总数，但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师看过，最好是不要，因为他们要是看到这种报表，一定会被吓个半死。

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is
expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of
deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so
much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was
postponed for a year.

先前我曾提到在1990 年会有另一项会计原则的重大变动，主要与递延所得税有关，这原则相当的复杂且极具争议性，以致于原定计划于1989 年实施延后一年。

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various
ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we
calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized
appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

当这项原则开始实施后，对我们有几个方面，最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得，其计算递延所得税负债的方式，

Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized
appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2
billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized
appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has
been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax
rates that went into effect in 1987.

原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层，对于1986 年以前帐列未实现利益，大约在12 亿美元左右，系以28% 的税率估算，对于1986 年之后的帐列未实现利益，大约在6 亿美元左右，系以34% 的税率估算，1987 年起调整税率的差异反应税
负的差异。

It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will
require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990,
taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in
tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that
year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The
proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet,
but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and
net worth.

现在看起来，新的会计原则要求我们从1990 年开始必须将所有未实现利益的预估税率订在34% ，经估算光是这一项做法就会使得我们的年度盈余与净值减少七千多万美元，还不包含其它大大小小的影响。

We have no strong views about the desirability of this
change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out,
however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely
depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to
sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.

其实我们不认为这样转变有其必要性，因为对于Berkshire 来说不管税率是28% 或是34% ，都不能反应我们公司的实质现况，因为我们从来不考虑出售我们具有庞大未实现利益的股票。

To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I
apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do
not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily
because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our
money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your
gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the
record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing
necessarily wrong with this kind of �Baith?approach to
investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an �瀗alysis?
approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our
own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches
give us the same answer.

对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人，很抱歉耽误各位的时间，我很清楚你们当中有很多根本不会仔细去看数字，但却仍持续支持我们，因为你们知道(1) 查理跟我本身的身家也都在里面(2) 我们绝对会与各位共享荣枯(3) 到目前为止先前的记录还算令人满意。事实上这种完全信任的投资方法并没有什么不好，但也有一些股东比较喜欢深入分析的方式，因此我们也有必要提供足够的信息给他们，至于Berkshire 本身在做投资时，则是两种方法并用，重点在于能不能得到满意的答案。

Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源

In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector
accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources
of Berkshire�r reported earnings just as we have in the past.

除了提供给各位最新四个部门的会计数据，我们一如往常还是会提列出
Berkshire 帐列盈余的主要来源

In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other
major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged
against the specific businesses to which they apply but are
instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you
view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been
reported had we not purchased them. I�ue explained in past
reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more
useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP
presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our
audited financial statements.

在下表商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加
总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所
影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则，不
管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经
会计师查核的数字一致。

Further information about these businesses is given in the
Business Segment section on pages 32-34, and in the Management�r
Discussion section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also
will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For
information on Wesco�r businesses, I urge you to read Charlie
Munger�r letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best
description I have seen of the events that produced the present
savings-and-loan crisis. Also, take special note of Dave
Hillstrom�r performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco
subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive
industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested
capital. Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it
is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past,
would rank him number one among his peers.

年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco 公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可
以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对储贷机构危机事件写得最贴切的
一篇文章，另外也可以顺便看看Precision 钢铁厂，这家Wesco 的子公司所处
的产业竞争相当激烈，但经理人Dave 仍然努力创造相当不错的绩效，虽然手头
上缺乏数据来证明，但我相信他的表现绝对不比其它同侪逊色。

* 不包含史考特飞兹金融集团的利息费用
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group.
我们旗下各项营运事业所创造的盈余，不管是依绝对值或是与同业相较，实在是
相当出色，对此我们衷心感谢这些辛苦的经理人，你我应该感到庆幸能与他们一
起共事。

The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are
superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of
their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You
and I are fortunate to be associated with them.
At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We
do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have
attained a specified age - whether the traditional 65, or the 95
reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb
managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because
a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with
newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic
records always look terrific and the candidates always know just
what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment
to the company and general business savvy. It�r difficult to
teach a new dog old tricks.

在Berkshire ，这样的关系可以维持相当长久，我们不会因为这些杰出优秀的明
星经理人年纪到了一定程度就把他们给换掉，不管是65 岁或是B 太太在1988
年所打破的95 岁上限，明星的经理人实在是可遇不可求的稀罕珍宝，他们就像
是插满蜡烛的蛋糕，如何叫人舍得把他们丢弃，相较之下，我们对于新进的MBA
企管硕士的评价就没有那么高了，他们的学术经历看起来总是很吓人，讲起话来
头头是道，但个人对于企业长期发展的投入却相当有限，实在是很难去教菜狗那
套老伎俩。

Here�r an update on our major non-insurance operations:
以下是我们非保险部门的最新营运状况︰

o At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her
cart roll on and on. She�r been the boss for 51 years, having
started the business at 44 with $500. (Think what she would have
done with $1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years
away.

在内布拉斯加家具店方面，B 太太坐着她的轮椅持续运转，自从44 岁那年以500
块美金开始创业当老板，至今已有51 个年头，( 要是当初是用1,000 块的话，
现在可能更不得了) ，对于B 太太来说，就是再多十岁也不嫌老。

The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the
country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a
detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our
ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.

这家全美最大的家具量贩店到现在还在持续成长，去年秋天，又新开了一家占地
20,000 平方英呎的清洁用品中心，让我们的产品线不论是各种价格都应有尽有。

Recently Dillard�r, one of the most successful department
store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In
many of its stores, Dillard�r runs a full furniture department,
undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in
Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company,
announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he,
referring to NFM: �攅 don�s want to compete with them. We think
they are about the best there is.?

最近Dillard 一家在全美地区经营相当成功的百货公司打算进军奥玛哈地区，在
它其它主要的分店都设有家具部门，事实上他们在这方面也做的相当成功，不过
就在其奥玛哈分店开幕的前夕，Dillard 总裁William 先生却宣布这家分店决定
不卖家具，他特别提到NFM ，表示你绝对不会想要与它竞争，我想它在当地已
经是最强的了。

At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and
our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over
the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in
the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in
the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no
other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings
operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we
also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux
City and Kansas City - always with good results. It truly does
pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to
offer.

水牛城报纸我们赞扬广告的价值，而我们在NFM 的政策则是证明我们所宣扬的
确实可行，过去三年来，NFM 是奥玛哈世界先锋报的最大广告客户，(ROP 是指
直接印在报纸而非夹报式的广告) ，据我所知，除此之外没有一家报纸的主要广
告客户是家具商，同时我们也在堪萨斯等地区刊登广告，所得到的反应也相当不
错，广告当然有其效果，只要你所要介绍的东西值得推荐。

Mrs. B�r son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the
winning Blumkin team. It�r a joy to work with this family. All
its members have character that matches their extraordinary
abilities.

B 太太的儿子路易，还有他几个小孩组成了一支梦幻队伍，跟他们一起共事实在
是一种享受，所有的成员品格与才能兼具。

o Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at
The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have
proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger.
But Stan Lipsey - bless him - has managed to make me look
foolish.

去年我曾明确地表示水牛城日报1988 年的税前盈余一定会下滑，事实证明要不
是有Stan Lipsey ，结果可能会如我所预测，与其它同规模的报纸同样地沈沦，
很高兴Stan 让我看起来很愚蠢。

Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry
average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates
rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins
a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial
record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper
that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe
that our �Jewshole?percentage - the portion of the paper devoted
to news - is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our
size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in
1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the
level or trend of profit margins.

虽然我们去年我们调涨的价格较同业水准略低，同时印刷与工资成本调整的幅度
与同业一致，但Stan 还是硬生生让毛利率又扩大一些，在新闻业没有其它人可
以像他这样有更好的经营绩效，且同时还能够让读者得到如此丰富的新闻，我们
相信我们自己的新闻比率，绝对是同样规模或甚至更大报纸中最高的，1988 年
49.5% ，不管获利状况如此，我们一定会努力将这个比率维持在50% 上下。

Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we
were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the
12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray
Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he
has made us proud of the paper ever since.

查理跟我在年轻的时候就很热爱新闻事业，而买下水牛城报纸的12 年来，让我
们渡过许多快乐时光，我们很幸运能够找到像Murray 这样杰出的总编辑，让我
们一入主水牛城报纸后，便深深引以为傲。

o See�r Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988.
Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent
Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in
1987, turned the tide.

喜斯糖果在1988 年总共销售了2,510 万磅重的糖果，本来在十月前整个销售
前景看起来不太乐观，但拜圣诞节旺季特别旺所致，整个局势跟着扭转。

As we�ue told you before, See�r business continues to become
more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a
record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29 million out
of $32.5 million before tax. (It�r enough to make you believe in
Santa Claus.) December�r deluge of business produces a modest
seasonal bulge in Berkshire�r corporate earnings. Another small
bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals
are sold.

就像我们以前告诉各位的，喜斯的糖果旺季越来越向圣诞节集中，去年光是12
月的税前获利2,900 万就占全年度3,250 万的90% ，( 如此你应该相信圣诞老
公公真的存在了吧) ，十二月的旺季使得Berkshire 第四季的盈余看起来相当不
错，另外第一季则是因为世界百科全书年度出版所以也会有一波小高潮。

Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See�r about
five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his
record, you may wonder what took us so long.

查理跟我是在买下喜斯糖果五分钟之后，决定为Chuck Huggins 负责这家公司
的管理，在看过他这些年来的绩效之后，你可能会怀疑为何我们要考虑那么久！

o At Fechheimer, the Heldmans - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and
Fred - are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither
furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently
attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional
managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And
that�r exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer
Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his
father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: �慼ere�r
a lot of heredity in that family.?

在费区海默，Heldmans 家族就好像是B 太太家族的辛辛那提版，不管是家具
业或者是制服业都不会很有吸引力的行业，也只有好的管理才能让股东们获得好
的投资报酬，这正是Heldmans 五位家族成员为Berkshire 所作的贡献，身为
职棒大都会队的发言人，Ralph Kiner 曾说比较该队投手Steve Trout 与他的父
亲Dizzy Trout 也是老虎队名投手，你就会发现虎父无犬子。

Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988.
Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the
Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at
it. There are very few managements anywhere - including those
running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500 - in which we
would exhibit similar confidence.

费区海默在1988 年进行了一项规模颇大的购并案，查理跟我对于他们相当有信
心，所以我们连看都没有看就同意了这项交易，很少有经营阶层，即便是财星五
百大企业也好，能得到我们这样的信任。

Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth,
sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.
因为这项购并案与内部本身的成长，费区海默的营业额可望大幅成长。

o All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey - World Book,
Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group - performed
splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph
continue to be exceptional.

所有Ralph Schey 所管理的事业，包含世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与史考特费
兹制造集团，在1988 年的表现皆相当出色，投资其上的资金也获得相当不错的
报酬。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly
fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell
Hausfeld. This company, the country�r leading producer of small
and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings
since 1986.

在史考特费兹制造集团当中，又以Campbell 家用器具最突出，这家全美最大的
中小型压缩机自从1986 年来每年盈余都呈倍数成长。

Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up
significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong.
World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September,
when that country�r largest American book store opened in Moscow.
Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.

寇比吸尘器与世界百科全书的1988 年销售数量都大幅成长，尤其在外销部份更
是强劲，世界百科全书在九月配合莫斯科当地最大的一家美国百货公司开幕，正
式在苏联推出，成为该店唯一展示的一套百科全书。

Ralph�r personal productivity is amazing: In addition to
running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The
Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a
venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based
companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire
are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.

Ralph 个人的工作效率真是惊人，除了同时经营19 项事业之外，他还投入相当
的时间在克里夫兰医院、Ohio 大学等单位，另外还负责一个创投，创设了16
家位于Ohio 的新公司，他可以称的上是Ohio 与Berkshire 之宝。
Borsheim�r
波仙珠宝

It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in
The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by
neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have
thought of: �}re there any more at home like you??Last month I
corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch
of the family.

Berkshire 是在1983 年买下内布拉斯加家具店80% 的股权，当时我忘了问B
太太一个连小学生都会想到的问题，你还有没有其它兄弟姊妹，上个月我补救了
这个错误，现在我们又成为另一个家族分支80% 的股东。

After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and
five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded
her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her
husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a
journey as perilous as Mrs. B�r earlier odyssey to the east
through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha
they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an
extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm
for work - and that�r all they needed. They have since proved
themselves invincible.

当B 太太1917 年从苏俄往东经满州一路逃到美国之后，她的双亲与五位兄弟姊
妹也陆续来到美国，其中她有一个姊妹Rebecca 在1922 年跟着丈夫Friedman
冒着生命危险往西途经拉脱维亚，当家族在奥玛哈重新团聚时大家一无所有且身
无分文，然而只要身具智慧、品格与热情一切就已足够，后来证明他们所向无敌。

In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim�r, a small Omaha
jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in
1950 and, as the years went by, Ike�r son, Alan, and his sons-in-
law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.

1948 年Friedman 先生买下奥玛哈地区一家叫波仙的小珠宝店，后来他的儿子
与女婿陆续加入。

You won�s be surprised to learn that this family brings to
the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the
Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for
both enterprises is Mrs. B�r creed: �恊ll cheap and tell the
truth.?Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single
store operations featuring huge inventories that provide
customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2)
daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover,
(4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The
combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer
everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to
matching.

你应该不难预料，这个家族为当地珠宝业所带来的影响与B 太太的情况相近，两
家店共同的特色就是东西实在又价美物廉，另外共通的特色还有(1) 单店经营，
但货品样式价格种类齐全，满足消费者各式需求(2) 老板每天专心经营(3) 货品周
转快速(4) 精明的采购(5) 费用开销难以想象地低。后面三项特点让店内产品的售
价，全美其它地方都得比。

Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other
matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry.
They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule
makes sense: If you don�s know jewelry, know the jeweler.

大部分的人们不管在其它行业多么学有专精，但是遇到买珠宝首饰时，就像是迷
失在森林里的小孩子一样，不会判断东西的品质好坏与价格高低，对这些人来
说，只要记住一条，不懂珠宝没有关系，只要认识珠宝商就好。

I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike
Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in
which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate
testimonial. Borsheim�r had no audited financial statements;
nevertheless, we didn�s take inventory, verify receivables or
audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so -
- and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a
large check.

我敢保证大家只要放心交给Friedman 家族，一定不会让各位失望，我们购买波
仙股权的方式就是最好的证明，波仙没有会计师查核报告，也没有盘点存货、验
证应收帐款或是做任何方式的查核，他们只是简单地告诉我们如何如何，于是双
方就草拟的一页简单的合约，并由我们开出一大笔金额的支票。

Business at Borsheim�r has mushroomed in recent years as the
reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come
to the store from all over the country. Among them have been
some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for
getting them there.

随着Friedman 家族声誉的远播，近年来波仙珠宝的生意越做越大，客户从美国
各地远道而来，其中也包含我一些从东西两岸来的朋友，他们也都很感谢我能带
他们去参观波仙。

Borsheim�r new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the
way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family
will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I
will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say �瀕l
members,?the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at
88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of
Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a
fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.

波仙的营运模式并不会因为Berkshire 的加入而有所改变，所有的家族成员仍将
持续在各自的岗位上奋斗，查理跟我会站在旁边默默支持，事实上所有的成员包
含高龄88 岁与87 岁的老先生与老太太，仍然每天到店里工作，其它儿子媳妇
也是从早忙到晚，家族的第四代已正准备开始学习接班。

It is great fun to be in business with people you have long
admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success
because they have deserved success. Both families focus on
what�r right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out
well for them, also. We couldn�s have better partners.

跟你所欣赏的人一起共事实在是一件很大的乐趣，Friedmans 家族的成功就像
是B 太太家族的成功一样，实至名归，两个家族都坚持对客户有益的事之上，同
时对他们自己也有很大的益处，这是我们最好的事业伙伴。

Insurance Operations
保险事业营运

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table
presenting key figures for the insurance industry:
下表是有关保险事业的几项主要的数据更新

Statutory
Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate
in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%)
------------- ---------------- ------------ ----------------
1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.6
1982 ..... 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.4
1983 ..... 5.0 112.0 6.8 3.8
1984 ..... 8.5 118.0 16.9 3.7
1985 ..... 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.2
1986 ..... 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.7
1987 ..... 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.3
1988 (Est.) 3.9 105.4 4.2 3.6
Source: A.M. Best Co.
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses
incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A
ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above
100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer
earns from holding on to policyholders?funds (�Phe float? is
taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range
typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of
earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表的是保险的总成本( 损失加上费用) 占保费收入的比率，100 以下代
表会有承销利益，100 以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金( 扣除
股东权益部份所产生的盈余) 所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概
是在107-111 之间。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the
industry�r incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in
years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium
growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting
losses will mount, though the industry�r tendency to underreserve
when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As
the table shows, the industry�r underwriting loss grew in 1988.
This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will
accelerate - for at least two more years.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期
保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10% 左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10% 以
上，损失一定会增加，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏
起来，如附表所示，1988 年产业整体的损失确实增加，而这个趋势应该会继续
持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。

The property-casualty insurance industry is not only
subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam
Goldwyn philosophized: �唍 life, one must learn to take the
bitter with the sour.? One of the ironies of business is that
many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by
inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate
customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are
spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.

产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，( 就像是山姆
高德温曾说一个人要学会体验人生的苦与乐，不过这行很讽刺的是，做的要死要
活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋，不像有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是
一个愿打，一个愿挨)

Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested
capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry
(which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at
five times book value and most large insurers sell close to
book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases,
few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet
not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise
prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases,
customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it�r clearly
better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto
insurance.

以早餐麦片为例，它的资产报酬率是汽车保险业的一倍( 这也是为什么家乐氏与
通用磨坊的股价净值比是五倍，而保险业者的股价净值比仅为一倍) ，麦片公司
常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变，但消费者却连一个屁都不吭一
声，但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是反映成本稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就
会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，最好是选择去卖高价的玉米片，而不是低价的
汽车保险。

The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can
have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California
initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance
prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The
price cut has been suspended while the courts review the
initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not
been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers
are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California.
(Thank heavens the citizenry isn�s mad at bonbons: If Proposition
103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See�r would be forced
to sell its product for $5.76 per pound. rather than the $7.60 we
charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.)

一般大众对于保险业的敌视会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项103
提案，虽然成本一再上涨，却还威胁要将汽车保费价格大幅压低，所幸法院后来
检视这项提案予以搁置，但这次投票所带来的冲击未曾稍减，保险业者在加州已
很难再有营运获利的空间，( 感谢老天还好加州人没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，
若是103 提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜斯可能被迫以每磅5.76 元而不
是现在的每磅7.6 元，果真如此，喜斯可能就要亏大钱了)

The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the
initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit
in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the
vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect
GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its
premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO
is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in
other states, through either initiatives or legislation.

对Berkshire 来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现
行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接
影响到我们持有44% 股权的GEICO ，约有10%2 的保费收入系来自加州，更具
威胁的是若其它州，不管是透过提案或是立法的方式，也跟进采取类似的行动，

If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost,
it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can
subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers
can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty
companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for
shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the
industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have
little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by
government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO,
because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on
equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn,
so do we.

若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府直接来负
责，股东或可暂时支应保户，但只有纳税人可以长久地给予支助，对大部分的产
物意外险业者来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这
个产业是属于大众产品，保险业者所赚的投资报酬平平，所以若因此被政府强迫
退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失，但GEICO 就不一样了，由于它的成本低，
相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影
响到我们。

At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall,
and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special
reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business
of Fireman�r Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will
return to Fireman�r Fund the unearned premiums we hold that
relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in
our �Lremiums written?account as a negative $85 million or so
and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar.
However, the termination of this contract will not have a
significant effect on profits.

在1988 年Berkshire 的保费收入持续减少，到了1989 年我们预期保费收入还
会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防人员退休基金即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我
们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额8,500 万美元，这将使得我
们第三季的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然这对于我们公司本身的获利不会造成太大
的影响。

Berkshire�r underwriting results continued to be excellent
in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding
structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104.
Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row,
after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory.
Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on
pages 36-38.

Berkshire 1988 年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率( 依照法定基础扣
除和解与财务再保) 大约在104 ，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况
还算良好)

Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to
run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for
profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire,
we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the
expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when
we expect a gain.

我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图
的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在Berkshire 我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的
情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们的麻烦够多了。

Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit
picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably
brighter than the industry�r. We are sure to have an exceptional
amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well
for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums
ratio to be at least three times that of the typical
property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from
Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial
team, has positioned us well in that respect.

尽管( 也或许正因为如此) 我们的保单量少，可以预期的我们的获利情况在未来几
年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，通常这代表着
获利，在1989 与1990 这两年内，我们的浮存金/ 保费收入比例至少会是同业
水准的三倍以上，Mike Goldberg 在Ajit Jain 等人的协助下，加上国家产险的
经营团队使我们站在相当有利的位置。

At some point - we don�s know when - we will be deluged with
insurance business. The cause will probably be some major
physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience
an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and
increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with
their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the
meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our
capital, and try not to make major mistakes.

有一点我们不知道什么时候，我们会被保险事业拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的天
然或是经济上的意外，但我们也有可能会遇到像1985 年一样爆炸性的成长，因
为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远
远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会稳固好我们的专业人员与资本并尽量避免犯
下重大的错误。

Marketable Securities
有价证券投资

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance
companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-
term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income
securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term
cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择(1) 长期股票
投资(2) 长期固定收益债券(3) 中期固定收益债券(4) 短期约当现金(5) 短期套利交
易

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from
these categories. We just continuously search among them for the
highest after-tax returns as measured by �Iathematical
expectation,?limiting ourselves always to investment
alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing
to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal,
rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的
税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与
短期的账面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over
$100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be
discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to
subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，( 不包含套利交易，这部份我们后
面会再谈) ，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire 关系企业所持有
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. .............. $517,500 $1,086,750
14,172,500 The Coca-Cola Company ........... 592,540 632,448
2,400,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Preferred* ............ 71,729 121,200
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ..................... 45,713 849,400
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ... 9,731 364,126
*Although nominally a preferred stock, this security is
financially equivalent to a common stock.
Our permanent holdings - Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO
Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - remain unchanged.
Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their
managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder
and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The
Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent
and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.

我们永久的持股- 资本城/ABC 、GEICO 汽车保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样
不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是资本城/ABC 的Tom
Murphy 与 Dan Burke 、GEICO 汽车保险的Bill Snyder 与Lou Simpson ，
还有华盛顿邮报的Kay Graham 与 Dick Simmons ，查理跟我对于他们所展现
的才能与品格同感敬佩。

Their performance, which we have observed at close range,
contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have
fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs
clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions,
nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business
management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep
his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.

他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的CEO 截然不同，所幸我们
能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些CEO 实在是不适任，但却总是能够坐
稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不适任的老板要比不适任的部属更容易保住其
位置。

If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing
ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable
of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time.
There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily
measured; and if you can�s make the grade, you�qe out.
Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient
business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not
be accepted as a substitute for orders.

假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打80 个字，但录取之后被发现一分
钟只能打50 个字，很快地她就可能会被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在
那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务，若是不能
马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就要走路，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发
生。

However, a CEO who doesn�s perform is frequently carried
indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his
job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may
be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls
are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots
the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the
bullseye around the spot where it lands.

但是一个CEO 表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套
可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是含混解释过去，
即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板射箭出去后，再到
墙上把准心描上去。

Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction
between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no
immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured.
The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales
force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate
self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes.
Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who
has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.

另外一个很重要但却很少被提起老板与员工之间的差别是老板本身没有一个直
接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅
粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的
一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。

But the CEO�r boss is a Board of Directors that seldom
measures itself and is infrequently held to account for
substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake
in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the
company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will
probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board
members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)

但CEO 的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算
董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接
收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益( 且通常公司越大，甜
头越多)

Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are
expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the
CEO�r performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of
belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from
critically evaluating the substandard typist.

最后董事会与CEO 之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于
CEO 表现的批评就好像是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人
会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。

These points should not be interpreted as a blanket
condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and
hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the
management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful
that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent
holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners,
and they exude integrity and ability.

以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的CEO 或是董事会都相当努力、能
干，有一小部份更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加
对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的
事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。

o In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Pfd. (�價eddie Mac? and Coca Cola. We expect to hold
these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions
of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our
favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of
those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform
well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint.
Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and
watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum
allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his
letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are
carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by
Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.

1988 年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进联邦家庭贷款抵押公司(Freddie
Mac) 与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间，事实上当我们发
现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，
我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩
效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林区生动地将这种行为解释成砍除花朵来当
作野草的肥料，我们持有Freddie Mac 的股份比例是法令规定的上限，这部份
查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是属于共同储贷- 我们一家非保险的子
公司所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列
示。

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few
companies that we try to understand well. There are only a
handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term
convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to
participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: �憃o
much of a good thing can be wonderful.?

我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，只有少部份是我们想要长
期投入的，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与
程度，我们同意Mae West 的看法，好东西当然是多多益善。

o We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by
about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were
acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by
property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the �Pax-exempt?
interest earned is subject to tax.

去年我们减少在中期免税债券约一亿美元的投资，所有卖出的债券都是在1986
年之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中15% 的利息收入
是要课税的。

The $800 million position we still hold consists almost
entirely of bonds �Crandfathered?under the Tax Reform Act of
1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales
produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an
average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than
carrying value.

剩下我们仍持有约8 亿美元的债券，都是属于适用1986 年租税改革法案完全
免税的祖父级债券，出售的债券将有些许的获利，而继续持有的债券平均到期日
大概是六年，其市价大概略高于账面价值。

Last year we described our holdings of short-term and
intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy.
During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax
profit of about $22 million. This sale explains close to $100
million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our
balance sheet.

去年我们曾提及我们所持有的已破产的Texaco 短期与中期公司债券，1988 年
我们已经将所有的部位处分，获利约2,200 万美元，此举将使得我们在固定收
益债券的投资部位减少1 亿美元。

We also told you last year about our holdings of another
security whose predominant characteristics are those of an
intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in
Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a
sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments
from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For
reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market
value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at
the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.

去年我们还提到了另外一个深具固定收益特色的投资：亦即所罗门公司9% 可转
换特别股，这种特别股特别要求公司提拨偿债基金，自1995 年到1999 年间分
批赎回，Berkshire 将这些投资以成本列示在帐上，基于查理所提的原因，现在
的估计市价以从前一年度略低于成本，转变为1988 年的略高于成本。

The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO
of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration
for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the
near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment
banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to
forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe
that our conversion privilege could well have important value
over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming
portion of the preferred�r value resides in its fixed-income
characteristics, not its equity characteristics.

我们与所罗门CEO- John Gutfreund 之间良好的关系，随着几年来的合作日益
增进，但我们还是无法判断投资银行业的前景，不管是短期、中期或是长期皆然，
这是一个难以预估未来获利程度的产业，我们仍然相信我们所拥有的转换权利会
在其有效期间内，对我们产生相当大的贡献，然而这种特别股的价值主要还是来
自于其固定收益，而不是股权特性之上。

o We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will
become enthused about such securities only when we become
enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the
purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn�s in
the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too
many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-
power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of
Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our
WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of
their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a
few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our
balance sheet at $247 million and have a market value of about
$352 million.

我们对于长期债券的规避依旧不变，唯有当我们对于货币的长期购买力有信心
时，我们才会对这类的债券有兴趣，但这种稳定却根本没办法预期，因为不管是
社会或是选出来的官员实在是有太多的优先事项是与购买力的稳定性相冲突
的。所以目前我们唯一持有的长期债券就是WPPSS 华盛顿功用电力供应系统，
其中有些属于短期，有一些则是分几年赎回的高票息，目前资产负债表上帐列成
本为2.47 亿美元，目前市价约为3.52 亿美元。

We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983
annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment
has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most
of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no
ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were
rated AA- by Standard & Poor�r. They now sell at levels only
slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.

我们在1983 年年报中曾经解释过购买WPPSS 的理由，现在很高兴跟大家报告结果完全符合我们当初的预期，在买进的时候，债券的评等被暂时取消，估计税后的投资报酬率约为17% ，最近它被史坦普评等机构评为AA- 等级，目前的市价大概只有比最高等级债信的投资报酬好一点。

In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS
purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned
out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the
general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both
are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns
achieved through 1988.

在1983 年的年报中，我们比较了投资WPPSS 与一般企业的差异，结果显示这
次的投资要比当时同期间所从事购并案还要好，假设两者皆以为无财务杠杆的基
础下进行。
Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter
our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us
hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose
troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the
market.

不过我们在WPPSS 的愉快经验并未能改变我们对于长期债券的负面看法，除非
再让我们碰到暂时僵住的大案子，因为短暂的问题使得其市价严重的被低估。

Arbitrage
套利

In past reports we have told you that our insurance
subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to
holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to
make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash
than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises
much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important,
cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-
term investments. (Charlie�r sign off after we�ue talked about
an arbitrage commitment is usually: �宬ay, at least it will keep
you out of bars.?

在过去的报告中我曾经告诉各位保险子公司有时也会从事套利的操作，以作为短
期资金的替代，当然我们比较喜欢长期的投入，但可惜资金总是多过于点子，与
此同时，套利的报酬有时会多过于政府公债，同时很重要的一点是可以稍微缓和
我们对于寻找长期资金去处的压力，( 每次在我们谈完套利投资之后，查理总是
会附带一句，这样也好，至少能让你暂时远离市场)

During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage,
measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-
tax gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about
$147 million.

在1988 年我们在套利部份斩获不少，不论是金额或是投资报酬率，总计投入
1.47 亿美元的资金，赚取7,800 万美元的获利。

This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of
arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word
applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities
or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to
exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say,
Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in
London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this
scalping; it won�s surprise you that practitioners opted for the
French term, arbitrage.

如此的成绩使我们值得详细的描述一下，所谓的套利是指在不同的市场同时买卖
相同的有价证券或是外汇，目的是为了撷取两者之间微小的差距，例如阿姆斯特
丹的荷兰币、英国的英镑或是纽约的美元，有些人将此行为称之为剃头皮，但通
常这一行的人惯用法国的字汇- 套利。

Since World War I the definition of arbitrage - or �Nisk
arbitrage,?as it is now sometimes called - has expanded to
include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event
such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization,
reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the
arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the
stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that
the announced event won�s happen.

自从第一次世界大战之后，套利或者说风险套利的定义，已延伸包括从已公开的
企业购并、重整再造、清算等企业活动中获利，大部分的情况下，套利者期望不
管股市变动如何皆能获利，相对的他面临的主要风险是宣布的事件未如预期般发
生。

Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the
arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24
and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co.,
a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited
profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941
when cocoa was selling for 50 cents per pound. In 1954 a
temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over
60 cents. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable
inventory - quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa
had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to
a 50% tax on the proceeds.

有些特别的套利机会也会偶尔出现，我记得在24 岁时当时我在纽约的葛拉罕-
纽曼公司上班，Rockwood 一家在布鲁克林生产巧克力的公司，原则该公司自
1941 年开始就采用后进先出制的存货评价方式，那时可可亚每磅是50 美分，
到了1954 年可可亚因为暂时缺货价格大涨至64 美分，因此Rockwood 想要
把帐上价值不菲的可可亚存货在价格滑落之前变卖掉，但若是直接将这批货卖
掉，所得的收益可能要支付50% 左右的税金，但1954 的税务法令及时公布，
其中有一项不太为人知的规定，就是如果企业不是把这些存货卖掉而是直接分配
给股东间接减少营运规模的话，就可以免税，因此Rockwood 决定停止其贩卖
可可亚奶油的业务，并将1,300 万磅的可可亚豆子发还给股东，同时公司也愿
意以可可亚豆子换买回部份股份，换算下来，每股可以换得80 磅的豆子。

The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an
arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO
profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a
plan reducing the scope of a corporation�r business. Rockwood
decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa
butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory
was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company
offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans
it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.
For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and
made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock
certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and
my only expense was subway tokens.

有好几个礼拜我整天忙着买进股票、换豆子，再把豆子拿去卖，并常常跑到
Schroeder 信托公司拿着股票凭证换取仓库保管单，获利算下来还不错，而唯一
的成本费用就是地铁车票。

The architect of Rockwood�r restructuring was an unknown,
but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you�qe
familiar with Jay�r subsequent record, you won�s be surprised to
hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood�r continuing
shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly
after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though
the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes
there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

Rockwood 改造计划的规划者是32 岁没有名气但相当优秀的芝加哥人Jay
Pritzker ，若你知道Jay 后来的记录，你应该就不会讶异这个动作对于公司股东
有多大的益处了，在这项提议推出不久之后，虽然公司营运呈现亏损，但
Rockwood 的股价却从15 美元涨到100 美元，有时股票的价格会远远超过合
理的本益比之外。

In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved
takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever
rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with
bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered
mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the
trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been �~eing
There.?In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: �刬ve a
man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to
arbitrage and you feed him forever.?(If, however, he studied at
the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state
institution that supplies his meals.)

近几年来，大部分的套利操作都牵涉到购并案，不管是友善的或是敌意的皆然，
在购并案狂热之时，几乎感觉不到托拉斯法的存在，投标的竞价履创天价，在当
时套利客大行其道，在这行不需要太多的才能，唯一的技巧就像是Peter Sellers
的电影那样，只要轧一脚就行，华尔街有一句经过改编的俗话，给一个人一条鱼，
你只能养活他一餐，教他如何套利，却可以养活他一辈子，( 当然要是他到学校
学习套利，可能就要靠州政府过活了)

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four
questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will
indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What
chance is there that something still better will transpire - a
competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if
the event does not take place because of anti-trust action,
financing glitches, etc.?

在评估套利活动时，你必须要能回答四个问题(1) 已公布的事件有多少可能性确
实会发生?(2) 你的资金总计要投入多久?(3) 有多少可能更好的结果会发生，例如
购并竞价提高(4) 因为反托拉斯或是财务意外状况发生导致购并案触礁的机率有
多高?

Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage
experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business.
On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle
to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR),
then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the
printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing
going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to
10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to
expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9
million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata
was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed
the interest rate that should apply to the period between the
taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling
legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a
much higher and compounded rate.

Arcata 公司我们最曲折离奇的购并经验，说明了企业的曲曲折折，1981 年9
月28 日该公司的董事同意将公司卖给KKR 公司，一家在当时同时也是现在最
大的融资买断公司，Arcata 所从事的是印刷与森林产品，但其中值得注意的是
在1978 年美国政府决定征收该公司所有10,700 公顷的红木林，以扩增国家公
园的范围，为此政府决定分期支付该公司总金额9,790 万美元的征收款，但
Arcata 公司却认为金额太少，同时双方也对适用的利率也争议，Arcata 极力争
取更高的赔偿金与适用的利率。

Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized
claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the
claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this
problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of
any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood
lands.

买下一家具有高度争议的公司将会让公司在谈判过程中，会增加许多的难度，不
管诉讼案件是不利或是有利于公司皆然，为了化解这个难题，KKR 决定支付
Arcata 每股37 美元再加上政府额外赔偿款的三分之二，作为购并的条件。

Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask
ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since,
among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining
�Oatisfactory financing.?A clause of this kind is always
dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor
whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we
were not particularly worried about this possibility because
KKR�r past record for closing had been good.

在评估过这项投资机会之后，我们自问KKR 能否真正完成这项交易的关键在于
他们是否能够顺利取得融资，这对卖方来说永远是风险最高的一项条款，追求者
在提出求婚到正式结婚的这段期间，要落跑是很容易的一件事，不过在这个案子
我们却不太担心，原因在于KKR 过去的记录还算不错。

We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR
deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably
comfortable: Arcata�r management and directors had been shopping
the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell.
If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though
of course, the price might be lower.

我们还必须扪心自问若是KKR 真的失败会如何，在这点我们觉得还好，Arcata
的董事会与经营阶层已经在外兜售好一段时间了，显示该公司却有决心要出售，
如果KKR 跑掉，Arcata 一定还会再找新的买主，当然届时的价格可能会差一点。

Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim
might be worth. Your Chairman, who can�s tell an elm from an
oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim
at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.

最后我们还必须问自己，那块红木林的价值到底有多少？坦白说我虽然个人连榆
树跟橡木都分不出来，但对于这个问题我的处理方式倒很简单，反正就是介于零
到一大笔钱之间就对了。

We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on
September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares,
or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the
$37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything
had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of
return of about 40% - not counting the redwood claim, which would
have been frosting.

后来我们开始从九月开始以每股33.5 元买进Arcata 股票，八个礼拜之内总共
买进40 万股，约占该公司5% 的股权，隔年一月第一次对外公布股东每股可以
拿到37 元，换算年投资报酬约为40% ，这还不包含可以的红木林赔偿损失。

All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that
the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive
agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our
stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our
holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our
willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been
postponed - reflected our leaning toward �� whole lot?rather
than �Vero?for the redwoods.

然而过程中不太顺利，到了12 月宣布交易可能会延后，尽管如果1 月铁定会签
约，受到这项鼓励，我们决定再加码以38 元每股至65.5 万股，约7% 的股权，
我们的努力终于获得回报，虽然有点拖延，但结果却相当令人满意。

Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a
�Oecond look?at financing terms ?in view of the severely
depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata�r outlook.?
The stockholders?meeting was postponed again, to April. An
Arcata spokesman said he �@id not think the fate of the
acquisition itself was imperiled.?When arbitrageurs hear such
reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: �卐 lied like
a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.?

接着在2 月25 日融资银行说有鉴于房地产景气不佳，连带对Arcata 的前景可
能有所疑虑，故有关融资条件可能还要再谈，股东临时会也因此再度延期到四月
举行，同时Arcata 公司发言人表示他不认为购并案已触礁，但是当套利客听到
这种重申时，脑中便闪过一句老话︰他说谎的方式就好像是即将面临汇率崩盘的
财政部长一样。

On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn�s work, first
cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to
$35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down
and accepted another group�r offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any
redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the
$37.50 was paid on June 4.

3 月12 日KKR 宣布先前的约定无效，并将报价砍至33.5 美元一股，两天后再
调高至35 美元，然而到了3 月15 日董事会拒绝了这项提议，并接受另一家集
团37.5 美元外加红木林一半的收益，股东会迅速通过这项交易，并于6 月4 日
收到现金。

We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million;
our average holding period was close to six months. Considering
the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of
return excluding any value for the redwood claim - was more than
satisfactory.

总计我们花了近六个月的时间，投资2,290 万美元，最后收回2,460 万美元，
但若是加计这项交易中间所经历的风风雨雨，则15% 的年报酬率( 未包含红木林
潜在收益) 还算令人满意。

But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two
commissions, one to look at the timber�r value, the other to
consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first
commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the
second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of
return working out to about 14%.

不过好戏还在后头，承审法院指派两个委员会来解决这项纷争，一个负责认定红
木林的价值，一个则负责应该适用的利率，隔年1 月委员会认定红木林的价值
为2.75 亿美元，适用的复利率应为14% 。

In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which
meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata.
The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this
appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million.
Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or
about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.

到了八月法官裁定这项决议，这代表政府需要再支付高达6 亿美元的赔偿金，
联邦政府立刻提出上诉，而就在上诉即将宣判结果时，双方以5.19 亿美元达成
和解，因此我们又额外收到1,930 万美元，相当于每股29.48 美元的大红包，
之后还可以再拿到80 万美元的进帐。

Berkshire�r arbitrage activities differ from those of many
arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually
very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into
a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many
irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring
both the progress of deals and the market movements of the
related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our
lives. (What�r the sense in getting rich just to stare at a
ticker tape all day?)

Berkshire 的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先相较于一般套利客一年从事
好几十个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案，有这么多锅子同时在
煮，他们必须花很多时间在监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查
理跟我想要过的生活方式，( 为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义?)

Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable
or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from
arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation.
So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we
will - and when it happens we�kl report the gory details to you.

也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会
大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，Berkshire 还没有遇到
什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。

The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is
that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly
announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover
candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of
the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.

另有一点不同的是我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或
是去预测可能被购并的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判
断的可能性做决定。

At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000
shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market
value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to
roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our
position. About three million shares were accepted when we
tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the
returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax
profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是334.2 万股的RJR Nabisco ，投资成本
2.82 亿美元，目前市价3.04 亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到400 万股，接
着在二月全部出清。有300 万股是KKR 决定购并RJR 后，我们卖给KKR 的，
获利6,400 万美元略高于预期。

Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding
contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that
made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; �唗 was deja vu
all over again.?

稍早之前，另外一个竞争对手Jay Pritzker- 第一波士顿集团浮现加入对RJR 的
竞争行列，提出以租税规划为导向的提案，套句Yogi Berra 的说法: 这感觉识曾
相识！

During most of the time when we normally would have been
purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted
because of Salomon�r participation in a bidding group.
Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon,
are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition
work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would
do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit
Berkshire�r arbitrage operations.

大部分的时间我们买进RJR 相当大的限制，由于我们在也是竞争者的所罗兄公司
有投资，虽然查理跟我都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与整个购并案的所有信息隔
绝，而我们认为这样也好，额外的信息对我们不见得就有好处，事实上，有时还
会妨碍到Berkshire 进行套利的投资。

However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon
proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be
fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire�r purchases of
RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days
immediately following management�r announcement of buyout plans,
before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the
RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could
not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire
significant money.

然而由于所罗门的提案规模相当的大，以致于所有的董事都必须完全被知会并参
与，因此Berkshire 总共只有两个时点可以进行买进RJR 的动作，第一次是当
RJR 经营阶层宣布整个购并计划的几天内，当时所罗门还未宣布加入竞标，另外
是后来RJR 董事会决定优先考虑KKR 的提案，也因为所罗门的董事职务，使得
Berkshire 的投资成本大大提高。

Considering Berkshire�r good results in 1988, you might
expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect
to be on the sidelines.

看到1988 年如此丰硕的套利成果，你可能会觉得我们应该继续朝这方面加强，
但事实上，我们决定采取观望的态度。

One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down -
because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a
very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this
report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment
about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they
reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for
specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never
will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest
rates, or business activity will be a year from now.

一个好的理由是因为我们决定大幅提高在长期股权方面的投资，所以目前的现金
水位已经下降，常常读我们年报的人可能都知道，我们的决定不是基于短期股市
的表现，反而我们注重的是个别企业的长期经济展望，我们从来没有、以后也不
会对短期股市、利率或企业活动做任何的评论。

Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in
arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in
the takeover field. As Dorothy says: �憃to, I have a feeling
we�qe not in Kansas any more.?

然而就算是我们现金满满，我们在1989 年可能也不会从事太多的套利交易，购
并市场的发展已经有点过头了，就像桃乐斯所说的: 「奥图，我觉得我们好像已
经不是在堪萨斯市了！」

We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we
know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and
buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence
with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence
with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire
to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in
our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and
lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb
Stein: �唂 something can�s go on forever, it will end.?

我们不太确定这种过热的现象会持续多久，包含参与热潮的政府、金主与买家的
态度会如何转变，不过我们可以确定的是，当别人越没有信心参与这些活动时，
我们的信心也就越高，我们不愿意参与那些反应买方与金主无可救药的乐观，通
常我们认为那是无保障的，在此我们宁愿注重Herb Stein 的智慧，若一件事不
能持久不衰，那么它终将结束。

Efficient Market Theory
效率市场理论

The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small
discussion of �Afficient market theory?(EMT) also seem relevant.
This doctrine became highly fashionable - indeed, almost holy
scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it
said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public
information about them was appropriately reflected in their
prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a
corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone
throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio
having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest,
most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced
not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and
corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market
was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly
that it was always efficient. The difference between these
propositions is night and day.

前面提到的套利活动使得我们有必要讨论一下市场效率理论，这理论在近年来变
得非常热门，尤其在1970 年代的学术圈被奉为圣旨，基本上它认为分析股票是
没有用的，因为所有公开的信息皆已反应在其股价之上，换句话说，市场永远知
道所有的事，学校教市场效率理论的教授因此做了一个推论，比喻说任何一个人
射飞镖随机所选出来的股票组合可以媲美，华尔街最聪明、最努力的证券分析师
所选出来的投资组合，令人惊讶的是市场效率理论不但为学术界所拥抱，更被许
多投资专家与企业经理人所接受，正确地观察到市场往往是具有效率的，他们却
继续下了错误的结论，市场永远都具有效率，这中间的假设差异，简直有天壤之
别。

In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience
of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire
illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There�r plenty of other
evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its
earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of
the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year.
Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham�r arbitrage principles,
first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I�ue not
made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that
the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I
operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben�r; he had
1929-1932 to contend with.)

就我个人的看法，就我个人过去在葛拉罕- 纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙企业与
Berkshire 公司连续63 年的套利经验，说明了效率市场理论有多么的愚蠢( 当然
还有其它一堆证据) ，当初在葛拉罕- 纽曼公司上班时，我将该公司1926 年到
1956 年的套利成果做了一番研究，每年平均20% 的投资报酬率，之后从1956
年开始我在巴菲特合伙企业与之后的Berkshire 公司，运用葛拉罕的套利原则，
虽然我并没有仔细地去算，但1956 年到1988 年间的投资报酬率应该也有超过
20% ，( 当然之后的投资环境比起葛拉罕当时要好的许多，因为当时他遇到过
1929-1932 年的景气大萧条) 。

All of the conditions are present that are required for a
fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations
traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-
year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate
experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or
develop keen insights about products or managements - we simply
acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage
positions were a clearly identified universe - they have not been
selected by hindsight.

所有的条件皆以具备来公平测试投资组合的表现(1) 三个公司63 年来买卖了上
百种不同的股票证券(2) 结果应该不会因为某个特别好的个案所扭曲(3) 我们不需
要故意隐瞒事实或是宣扬我们的产品优秀或是经营者眼光独到，我们只是从事高
度公开的个案(4) 我们的套利部份可以很容易就被追查到，他们并不是事后才特
别挑选出来的

Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a
10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000 would
have grown to $405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20%
rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That
strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that
might, conceivably, arouse one�r curiosity.

过去63 年来，大盘整体的投资报酬( 加计股利) 大概只有10% ，意思是说若当初
投入1,000 美元的话，现在可以获得405,000 美元，但是若投资报酬率改为
20% 的话，现在却会变成9,700 万美元，统计上如此大的差异使得我们不禁好
奇的想要怀疑，然而理论支持者从来就不会去注意理论与现实如此地不相符，确
实现在他们讲话已不如过去那么大声，但据我所知却没有任何一个人愿意承认错
误，不管他们已经误导了多少个学生，市场效率理论还是继续在各个企管名校间
列为投资课程的重要教材之一，很显然的，死不悔改、甚而曲解神意，不是只有
神学家才做的出来。

Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in
discordant evidence of this type. True, they don�s talk quite as
much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my
knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many
thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT,
moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment
curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance
to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not
limited to theologians.
Naturally the disservice done students and gullible
investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an
extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In
any sort of a contest - financial, mental, or physical - it�r an
enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that
it�r useless to even try. From a selfish point of view,
Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual
teaching of EMT.

自然而然，这些遇人不淑的学生与被骗的投资专家在接受市场效率理论后，对于
我们与其它葛拉罕的追随者实在有莫大的帮助，在任何的竞赛中，不管是投资、
心智或是体能方面，要是遇到对手被告知思考与尝试是没有用的，对我们来说等
于是占尽了优势，从一个自私的观点来看，葛拉罕学派应该祈祷市场效率理论
能够在校园中永为流传。

All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has
looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that
guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of
any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of
the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-
year period, many more were foregone because they seemed
properly-priced.

说了那么多，最后还是要提出一个警告，最近套利看起来相当容易，但它却不是
永远都保证有20% 报酬的投资活动，现在的市场比起过去来的有效率许多，除
了我们过去63 年所真正掌握的套利活动之外，还有更多是因为价格合理而因此
被舍弃掉的。

An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by
simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He
can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously
exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per
se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by
throwing darts.

一个投资者很难只靠单一一种投资类别或投资风格而创造超人的利益，他只能靠
着仔细评估事实并持续地遵照原则才能赚取超额利润，就套利投资本身而言，并
没有比选择利用飞镖选股的策略好到哪里去。

New York Stock Exchange Listing
纽约证券交易所挂牌

Berkshire�r shares were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the
letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.

Berkshire 的股份于1988 年11 月29 日正式在纽约证券交易所挂牌，后面附
有我们写给股东有关挂牌的正式声明。

Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter:
Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any
number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.

除了那封信之外，我个人还有一点要说明，虽然我们在交易所的基本交易单位是
10 股，但只要是1 股以上还是一样可以进行买卖。

As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to
reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being
achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price
on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the
over-the-counter market.

另外如同信中所提到的，我们之所以决定挂牌的主要目的是要降低交易成本，而
我相信这目的也已经达到，一般来说，在NYSE 买卖之间的价差会比在柜台买卖
要来得小的多。

Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is
the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its
progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500 on
September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about
$625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks
second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased
when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with
the firm�r performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally
manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better
hands.

负责买卖Berkshire 股份的是Henderson 兄弟公司- 交易所中一家老牌专家，
它的前身William Thomas Henderson ，是在1861 年以500 块美金买下一个
交易所的席位( 最近一个席位的成交价大约是62.5 万美金) ，在所有54 家交易
公司当中，HBI 共被分配到第二多的83 种股票，我们很高兴Berkshire 能够被
分配给HBI 负责交易，到目前为止对于他们的服务感到相当满意，该公司负责人
Jim Maguire 亲自负责Berkshire 的交易，他是我们可以找到的最佳人选。

In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from
those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to
maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish
instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic
business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable - or,
better yet, unreasonable - rate). Charlie and I are bothered as
much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation.
Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many
shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire�r business
results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors
business value, each of our shareholders will receive an
investment result that roughly parallels the business results of
Berkshire during his holding period.

有两点是我们与其它挂牌公司最大不同的地方，第一我们不希望Berkshire 的股
价过高，主要是希望它能够反应的实质价值范围内交易( 当然我们希望实质价值
能够以合理的速度增加，当然能够不合理的增加更好) ，查理跟我都不希望，股
价被过分高估或是被过分低估，两者都会使Berkshire 的股东的获利与公司本身
经营获利状况不相当，所以如果Berkshire 的股价持续地反应企业实质的价值，
则我们可以确定每个股东在他持有公司股份的期间所获得的利益，都能与公司本
身营运的获利成等比。

Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran
a private business with a few passive partners, we would be
disappointed if those partners, and their replacements,
frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public
company, we feel the same way.

第二我们希望交易量越少越好，如果我们经营的是一家只有几位合伙人的私人企
业，我们也不希望合伙人时常进进出出合伙事业，经营一家公开上市公司也是同
样的道理。

Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of
purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan
instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don�s understand the
CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved
only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other
organization - school, club, church, etc. - do leaders cheer when
members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood
depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you
could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of
activity, as in: �慼ere hasn�s been much going on in Christianity
for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.?

我们希望能够吸引具有远见的投资人，在买进股份时，抱着打算与我们永远同在
而不是订有卖出价格的时间表，我们实在不能理解为何有公司的CEO 希望自己
公司的股份交易量越多越好，这代表公司的股东组合会变来变去，在其它如学
校、俱乐部、教堂等社会机构当中，没有主持人希望自己的组织成员离开的，( 然
而偏偏就有营业员就是要靠着说服成员离开组织来维生，你有没有听过有人劝你
反正最近基督教也没有什么搞头，不如下礼拜大家改信佛教试一试) 。

Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell
from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay
them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies,
performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who
understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure
us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this
sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be
uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic
expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at
prices reasonably related to business value.

当然还是有些Berkshire 股东需要或是想要偶尔把他持有的股份卖掉，而我们希
望能够找到合适的人以适当的价格来接手，因此我们试着透过我们的政策、表现
与沟通，吸引真正了解我们营运、认同我们理念并用同样的方式来对待我们的新
股东，如果我们能够持续地吸引这种类型的股东，同时很重要的，让那些短视近
利的投资人远离我们，相信Berkshire 一定能够持续地以合理的价格交易买卖。

David L. Dodd
戴维．托德

Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last
year at age 93. Most of you don�s know of him. Yet any long-
time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of
the indirect influence he had upon our company.

与我相交38 年亦师亦友的戴维．托德，于去年以高龄93 岁过世，大多数的人
可能都不知道他是谁，但是许多Berkshire 的老股东却因为他对本公司的间接影
响而受益良多。

Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and
he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the
moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and
educated me; one influence was as important as the other.
Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made
sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my
education right up until his death.

戴维终其一生在哥伦比亚大学教书，同时他也与葛拉罕合作著述「证券分析」一
书，自从我到哥伦比亚之后，戴维不时地鼓励与教导我，给我的影响一个接着一
个，他所教导我的很一件事，不论是直接或透过他的著作都非常有道理，后来毕
业后，透过不断往来的信件，他给我的教育持续到他逝世之前。

I have known many professors of finance and investments but
I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match
of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students:
No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have
achieved unusual success.

我认识许多财经与投资学的教授，除了葛拉罕以外，没有人可以比得上戴维，最
好的证明就是他学生的成绩，没有其它投资学的教授可以造就出那么多杰出的英
才。

When students left Dave�r classroom, they were equipped to
invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he
taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these
may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles
embodying them has been rare.

当学生离开戴维的教室，就代表着他们一生将具备有投资智慧，因为他所教导的
原则是如此的简单、完整有用且持久，虽然这些特点看起来并不显著，但要将这
些原则教导给学生却不是一件容易的事。

It�r particularly impressive that Dave could practice as
well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his
academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed,
his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began
as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory)
and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was
right from the start.

让我印象最深刻的是戴维总是言行一致，就像凯因斯运用自己研究出的学术观点
来致富，戴维也是如此。事实上他在财务操作上的表现远比凯因斯来得出色，凭
借着企业与信用循环理论，之后再演变成价值投资，戴维一开始就选择了正确的
方向。

In Berkshire�r investments, Charlie and I have employed the
principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the
fruit of their intellectual tree.

查理跟我运用戴维与葛拉罕所教的原则，在Berkshire 的投资之上，我们的成功
正代表着他们心血的结晶。

Miscellaneous
其它事项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones
we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that
fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以透过大家的协
助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我，

Here�r what we�qe looking for:
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections
are of little interest to us, nor are �Purnaround?
situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing
little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can�s supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there�r lots of technology, we won�s
understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don�s want to waste our time or that
of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a
transaction when price is unknown).

我们想要找
(1) 巨额交易( 每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)
(2) 持续稳定获利( 我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3) 高股东报酬率( 并且甚少举债)
(4) 具备管理阶层( 我们无法提供)
(5) 简单的企业( 若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6) 合理的价格( 在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣( 通常不超过
五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样
多，否则不考虑发行股份。
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B 太太- Heldman 家族那样，公司经营者希望
能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往
常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意
的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we�qe interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive
as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-
Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company�r owner-
managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes
for themselves, but often for their families or inactive
shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain
significant owners who continue to run their companies just as
they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit
for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to
check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business
in the past.
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions
that don�s come close to meeting our tests: We�ue found that if
you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will
call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in
new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be
expressed by another Goldwynism: �峫ease include me out.?

另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍
卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆
人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有高德温的另一句话
可以形容，请把我排除在外。

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as
described above, we are also interested in the negotiated
purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock
comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a
special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-
term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股
份，就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个Case 一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买
所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。
* * *
We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard &
Poor�r raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest
rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property-
casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.

几个礼拜以前，我们接到了一个好消息，史坦普评等机构将我们的债信等级调高
的三A 的最高标准，相较于1980 年的28 家，目前全美只有15 家公司可以拥
有此殊荣。

Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few
years from �Avent risk.?This term refers to the overnight
degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged
purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial
policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of
takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations
present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise
bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.

过去几年企业公司债的持有人在事件风险上跌了一大跤，意思是说一家原本财务
操作保守的公司，因为进行高杠杆购并或是重整再造，使得公司在一夜之间被大
幅调降信用评等，购并的世界之中，除了少数经营权与所有权一致的公司之外，
大部分的公司都会面临这样的风险，但Berkshire 绝对不会，查理跟我保证给债
券持有人与股东一样的承诺。
* * *
About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in
Berkshire�r 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program.
Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319
charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business
results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.

大约有97.4% 的有效股权参与1988 年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约500万美
元捐出的款项分配给2,319 家慈善机构，若经营情况许可，我们计划在1989年
扩大这项捐赠计划。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we
strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are
registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee
name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered
on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在
未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是
受托人的名下，必须在1989 年9 月30 日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1989
年的计划。
* * *
Berkshire�r annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday,
April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides
the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may
have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing
with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have
been dealt with.

今年的股东会将在1989 年4 月24 日星期一在奥玛哈举行，我们希望大家都能
来参加，这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一
直回答到所有股东都满意为止( 除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的
人)
After the meeting we will have several buses available to
take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike
Friedman at Borsheim�r. Be prepared for bargains.

会后我们将安排几台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到B 太太的家具广场与波仙珠宝
店，准备大捡便宜货吧！
Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B
during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday
hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely
allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the
store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is
not open on Sunday.

外地来的股东可以会选择提早一点来，B 太太的店星期天会从中午开到下午五
点，只有五个小时可能不够B 太太暖身，她可能希望还是能够像平日一样从早上
10 点到晚上9 点，另外波仙珠宝星期天并不开门营业。

Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet
prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how
she does it: �� can sell so cheap �哸use I work for this dummy
who doesn�s know anything about carpet.?

记得问B 太太地毯价格为什么会如此便宜的秘密，她一定会向跟所有人一样地偷
偷跟你讲她是如何办到的，( 我之所以能够卖的这么便宜是因为我的老板对于地
毯根本就一无所知！)

Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1989 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1989 年2 月28 日

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